Wiggins v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: 529, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NAKIA U. WIGGINS, § § No. 529, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. K1607000037 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: March 5, 2025 Decided: April 11, 2025

Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Nakia U. Wiggins, filed this appeal from his sentencing

for a violation of probation (“VOP”). The State has moved to affirm the judgment

below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this

appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) In August 2019, Wiggins pleaded guilty to drug dealing cocaine in a

Tier IV quantity. The Superior Court sentenced Wiggins to twenty-five years of

imprisonment, suspended after three years and nine months for nine months of Level IV Work Release, followed by eighteen months of Level III probation with GPS

monitoring.

(3) On November 25, 2024, the Superior Court found Wiggins in violation

of probation for a third time. The court sentenced him, effective September 18,

2024, to nineteen years, eleven months, and twenty-four days of imprisonment,

suspended for one year of Level IV DOC Discretion, followed by one year of Level

III probation with GPS monitoring.

(4) Wiggins has appealed to this Court. His arguments are difficult to

discern, but it appears that he contends that (i) the VOP proceedings were

procedurally improper and (ii) the court did not “completely” follow the probation

officer’s sentencing recommendation. The VOP report recommended a sentence of

twenty years of imprisonment, suspended after one year for one year of Level III

with GPS monitoring.

(5) We find no reversible error. “It is well-established that appellate review

of sentences is extremely limited.”1 Our review of a sentence generally ends upon a

determination that the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the

legislature.2 When sentencing a defendant for a VOP, the trial court may impose

any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time

1 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006). 2 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 2 remaining to be served on the prior sentence.3 Wiggins does not contend that the

sentence imposed exceeded the Level V time remaining on his sentence.

(6) As to the claim of procedural impropriety, Wiggins has not sufficiently

described the nature of the alleged impropriety to enable appellate review. To the

extent that he asserts that he did not receive notice of the VOP hearing, his claim is

inconsistent with the record. The docket reflects that after the VOP report and

administrative warrant were filed on September 19, 2024, a VOP hearing was

scheduled for October 7. Then, on October 7, 2024, the VOP hearing was continued

at the defense’s request. Thus, the record reflects that Wiggins had notice of the

VOP proceedings.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice

3 11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005). 3