Wilber Bonilla-Flores v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Wilber Bonilla-Flores v. Loretta E. Lynch

621 F. App'x 379

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 22, 2015

Docket10-73832

StatusUnpublished

This text of 621 F. App'x 379 (Wilber Bonilla-Flores v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Wilber Bonilla-Flores v. Loretta E. Lynch, 621 F. App'x 379 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Wilber Arnulfo Bonilla-Flores, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006). We review de novo questions of law. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.2004). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Bonilla-Flores failed to establish past mistreatment or a fear of future mistreatment .on account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (“to demonstrate that a protected ground was ‘at least once central reason’ for persecution, an applicant must prove that such ground was a cause of the persecutors’ acts”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal dispute is not a ground for asylum unless .connected to a protected ground). We lack jurisdiction to review Bonilla-Flores’ contentions regarding his perceived sexual orientation because he failed to exhaust them before the BIA. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78. Thus, we deny Bonilla-Flores’ petition as to his asylum and withholding of removal claims. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir.2010).

*380 Finally, we reject Bonilla-Flores contention that the BIA erred in finding his CAT claim waived for failure to present any factual or legal argument on appeal to the Board. We lack jurisdiction over Bon-illa-Flores’ contention that the IJ erred in failing to consider the merits of his CAT claim because he did not raise this contention before the BIA. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Wilber Arnulfo Bonilla-Flores, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006). We review de novo questions of law. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.2004). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Bonilla-Flores failed to establish past mistreatment or a fear of future mistreatment .on account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (“to demonstrate that a protected ground was ‘at least once central reason’ for persecution, an applicant must prove that such ground was a cause of the persecutors’ acts”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal dispute is not a ground for asylum unless .connected to a protected ground). We lack jurisdiction to review Bonilla-Flores’ contentions regarding his perceived sexual orientation because he failed to exhaust them before the BIA. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78. Thus, we deny Bonilla-Flores’ petition as to his asylum and withholding of removal claims. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir.2010).

*380 Finally, we reject Bonilla-Flores contention that the BIA erred in finding his CAT claim waived for failure to present any factual or legal argument on appeal to the Board. We lack jurisdiction over Bon-illa-Flores’ contention that the IJ erred in failing to consider the merits of his CAT claim because he did not raise this contention before the BIA. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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