Wikle v. City of Rapid City

347 N.W.2d 584, 1984 S.D. LEXIS 286
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedApril 25, 1984
DocketNo. 14199
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 347 N.W.2d 584 (Wikle v. City of Rapid City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wikle v. City of Rapid City, 347 N.W.2d 584, 1984 S.D. LEXIS 286 (S.D. 1984).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a circuit court order affirming a magistrate court order directing Lee S. Wikle to pay his $55.00 speeding ticket in “legal tender Federal Reserve Notes.” Wikle earlier refused to pay the fine until the magistrate court denominated the method of payment. We affirm.

Wikle argues that federal reserve notes discharge obligations but do not pay debts since gold and silver coin has “substance” and is the only “lawfull [sic] money” that can be used to pay his fine. Because the magistrate court ordered him to pay his fine in federal reserve notes rather than gold and silver coin, Wikle argues that the order is void.

This Court faced and resolved a similar contention in City of Colton v. Corbly, 323 N.W.2d 138, 139 (S.D.1982):

She argues that since federal reserve notes are not redeemable in specie, payment of the fee violates art. 1, § 10 of the federal constitution, which provides: “No state shall ... make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.... ”
Although art. 1, § 10 constitutes a limitation on the power of the states, the constitution does not limit Congress’ power to declare what shall be' legal tender for all debts. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 446-50, 4 S.Ct. 122, 128-31, 28 L.Ed. 204, 213-15 (1884). Congress has declared that federal reserve notes constitute legal tender for all debts. 31 U.S.C. § 392 (1976). In recognition of established legal principle, we conclude that appellant’s contention regarding payment of the fee is without merit, [citations omitted]

We further elaborated in First National Bank of Black Hills v. Treadway, 339 N.W.2d 119, 120 (S.D.1983):

First, it has long been recognized that Congress has the power, under art. I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, to establish a uniform legal tender for payment of debts. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204 (1884). The mere utilization of a standard of tender prescribed by Congress is not state action as prohibited by art. I, [585]*585§ 10; it is an effectuation of validly exercised Congressional power under art. I, § 8. Since Congress has declared that federal reserve notes constitute legal tender for all debts, appellants’ claim that the fee must be paid in gold or silver before the circuit court has jurisdiction is without merit. Chermack v. Bjornson, 302 Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 915, 95 S.Ct. 1573, 43 L.Ed.2d 780 (1975); City of Colton v. Corbly, 323 N.W.2d 138 (S.D.1982).

Consequently, the order is affirmed.

31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1983), formerly 31 U.S.C. § 392 (1976), provides:

United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts.

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Related

State v. Dale
439 N.W.2d 98 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
347 N.W.2d 584, 1984 S.D. LEXIS 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wikle-v-city-of-rapid-city-sd-1984.