Wickes v. Wickes

98 Ill. App. 156, 1901 Ill. App. LEXIS 251
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedNovember 21, 1901
StatusPublished

This text of 98 Ill. App. 156 (Wickes v. Wickes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Ill. App. 156, 1901 Ill. App. LEXIS 251 (Ill. Ct. App. 1901).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Adams

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented by the record is, who is liable for the repairs of the premises number 3647 Grand Boulevard, appellant or appellee ? If appellant is liable, then it must be on one of two grounds: either that he is liable by the terms of the decree of February 19, 1895, or by reason of his acts in relation to the premises.

The decree in respect to the premises 3647, provides for the conveyance thereof to appellee by a good and sufficient deed, and the discharge by appellant of an incumbrance 'thereon, amounting to $7,000 and interest. The conveyanee directed is in fee simple. The only provision in regard to repairs of number 3647 is contained in the 5th clause of the decree, which is that the defendant (appellant) shall pay to complainant’s solicitor $750 as solicitor’s fees, etc., “ and the further sum, not. to exceed one hundred dollars, to be expended on repairs upon said premises, numbered 3647 Grand Boulevard.”

The second clause of the decree provides, in respect to the premises 3645 Grand Boulevard, “ that defendant also pay all taxes and other governmental charges levied or to be levied upon said premises, Ho. 3645 Grand Boulevard, during the life of complainant; that defendant also keep said premises, at all times, in good and tenantable condition, and insured in a sum of not less than seventy-five hundred dollars.”

Clause 4th of the decree provides “ that in case the gross income derived from said two houses, after the said Thomas H. Wickes, Jr., attains his majority, shall not amount to two hundred dollars per month, the defendant shall pay to the complainant the difference between said gross income and said two hundred dollars per month.”

We have, then, a decree expressly limiting appellant’s liability for repairs of the premises, number 3647, to the sum of $100, which sum he has paid, and no provision requiring him to pay the taxes levied or to be levied on said premises; requiring him to pay taxes levied and to be levied on the premises number 3645, during appellee’s life, and to keep said premises, during her life, in good and tenantable condition, to do which involves the making necessary repairs, and, lastly, that if the gross income from the two houses shall be less than $200 per month, requiring appellant to pay the difference between such gross income: and $200 per month. The fact that the decree'contains no provision for the payment by appellant for repairs of number 3647 in excess of the sum of $100, and limits his liability to that amount, while requiring pa^yment by appellant for such repairs as will be necessary to keep number 3645 in good and tenantable condition, is wholly inconsistent with the view that appellant is, by the decree, liable for repairs of the premises number 3647. The subject of repairs of both the houses was, as is manifest by the decree, in the minds of the parties who consented to it, and the decree was doubtless carefully scrutinized by their solicitors, respectively, and had it been intended that appellant should pay for the necessary repairs of the premises, number 3647, it is to be presumed that the decree would have contained a provision to that effect, as it does in regard to the premises number 3645. The reason for the distinction made by the decree between the two houses, in the matter of repairs, is obvious. The premises number 3647 were to be conveyed to appellee in fee. Therefore she could alienáte them, if she so desired, in which case the appellant should not be required to keep them in repair; but the decree as to the premises 3645 is that they shall be conveyed to appellee for her life, remainder to the children, and that the deed conveying them shall contain a provision that, in the event of the death of all the children without issue, the defendant surviving them, the premises shall revert to him. The provision in the decree that if the gross income from the two houses shall npt amount to §200 per month the appellant shall pay to appellee the difference between said gross income and $200 per month, also indicates clearly, as we think, that appellee was to receive only the gross income, subject to appellant’s liability to keep number 3645 in good and tenantable condition during appellee’s life. The manifest object of the provision is to secure for appellee a gross income from the two houses of $200 per month. If the houses rent for less than that sum, appellant is required to pay the difference between the sum they rent for and $200 per month. The decree, presumably drafted by appellee’s counsel, refers to the provision as “ the guarantee of the gross rentals of said premises, in the said original decree mentioned, by the said defendant, at the sum of two hundred dollars per month.” The decree-evidently contemplates a renting of the houses, and the-gross income from leased premises is the amount of rent reserved by the lease and paid by the tenant. Appellant’s counsel contend that there is a distinction in meaning between the phrases, “ gross income ” and “ gross rentals.” There is no such distinction in the phrases as applied to the facts of the case, as they, themselves, have illustrated by using, as above shown, the phrase “ gross rentals ” as identical in meaning with “gross income.” In Webster’s dictionary the word “ gross ” is defined : “Whole; entire; total; without deduction; as, the gross sum, or gross amount; gross weight, opposed to net.” So that it is not the net rent or income of the premises 3647 which appellee is, by the decree, to receive, but the gross rent, without deduction for repairs, or other expenses.

We think it clear that, by the terms of the decree, if appellant kept number 3645 in good and tenantable condition, and the gross rental of both places equaled $200 per month, he would owe appellee nothing, even though she had expended money for repairs of number 3647. It appears from a letter of appellee, of date October 18, 1895, to Rhodes Bros. & Co., who were then her agents, that it was her understanding that appellant was not required, by the decree, to keep in repair the premises 3647. In that letter she writes:

“ While the property remains in your hands, as agents, you may have any usual and necessary repairs made to the house Ro. 3647, without, however, waiving any of the covenants of the lease. By this Í mean, that you may make such repairs as are usually made bv the landlord in the ordinary course of renting houses. The matter of all ordinary and current repairs is left to your discretion, with the understanding, of course, that I desire the repair account of this house to be kept as low as possible, consistent with its proper renting. * * * Mr. T. H. Wickes is required to' pay the repairs to Ro. 3645, and you will look to him for all directions concerning repairs made on that house. ”

By this letter appellee authorized repairs on Ro. 3647, and expressed a desire that the account for the same should be kept as low as possible, which was to her interest if she was liable for the repairs, but which did not concern her if appellant was liable for them; and as to the repairs of the premises 3645, she referred the agents to appellant. In another letter from appellee to the same agents, of date August 24, 1897, she impliedly admits that repairs of the premises Ho. 3647 were to be made at her expense. The next question to be considered is, whether appellant, by his acts, or otherwise, has made himself exclusively liable for the cost of the repairs of the premises number 3647.

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Bluebook (online)
98 Ill. App. 156, 1901 Ill. App. LEXIS 251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wickes-v-wickes-illappct-1901.