IToke, J.
At the time this action was commenced and the Georgia attachment was levied, the property attached was protected, both by the personal property exemption provided for by the Constitution and the general exemption laws of the State, and also by section 493 of The Code (section 678 of the present Revisal), prohibiting wages due for personal services of the debtor rendered within sixty days prior to the levy, and necessary for the use of the family which was supported by his labor, from being subjected and applied to the laborer’s indebtedness; and, this being true, on the facts established, the Judge correctly ruled that the restraining order be continued to the hearing.
As stated in Amer. and Eng. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 256: “It may be regarded as settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a resident creditor from instituting
or prosecuting an action or proceeding in another State for tbe purpose of evading tbe exemption laws of bis State, and of collecting bis claim by subjecting to its satisfaction property or credits wbicb tbe debtor could claim as exempt if tbe action or proceeding were brought within tbe State. And in such a case an injunction should generally be granted.” And tbe doctrine so stated is grounded in right reason and fully sustained by authority.
Dehon et al. v. Foster,
86 Mass., 545;
Teager v. Landsley et al.,
69 Iowa, 725 ;
Engle v. Schenerman,
40 Ga., 206;
Keyser v.
Rice, 47 Md., 203;
Snook v. Snetzer,
25 Ohio, 516; Waples on Homestead Exemptions, pp. 888, 889.
It is objected chiefly that an injunction on tbe facts before us is in violation of Article IV, section 1, of tbe Federal Constitution, providing that in each State full faith and credit shall be given to tbe judicial proceedings of every other State, etc., and section 2, same article, providing that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all tbe privileges and immuni-* ties of tbe several States. This view is fully discussed in tbe aiitborities cited, and rejected as unsound; and tbe correct doctrine is held to be that tbe courts of tbe resident creditor have power in proper cases to issue an injunction, not in restraint of tbe action of tbe court of another State, but operating
in personam
on tbe creditor and compelling him to obey -the laws of bis own Commonwealth. Thus, in
Dehon’s case, supra, Chief Justice Bigelow,
speaking to this question, says: “Tbe authority of this Court, as a court of chancery, upon a proper case being made, to.restrain persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting 'suits, either in tbe courts of this State or of other States or foreign countries, is clear and indisputable. In the exercise of this power courts of equity proceed, not upon any claim of right to interfere with or control the course of proceedings in other tribunals, or to prevent them from adjudicating on the rights of parties when drawn in controversy and duly presented for their determination, but the jurisdiction is founded on the clear authority vested
in courts of equity over persons witbin tbe limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to process, to restrain them from doing acts which will work wrong and injury to others, and are, therefore, contrary to equity and good conscience. As the decree of the court in such cases is pointed solely at the party, and does not extend to the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending, it is wholly immaterial that the party is prosecuting his action in the courts of a foreign State or country. If the case stated in the bill is such as to render it the duty of the court to restrain a party from instituting or carrying on proceedings in a court in this State, it is bound in like manner to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit in a foreign court. 2 Story on Eq., pp. 889-900;
Mackintosh v. Ogilvie,
3 Swanst., 365n, and 4 T. K., 193n;
Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren,
5 H. L. Cas., 416, 445;
Maclaren v. Stainton,
16 Beav., 286.” And in
Snook v. Snetzer,
25 Ohio, 519,
Bex, J.,
delivering the opinion, says: “In exercising this •.authority, courts proceed, not upon any claim of right to control or stay proceedings in the courts of another. State or ■country, but upon the ground that the person on whom the restraining order is made resides within the jurisdiction and in the power of the court issuing it. The order operates upon the person of the party and directs him to proceed no further in the action, and not upon the court of the foreign State or country in which the action is pending.” On this -subject
Mr. Justice Story,
in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 899, says: “Although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the- courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their territorial limits. When, 'therefore, both parties to a suit in á foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the •courts of equity in the latter may act
in personam
upon those parties, and direct them by injunction to proceed no further in such sirit. In such a case these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction.
They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to the situation of the sxxbject-matter in dispute, they consider the equities between the parties, and decree
in personam
according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees
in personamJ
And in the case of
Keyser v.
Rice, 47 Md.,
Bowie, Judge,
for the Court, said: “The power of the State to compel its citizens to respect and obey its laws, even beyond its own territorial limits, is supported, we think, by the great preponderance of precedent and authority.” And again: “All these instances imply that the citizen going from one State to another shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the State to which he goes, but they do not absolve him from the duties and obligations of a citizen to the State to which he belongs and from which he went. As long as a citizen belongs to a State, he owes it obedience; and, as between States, that State in which he is domiciled has jurisdiction over his person and his personal relations to other citizens of the State.”
