Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

981 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 2013 WL 5925545, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159756
District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided October 25, 2013·No. Case No. 8:12-CV-557-T-27EAJ·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

ORDER

ELIZABETH A. JENKINS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Following in camera review of the privilege log and documents submitted by Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) pursuant to a prior order (Dkt. 83), as well as the Joint Proposed Protocol for In Camera Review (Dkt. 84), and following oral argument on September 23, 2013, the Court finds that Wells Fargo has sustained its position regarding some of the documents identified below, but that most of the documents are not protected by the privilege asserted.

Background

Plaintiff Burton W. Wiand (“Receiver”) is the court-appointed Receiver for six hedge funds that lost approximately $168 million in a Ponzi scheme run by Arthur Nadel (“Nadel”) from 1999 to 2009. In this lawsuit, Receiver alleges that Defendants Wells Fargo, et al. (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to comply with federal banking regulations and the bank’s own internal procedures which allowed Nadel to conduct the Ponzi scheme. Here, Receiver challenges Wells Fargo’s assertion of privilege for certain documents that the [1216]*1216bank has withheld from discovery (hereinafter “Bank Documents”).

The privilege is the Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) privilege, which pertains to certain reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions by federal law. The prior order directed Wells Fargo to submit for in camera review “any documents that have been withheld under the SAR privilege, but which are neither SARs nor documents which refer to any SAR-related decision.” (Dkt. 83 at 8) As such, the Bank Documents do not clearly fall under the privilege. The parties have articulated their respective positions regarding the scope of the SAR privilege in prior submissions, in the Joint Proposed Protocol, and at oral argument.

Essentially, Wells Fargo maintains that the SAR privilege covers not only a SAR and any information that could reveal the existence of a SAR, but also material prepared by the bank to detect suspicious activity, regardless of whether a SAR was ultimately filed or not. The bank contends that any material prepared as part of the bank’s process for complying with federal reporting requirements or to detect and report suspicious activity is covered by the SAR privilege. Receiver responds that the SAR privilege does not extend to other reports of suspicious activity generated by the bank’s internal investigations, even if a SAR may be anticipated, as it is standard business practice for a bank to investigate suspicious activity to protect its interests. Pointing to the express language in federal regulations that exempts underlying documents from the SAR privilege, Receiver argues that the Bank Documents, as described in the privilege log, are not covered under the SAR privilege.

Discussion

It is well established that the party invoking a privilege “bear[s] the burden of proving its existence.” In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir.1987) (citations omitted) (referring to attorney-client privilege). Moreover, because withholding of otherwise discoverable information “serves to obscure the truth,” a privilege “should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with its purpose.” United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).

It is undisputed that the Bank Documents are responsive to prior discovery requests. The Court has likewise determined that they are relevant. The only issue is whether they are subject to the “absolute prohibition” against disclosure under the SAR privilege established by federal law.1 In re Whitley, No. 10-10426C-7G, 2011 WL 6202895, at *3 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318,2 financial institutions are required to file SARs to notify the government of possible criminal activities. Cotton v. PrivateBank &. Trust, Co., 235 F.Supp.2d 809, 812 (N.D.Ill.2002) (citation and footnote omitted). SARs are confidential and subject to an “unqualified discovery and evidentiary privilege that courts have held cannot be [1217]*1217waived.” Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F.Supp.2d 678, 682 (S.D.Tex.2004) (citations omitted).

Yet, federal regulations expressly state that the SAR privilege does not prohibit disclosure by a national bank of:

The underlying facts, transactions, and documents upon which a SAR is based, including, but not limited to, disclosures:
(i) To another financial institution, or any director, officer, employee or agent of a financial institution, for the preparation of a joint SAR; or
(ii) In connection with certain employment references or termination notices[.]

12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (k)(1)(ii)(A)(2).

Accordingly, courts have held that the SAR privilege does not shield from discovery reports, memoranda, or underlying transactional documents generated by a bank’s internal investigation procedures. See Whitley, 2011 WL 6202895 at *4 (explaining that internal bank reports or memoranda regarding an investigation into suspicious activity are not protected by SAR privilege (citation omitted)); Freedman & Gersten, LLP v. Bank of Am., No. 09-5351(SRC)(MAS), 2010 WL 5139874, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) (finding SAR privilege does not encompass “documents and facts pertaining to the suspicious activity” that “were created in the ordinary course of business” (citations omitted)); Weil v. Long Island Sav. Bank, 195 F.Supp.2d 383, 389 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (explaining that “supporting documentation” is not covered by the SAR privilege); Cotton, 235 F.Supp.2d at 814 (“Nothing in the Act or regulations prohibits the disclosure of the underlying factual documents which may cause a bank to submit a SAR. Furthermore, those underlying documents do not become confidential by reason of being attached or described in a SAR.”). But see United States v. LaCost, No. 10-CR-20001, 2011 WL 1542072, at *8 (C.D.Ill. Apr. 22, 2011) (concluding that “incident reports that let to the filing of a SAR and other documents related to the filing of SARs” are within the SAR privilege).

In arguing for a broader interpretation of the regulatory language of section 21.11(k), Wells Fargo cites to comments in the Federal Register stating that the SAR privilege applies to “material prepared by the financial institution as part of its process to detect and report suspicious activity, regardless of whether a SAR ultimately was filed or not.” Confidentiality of SARs, 75 Fed.Reg. 75593-01 (Dec. 3, 2010), 2010 WL 4902681.3 And a financial institution should also “afford confidentiality to any document stating that a SAR has not been filed.” Id. at 75595.

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Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 981 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 2013 WL 5925545, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159756 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

981 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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