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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DARWIN W., CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05270-GJL 11 Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 12 APPEAL ORDER COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.
15 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and Local 16 Magistrate Judge Rule 13. See also Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, 17 Dkt. 2. This matter has been fully briefed. See Dkts. 9, 11, 14. 18 Having considered the administrative record (AR) and all memoranda, the Court 19 concludes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in finding Plaintiff not disabled. 20 Accordingly, this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative 21 proceedings. 22 // 23 // 24 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Plaintiff’s application Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) was denied initially and 3 following reconsideration. AR 66–87. Plaintiff’s requested hearing was held before the ALJ on 4 October 2, 2024. AR 34–65. On November 26, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision
5 concluding Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 14–33. On February 4, 2025, the Appeals Council 6 declined Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 7 decision subject to judicial review. AR 1–6. On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this 8 Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 5. Defendant filed the sealed AR in this 9 matter on June 2, 2025. Dkt. 7. 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff was born in 1971 and was 51 years old on April 14, 2022, his alleged date of 12 disability onset. AR 17, 28. Plaintiff has at least a high school education. AR 28. According to 13 the ALJ, Plaintiff suffers from, at a minimum, the severe impairments of degenerative disc 14 disease, trauma, asthma, and osteoarthritis. AR 19. However, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not
15 disabled because he had the following Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): 16 to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the individual can frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The individual can 17 tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold, and to workplace vibration. The individual can tolerate occasional exposure to atmospheric conditions as defined in 18 Selected Characteristics of Occupations. The individual can tolerate occasional exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights and exposed, moving 19 machinery. The individual can perform simple and moderately complex tasks, consistent with a reasoning level of 5 or less. 20 AR 21–22. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 23 benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 24 1 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 2 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 3 In his opening brief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in considering the medical opinion of 4 Ryan Castro, D.C., and his subjective symptom testimony. Dkt. 9.
5 A. Dr. Castro’s Opinion 6 Treating chiropractor Dr. Castro completed an opinion in May 2023. AR 573–79. He 7 opined Plaintiff could stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday; could sit about 8 three hours in an eight-hour workday; and needed to change positions between sitting and 9 standing every 20 minutes. AR 576. He explained Plaintiff “should switch positions every 20 10 minutes to avoid further injuring his back. If [Plaintiff] does not move frequently he will begin to 11 stiffen up.” AR 577. He also opined Plaintiff could not lift more than 30 pounds (but could lift up 12 to 10 pounds frequently) and would be absent more than four times per month. AR 577–78. 13 For applications, like Plaintiff's, filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs need not “defer or give 14 any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to” particular medical opinions,
15 including those of treating or examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, ALJs 16 must consider every medical opinion in the record and evaluate each opinion's persuasiveness, 17 considering each opinion's “supportability” and “consistency,” and, under some circumstances, 18 other factors. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)– 19 (c). Supportability concerns how a medical source supports a medical opinion with relevant 20 evidence, while consistency concerns how a medical opinion is consistent with other evidence 21 from medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2). 22 The ALJ found Dr. Castro’s opinion unpersuasive because it was: 23 inconsistent with and unsupported by the treatment records and the consultative examination. Examination often showed no focal neurological deficits with normal 24 1 motor strength and normal sensation bilaterally, and a normal, unremarkable gait [AR 613, 617, 933, 1167, 1587, 1726–27]. However, at times, the claimant also 2 exhibited a painful but only mildly reduced thoracic and lumbar ranges of motion and thoracic and lumbar tenderness, as well as bilateral hip tenderness [see AR 3 374–461, 933–34]. Further, the chiropractic progress notes show that the claimant’s condition/pain was improving as he was reporting less discomfort overall [AR 374, 4 389, 391, 395, 402, 411, 413, 426, 435]. These findings are consistent with the claimant being capable of medium exertional work with some postural and 5 environmental precautions.
6 AR 25–26. 7 These were inadequate reasons for rejecting Dr. Castro’s medical opinion. Dr. Castro 8 explained that his opined limitations in sitting, walking, standing, and lifting were prophylactic 9 measures intended to prevent Plaintiff’s back from stiffening and causing pain-related symptoms. 10 See AR 576–77. For this reason, the lack of deficits in strength, sensation, and gait are not 11 inconsistent with the prophylactic limitations opined by Dr. Castro. 12 With respect to Plaintiff’s improvement, most of the evidence cited by the ALJ does not 13 show significant improvement; some of it reflects worsening and exacerbation by movement; 14 and much of it is in the context of his ability to perform reduced-duty work or in the context of 15 him not working. See AR 389 (“treatment has been helping to reduce his symptoms but as soon 16 as he gets to work and has to sit in the booth, his complaints become re-aggravated”), 391 17 (gradually improving), 395 (“He reports he has constant sharp, shooting, burning, and radiating 18 pain from his low back upward on the right side toward his medial scapular area. He rates this 19 pain as 6/10 . . . and reports it is better with movement, but not too much activity.
