Wick v. Wick

42 A.2d 76, 352 Pa. 25, 1945 Pa. LEXIS 385
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 22, 1945
DocketAppeal, 58
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 42 A.2d 76 (Wick v. Wick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wick v. Wick, 42 A.2d 76, 352 Pa. 25, 1945 Pa. LEXIS 385 (Pa. 1945).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Linn,

The appellant, Margaret Wick, on May 28, 1943, filed her libel in the court of common pleas of Allegheny County praying for a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro. She alleged two causes under Section 11 of the Divorce Statute of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS section 11: (1) cruel and barbarous treatment endangering her life and (2) indignities to the person rendering her condition intolerable and life burdensome. The case was tried *27 before Judge McDonald for several days beginning December 9, 1948. He entered a decree as prayed for on the ground of indignities. There is no evidence to support a decree on the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court which set aside the decree and ordered the libel dismissed. On libellant’s petition, we allowed this appeal.

On July 2,1943, the appellant’s husband, George D. Wick, filed his libel in the same court, under section 10 of the statute, praying for a decree a vinculo matrimonii on averments of cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to the person. The case was tried with the trial of her suit against him; his libel was dismissed. He appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the decree. On his application, we granted leave to appeal.

When these appeals, so allowed, were called for argument in this court, Mrs. Wick moved to quash Mr. Wick’s appeal on the ground that, since the trial in the common pleas, Mr. Wick asserted that he had gone to Eeno, in the State of Nevada, and procured a decree of divorce; she contended that if he was divorced in Nevada, he Avas not noAV entitled to have this court review the action of the courts below refusing a divorce. After hearing argument on the point, her motion was granted; the effect was to vacate the allowance of Mr. Wick’s appeal and to leave the order of the Superior Court the final decree in his suit.

We noAV have for consideration Mrs. Wick’s appeal. A libellant’s case must be clearly made out to sustain a decree of divorce: Esenwein v. Esenwein, 312 Pa. 77, 79, 167 A. 350. In determining which of the oral evidence to accept and which to reject, we lack the advantage possessed by the trial judge who, for several days, had the parties and witnesses before him, with ample opportunity to observe them during the trial. The findings of fact made by him have not the same effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury: Esenwein v. Esenwein, 312 Pa. 77, pages 80 and 81, 167 A. 350. Presumably, a trial judge’s *28 opportunity to observe the parties and witnesses during the trial, became the basis of a rule that “When witnesses who are competent and equally interested, flatly contradict each other, the conclusion of the judge who heard them, as to which is to be believed, is not to be lightly disturbed.” Krug v. Krug, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 572, 573; Koontz v. Koontz, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 70; Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 344, 15 A. 2d 37. In accord with that rule, we have at times resolved doubt in dealing with conflicting testimony, by relying on expressed or implied conclusions of the trial judge.

What is sufficient to support a decree under the section of the statute relied on has been variously stated and necessarily includes a wide range of conduct. “It is not of a single act that the law speaks in the clause under which this case falls; but of such a course of conduct or continued treatment as renders the wife’s condition intolerable and her life burdensome . . .” Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. 225.

The term “indignities to the person” of a wife as a cause of divorce has been in our law since the Act of September 19,1785, 2 Sm. L. 343. Experience has shown it to be impossible to embrace in a single definition the great variety of conduct intended to be included in the meaning of the words used by the legislature and at the same time to exclude conduct not within the legislative description. “What is meant by such indignities is left undefined in the law, and depends largely upon the circumstances of each case; they must consist of such a course of conduct as is humiliating, degrading and inconsistent with her position and relations as a wife.” Donnelly v. Donnelly, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 92, 95. In Lowe v. Lowe, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 439, 25 A. 2d 781, President Judge Keller said: “Conduct by a husband with respect to other women, although not sufficient to support a charge of adultery, may be considered as a form of personal indignity to his wife rendering her condition intolerable and life burdensome. See Manzi v. *29 Manzi, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 332, 171 A. 92; Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 344, 15 A. 2d 37; . . .”

The parties were married in 1914. In December, 1943, when the case was tried, Mrs. Wick was about 50 years of age and Mr. Wick about 54; they have three children, a daughter, Ruth, then aged 16, a son, 19, and a daughter, Kathryn, 23. They have lived in Pittsburgh during their entire married lives.

On July 7, 1942, Mr. Wick left his home and established himself in the Keystone Hotel in Pittsburgh, a hotel that had come under his management as a trustee in bankruptcy and which he reorganized.

In the trial of his suit against his wife, he attempted to prove that her conduct justified his leaving home. The court held that he failed to justify his conduct; the decree dismissing his libel has become a final judgment. We must reject the contention made on behalf of Mr. Wick that his wife “cannot obtain a divorce because she is not an ‘innocent and injured’ party; she has been guilty of acts which give legal cause for divorce from her.” The learned trial judge ruled that Mr. Wick had not proved the indignities alleged in his libel. 1 While the term “innocent and injured spouse” appears in section 10 under which Mr. Wick filed his libel, they do not appear in section 11, under which Mrs. Wick sued.

In the light of the decisions quoted above and others that are familiar, holding or describing certain types of conduct as within the meaning of the statute, we must find, and we all agree in the finding, that the record shows a course of conduct that began just prior to December, 1941, and continued to the time of trial, clearly showing a case supporting the decree made in the common pleas.

There is evidence to show that the parties lived happily from the time they were married in 1914 until *30 shortly before December, 1941. 2 There may have been differences such as are said to be usual in matrimonial experience, but none seriously affecting the matrimonial relation.

Mr. Wick had prospered in a worldly sense, coming, as he said, “to this town [Pittsburgh] without a suit,” and living, for many years, in a house in which he said he had invested $55,000.00.

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Bluebook (online)
42 A.2d 76, 352 Pa. 25, 1945 Pa. LEXIS 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wick-v-wick-pa-1945.