And the question was directly presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, the final arbiter on such matters, in
Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U. S., 107, in which
Glvief Justice Fuller,
in a learned and elaborate opinion, established the proposition that the Constitution of the United States, in proper case, permits equity courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in another State, and applied the principle to a case not unlike the one now before us. The same opinion, too, cites with approval several cases where the same principle is applied on facts almost identical with those existent here, and making the cases an apt authority in support of our present decision.
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IToke, J.
At the time this action was commenced and the Georgia attachment was levied, the property attached was protected, both by the personal property exemption provided for by the Constitution and the general exemption laws of the State, and also by section 493 of The Code (section 678 of the present Revisal), prohibiting wages due for personal services of the debtor rendered within sixty days prior to the levy, and necessary for the use of the family which was supported by his labor, from being subjected and applied to the laborer’s indebtedness; and, this being true, on the facts established, the Judge correctly ruled that the restraining order be continued to the hearing.
As stated in Amer. and Eng. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 256: “It may be regarded as settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a resident creditor from instituting
or prosecuting an action or proceeding in another State for tbe purpose of evading tbe exemption laws of bis State, and of collecting bis claim by subjecting to its satisfaction property or credits wbicb tbe debtor could claim as exempt if tbe action or proceeding were brought within tbe State. And in such a case an injunction should generally be granted.” And tbe doctrine so stated is grounded in right reason and fully sustained by authority.
Dehon et al. v. Foster,
86 Mass., 545;
Teager v. Landsley et al.,
69 Iowa, 725 ;
Engle v. Schenerman,
40 Ga., 206;
Keyser v.
Rice, 47 Md., 203;
Snook v. Snetzer,
25 Ohio, 516; Waples on Homestead Exemptions, pp. 888, 889.
It is objected chiefly that an injunction on tbe facts before us is in violation of Article IV, section 1, of tbe Federal Constitution, providing that in each State full faith and credit shall be given to tbe judicial proceedings of every other State, etc., and section 2, same article, providing that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all tbe privileges and immuni-* ties of tbe several States. This view is fully discussed in tbe aiitborities cited, and rejected as unsound; and tbe correct doctrine is held to be that tbe courts of tbe resident creditor have power in proper cases to issue an injunction, not in restraint of tbe action of tbe court of another State, but operating
in personam
on tbe creditor and compelling him to obey -the laws of bis own Commonwealth. Thus, in
Dehon’s case, supra, Chief Justice Bigelow,
speaking to this question, says: “Tbe authority of this Court, as a court of chancery, upon a proper case being made, to.restrain persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting 'suits, either in tbe courts of this State or of other States or foreign countries, is clear and indisputable. In the exercise of this power courts of equity proceed, not upon any claim of right to interfere with or control the course of proceedings in other tribunals, or to prevent them from adjudicating on the rights of parties when drawn in controversy and duly presented for their determination, but the jurisdiction is founded on the clear authority vested
in courts of equity over persons witbin tbe limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to process, to restrain them from doing acts which will work wrong and injury to others, and are, therefore, contrary to equity and good conscience. As the decree of the court in such cases is pointed solely at the party, and does not extend to the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending, it is wholly immaterial that the party is prosecuting his action in the courts of a foreign State or country. If the case stated in the bill is such as to render it the duty of the court to restrain a party from instituting or carrying on proceedings in a court in this State, it is bound in like manner to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit in a foreign court. 2 Story on Eq., pp. 889-900;
Mackintosh v. Ogilvie,
3 Swanst., 365n, and 4 T. K., 193n;
Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren,
5 H. L. Cas., 416, 445;
Maclaren v. Stainton,
16 Beav., 286.” And in
Snook v. Snetzer,
25 Ohio, 519,
Bex, J.,
delivering the opinion, says: “In exercising this •.authority, courts proceed, not upon any claim of right to control or stay proceedings in the courts of another. State or ■country, but upon the ground that the person on whom the restraining order is made resides within the jurisdiction and in the power of the court issuing it. The order operates upon the person of the party and directs him to proceed no further in the action, and not upon the court of the foreign State or country in which the action is pending.” On this -subject
Mr. Justice Story,
in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 899, says: “Although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the- courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their territorial limits. When, 'therefore, both parties to a suit in á foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the •courts of equity in the latter may act
in personam
upon those parties, and direct them by injunction to proceed no further in such sirit. In such a case these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction.