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DARWIN W., CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05270-GJL 11 Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 12 APPEAL ORDER COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.
15 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and Local 16 Magistrate Judge Rule 13. See also Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, 17 Dkt. 2. This matter has been fully briefed. See Dkts. 9, 11, 14. 18 Having considered the administrative record (AR) and all memoranda, the Court 19 concludes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in finding Plaintiff not disabled. 20 Accordingly, this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative 21 proceedings. 22 // 23 // 24 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Plaintiff’s application Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) was denied initially and 3 following reconsideration. AR 66–87. Plaintiff’s requested hearing was held before the ALJ on 4 October 2, 2024. AR 34–65. On November 26, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision
5 concluding Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 14–33. On February 4, 2025, the Appeals Council 6 declined Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 7 decision subject to judicial review. AR 1–6. On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this 8 Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 5. Defendant filed the sealed AR in this 9 matter on June 2, 2025. Dkt. 7. 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff was born in 1971 and was 51 years old on April 14, 2022, his alleged date of 12 disability onset. AR 17, 28. Plaintiff has at least a high school education. AR 28. According to 13 the ALJ, Plaintiff suffers from, at a minimum, the severe impairments of degenerative disc 14 disease, trauma, asthma, and osteoarthritis. AR 19. However, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not
15 disabled because he had the following Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): 16 to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the individual can frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The individual can 17 tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold, and to workplace vibration. The individual can tolerate occasional exposure to atmospheric conditions as defined in 18 Selected Characteristics of Occupations. The individual can tolerate occasional exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights and exposed, moving 19 machinery. The individual can perform simple and moderately complex tasks, consistent with a reasoning level of 5 or less. 20 AR 21–22. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 23 benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 24 1 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 2 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 3 In his opening brief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in considering the medical opinion of 4 Ryan Castro, D.C., and his subjective symptom testimony. Dkt. 9.
5 A. Dr. Castro’s Opinion 6 Treating chiropractor Dr. Castro completed an opinion in May 2023. AR 573–79. He 7 opined Plaintiff could stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday; could sit about 8 three hours in an eight-hour workday; and needed to change positions between sitting and 9 standing every 20 minutes. AR 576. He explained Plaintiff “should switch positions every 20 10 minutes to avoid further injuring his back. If [Plaintiff] does not move frequently he will begin to 11 stiffen up.” AR 577. He also opined Plaintiff could not lift more than 30 pounds (but could lift up 12 to 10 pounds frequently) and would be absent more than four times per month. AR 577–78. 13 For applications, like Plaintiff's, filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs need not “defer or give 14 any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to” particular medical opinions,
15 including those of treating or examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, ALJs 16 must consider every medical opinion in the record and evaluate each opinion's persuasiveness, 17 considering each opinion's “supportability” and “consistency,” and, under some circumstances, 18 other factors. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)– 19 (c). Supportability concerns how a medical source supports a medical opinion with relevant 20 evidence, while consistency concerns how a medical opinion is consistent with other evidence 21 from medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2). 22 The ALJ found Dr. Castro’s opinion unpersuasive because it was: 23 inconsistent with and unsupported by the treatment records and the consultative examination. Examination often showed no focal neurological deficits with normal 24 1 motor strength and normal sensation bilaterally, and a normal, unremarkable gait [AR 613, 617, 933, 1167, 1587, 1726–27]. However, at times, the claimant also 2 exhibited a painful but only mildly reduced thoracic and lumbar ranges of motion and thoracic and lumbar tenderness, as well as bilateral hip tenderness [see AR 3 374–461, 933–34]. Further, the chiropractic progress notes show that the claimant’s condition/pain was improving as he was reporting less discomfort overall [AR 374, 4 389, 391, 395, 402, 411, 413, 426, 435]. These findings are consistent with the claimant being capable of medium exertional work with some postural and 5 environmental precautions.
6 AR 25–26. 7 These were inadequate reasons for rejecting Dr. Castro’s medical opinion. Dr. Castro 8 explained that his opined limitations in sitting, walking, standing, and lifting were prophylactic 9 measures intended to prevent Plaintiff’s back from stiffening and causing pain-related symptoms. 10 See AR 576–77. For this reason, the lack of deficits in strength, sensation, and gait are not 11 inconsistent with the prophylactic limitations opined by Dr. Castro. 12 With respect to Plaintiff’s improvement, most of the evidence cited by the ALJ does not 13 show significant improvement; some of it reflects worsening and exacerbation by movement; 14 and much of it is in the context of his ability to perform reduced-duty work or in the context of 15 him not working. See AR 389 (“treatment has been helping to reduce his symptoms but as soon 16 as he gets to work and has to sit in the booth, his complaints become re-aggravated”), 391 17 (gradually improving), 395 (“He reports he has constant sharp, shooting, burning, and radiating 18 pain from his low back upward on the right side toward his medial scapular area. He rates this 19 pain as 6/10 . . . and reports it is better with movement, but not too much activity. It is made 20 worse with inactivity and sitting[.]”), 402 (two days pain free), 411 (“having these past couple of 21 days off [from work] have been beneficial”), 413 (injuries flared up again), 435 (pain “has 22 decreased slightly”). Given this context, the evidence cited by the ALJ is not substantial evidence 23 24 1 showing Plaintiff’s improvement was such that prophylactic measures and other limitations were 2 unwarranted. 3 The ALJ also noted Dr. Castro was not an Acceptable Medical Source (AMS). AR 25. 4 But under the regulations applicable to this claim, a source need not be an AMS to submit a
5 medical opinion; they need only be a “medical source.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a), (d) 6 (distinguishing between AMS and medical source); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (“A medical 7 opinion is a statement from a medical source . . . .”); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5844 (Jan. 18, 8 2017) (under new regulations, “our adjudicators will articulate how they consider medical 9 opinions from all medical sources, regardless of whether or not the medical source is an AMS”). 10 A medical source includes “an individual who is licensed as a healthcare worker by a State and 11 working within the scope of practice permitted under State or Federal law,” 20 C.F.R. § 12 404.1513(d), encompassing a licensed chiropractor like Dr. Castro opining on restrictions posed 13 by a claimant’s orthopedic injuries, see Wash. Rev. Code §§ 18.25.005, 18.25.011. 14 Defendant contends Dr. Castro’s status as a non-AMS was relevant to the ALJ’s
15 supportability determination. Dkt. 11 at 3. The Court disagrees. Supportability considers the 16 extent to which the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by a medical source 17 support the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Such a standard is indiscriminate as to the sort 18 of medical source which is presenting those explanations and evidence. 19 Finally, the ALJ noted with respect to another medical opinion he considered alongside 20 Dr. Castro’s that it provided “only snapshots of the claimant’s functioning.” AR 25. Defendant 21 contends this reasoning applies to Dr. Castro’s opinion (Dkt. 11 at 4), but Dr. Castro had been 22 treating Plaintiff once every two weeks for 15 months at the time he completed his opinion. See 23 AR 573. A medical opinion does not “stand alone” but, rather, must be evaluated alongside the
24 1 treatment notes that accompany it. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 n.17 (9th Cir. 2 2014). 3 In sum, the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting Dr. Castro’s medical 4 opinion. Because Dr. Castro’s opinion suggested Plaintiff was more limited than the ALJ found,
5 this error requires reversal. See Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 6 2006) (error that could result in more restrictive RFC not harmless). 7 B. Subjective Symptom Testimony 8 Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in assessing his subjective symptom testimony. Dkt. 9 9 at 8–12. Having found error in the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Castro’s medical opinion, the 10 Court need not consider this issue. Rather, on remand, the ALJ should reassess the medical 11 evidence and, if appropriate, reassess the RFC and his findings at steps four and five of the 12 sequential evaluation process.1 13 // 14 //
15 // 16 17 18 19 20 1 Plaintiff states in the conclusion to his brief that “[t]he Court is respectfully requested to remand for further 21 proceedings at the very least” but also contends the evidence indicates he would be unable to perform his past work or other work existing in significant numbers. Dkt. 9 at 12. To the extent Plaintiff requests the Court remand for an 22 award of benefits, Plaintiff has failed to make such an argument “specifically and distinctly” in his opening brief, and therefore the Court declines to consider whether such a remedy is appropriate. Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 23 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). 24 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on these reasons and the relevant record, the Court ORDERS that this matter be 3 REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 4 administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.
5 6 Dated this 5th day of September, 2025. 7 A 8 9 Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24