They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to the situation of the sxxbject-matter in dispute, they consider the equities between the parties, and decree
in personam
according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees
in personamJ
And in the case of
Keyser v.
Rice, 47 Md.,
Bowie, Judge,
for the Court, said: “The power of the State to compel its citizens to respect and obey its laws, even beyond its own territorial limits, is supported, we think, by the great preponderance of precedent and authority.” And again: “All these instances imply that the citizen going from one State to another shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the State to which he goes, but they do not absolve him from the duties and obligations of a citizen to the State to which he belongs and from which he went. As long as a citizen belongs to a State, he owes it obedience; and, as between States, that State in which he is domiciled has jurisdiction over his person and his personal relations to other citizens of the State.”
And the question was directly presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, the final arbiter on such matters, in
Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U. S., 107, in which
Glvief Justice Fuller,
in a learned and elaborate opinion, established the proposition that the Constitution of the United States, in proper case, permits equity courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in another State, and applied the principle to a case not unlike the one now before us. The same opinion, too, cites with approval several cases where the same principle is applied on facts almost identical with those existent here, and making the cases an apt authority in support of our present decision. True, it is not found as a fact in express terms that the purpose of the creditor in resorting to the Georgia courts was to evade the exemption laws of his own State, but, as both plaintiff and his creditor were then resident and domiciled in the same city, where the railroad company had its office and principal
place of business, and where the local courts were open and accessible, no other reason could be well conceived or suggested, and the existence of such a purpose is an inference well-nigh conclusive from the facts which are declared. As said in the
Key ser case, supra:
“We think the intention to evade is necessarily presumed. Eational creatures must be presumed to intend the necessary and inevitable consequences of their deliberate acts.”
There is nothing in our present decision which is intended to militate against the position, undoubtedly correct, that our exemption laws have no extraterritorial vigor; nor do we question in any way the doctrine declared by the United States Supreme Court in several recent decisions, that, for the purpose of attachment and jurisdiction to the extent that it may be so acquired, the
situs
of the debt is at the debtor’s residence, or wherever he may be personally served with process.
Railroad Co. v. Deer,
200 U. S., 176;
Harris v. Balk,
198 U. S., 214;
Railroad v. Sturm,
174 U. S., 710. While the debt may have a
situs
in the State of Georgia, it has its
situs,
too, in the State of North Carolina, where the railroad also has its residence and principal place of business, and where the debt due to plaintiff, its employee, is subject to our general exemption laws and the statute passed for the especial protection of a laborer’s wages; and, though the Georgia court has jurisdiction for the purpose, and to the extent indicated, and if it should proceed its judgment applying the property on the claim would be allowed full force and effect, so as to protect the railroad company from a second payment, this does not impair the right of the court of the creditor’s residence, acting
in personam,
to compel obedience to its own laws, to the extent permitted by the proper application of the constitutional principle; and if such creditor, in defiance of an injunction duly served in an action properly constituted, should proceed in the Georgia courts, he would be subject, perhaps, to punishment for disobeying the restraining order, and could certainly be made
here to restore the amount wrongfully collected from the debtor.
Teager v. Langley, supra.
In
Sturm's case, supra,
which was strongly urged upon our attention in behalf of defendants, it does not appear in any report of the case to which we have access that the attaching creditor was a resident of the State whose exemption laws were alleged to' have been violated, and the right of the court of the resident creditor to compel obedience to its own laws does not seem to have been presented. It was certainly not considered or passed upon. The court only applied the recognized principle that, the court where the attachment issued having acquired jurisdiction, its judgment condemning the debt would protect the garnishee from a second payment. The same doctrine was applied here in a recent
case
— Wright
v. Railroad,
141 N. C., 164 — and neither decision is in conflict with our present opinion, nor the principle upon which it is made to rest.
AYe note an affidavit sent up with the record to the effect that, since this suit was instituted, the plaintiff has removed from the State and become a resident of South Carolina. This is not adverted to by the court in its findings of fact; and, while the findings are not conclusive upon this Court in a case of this kind
(Mayo v. Commissioners,
122 N. C., 5), as the evidence on the matter may not all have been sent up, we make no comment, except to say that, if it should be made to appear that plaintiff has ceased to be a resident and citizen of this State at any time before the property is applicable to the creditor’s claim, the general exemption laws of our State would not operate in his favor. The'authorities, however, seem to have decided that the statute passed to protect a laborer’s,wages (Revisal, sec. 618) would, in any event, be effective for his protection.
Goodwin v. Claytor,
137 N. C., 224-236.
There is no error, and the judgment of the lower court is
Affirmed.