MOSER, P.J.
The action for divorce was commenced in July, 1975 and was tried to the court as a default on October 24, 1977. At a temporary hearing held on August 8, 1975, Mr. Whitwam’s support obligation was “held open” because he was unemployed. The temporary order
provided that if the wife or children received financial assistance from the county welfare department, Mr. Whitwam was to reimburse the department on such terms as it might direct. Subsequently, Mrs. Whitwam applied for and began receiving public assistance. Through a modified temporary order filed September 29, 1977, the court required Mr. Whitwam to pay child support of $20 per week. Mr. Whitwam paid the required child support in full.
At trial, the court granted the divorce to the plaintiff and disposed of all other issues in accordance with a written stipulation of the parties. At the court’s request, Mrs. Whitwam’s trial counsel drafted findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment which included the “usual orders” concerning social services.
The “usual orders” added to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment read as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED:
That the question of alimony is held open, to be reviewed only in the event either party becomes a public charge in the State of Wisconsin and any such alimony review shall be held upon the merits — except that no alimony shall be awarded which is in excess of the amount of public assistance which may have been furnished or may thereafter be furnished, it being the intention of this Interlocutory Order to be solely for the protection of the public.
That the Department of Social Services has heretofore paid unrefunded public assistance in the sum of $9,233.23 in behalf of the dependents of the parties in this action, and that the present monthly grant by said Department for said dependents is $218.00; that the parties herein shall repay said Department for all sums advanced heretofore and hereafter, in the amount and form required by law.
That in the event at any time hereafter any real estate, in which the parties or either of them have an interest,
shall be sold, the net proceeds of any such sale shall be paid over to the Clerk of Courts and held by said Clerk pending further order of the Court; that any application by either party to withdraw any such real estate sale funds shall be on written Notice of Motion to the Department of Social Services. . . .
On March 8, 1978, Mr. Whitwam moved that the judgment be amended to delete these provisions. The motion was denied April 14, 1978, and Mr. Whitwam appealed.
The issues presented on this appeal are (1) may a future grant of alimony be conditioned on the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance and limited to the amount of such assistance received, (2) did the trial court have the authority to order the parties to repay the welfare department for all unrefunded public assistance provided before or after the divorce judgment, and (3) did the trial court have the authority to encumber the parties’ current and after-acquired real estate for the benefit of the local welfare department.
CONDITIONAL ALIMONY
A future grant of alimony may not be conditioned upon the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance. A family court judge’s power to make judgments and orders regarding alimony or maintenance is limited to what the statutes allow.
Factors to be considered by the family trial court in making a determination of alimony are fixed on the basis of the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay. These needs are ordinarily established by considering the wife’s assets, income, her special needs, her age and health, and her customary station in life. The ability of the husband to pay is usually determined by his income, assets and debts, as well as his age and health. These determinations are to be made upon
the basis of circumstances existing at the time of the divorce.
The Family Code of Wisconsin
provides for certain instances when social welfare agencies become active parties in marital actions. A welfare agency is permitted to maintain a separate cause of action for maintenance (alimony) when a recipient of aid refuses to proceed against a divorced spouse who is under a family court order for maintenance (alimony) of the recipient.
A welfare agency can also, by assignment and with the approval of the family court, become a real party in in
terest for the sole purpose of collecting unpaid alimony.
These provisions are obviously for the protection of the general public and the taxpayers.
These statutory requirements have not been satisfied in this case. Therefore, the inclusion of this paragraph conditioning alimony on the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance and the subsequent order denying the motion to strike this paragraph finds no support in either the family code or case law. The judgment must therefore be amended to delete this provision.
REPAYMENT OF UNREFUNDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
The divorce judgment ordered the parties to pay the Waukesha County Department of Social Services the un-refunded amount of $9,233.23 paid heretofore on behalf
of the dependents of the parties. That judgment also noted that the social service’s grant was in the amount of $218 per month and ordered the parties to pay all sums hereafter owed to the department. Mr. Whitwam filed a motion under sec. 806.07(1) (d), Stats., for a modification of the judgment with this paragraph deleted. This motion was denied.
We note that there was a temporary order for support of $20 per week and that such order held open the issue of alimony. We note further that the divorce judgment grants custody to Mrs. Whitwam and ordered support payments in the amount of $25 per week, which judgment adopted the written stipulation of the parties. The record reflects that Mr. Whitwam was current with the court ordered support payments at the time of the divorce judgment and at the time of the denial of the motion to amend.
In the case of Mr. Whitwam, this paragraph of the judgment of divorce amounts to a judgment requiring retroactive support. In essence, it required Mr. Whitwam to pay for public assistance received prior to the divorce for the support of his child. Imposing liability for that assistance made Mr. Whitwam retroactively liable for more than $20 per week. Twenty dollars per week was all Mr. Whitwam was required to pay for child support, prior to the divorce. The order denying the motion to amend accomplished the same purpose. A family trial court has discretion to reduce or eliminate support ar-rearages with cause or justification.
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MOSER, P.J.
The action for divorce was commenced in July, 1975 and was tried to the court as a default on October 24, 1977. At a temporary hearing held on August 8, 1975, Mr. Whitwam’s support obligation was “held open” because he was unemployed. The temporary order
provided that if the wife or children received financial assistance from the county welfare department, Mr. Whitwam was to reimburse the department on such terms as it might direct. Subsequently, Mrs. Whitwam applied for and began receiving public assistance. Through a modified temporary order filed September 29, 1977, the court required Mr. Whitwam to pay child support of $20 per week. Mr. Whitwam paid the required child support in full.
At trial, the court granted the divorce to the plaintiff and disposed of all other issues in accordance with a written stipulation of the parties. At the court’s request, Mrs. Whitwam’s trial counsel drafted findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment which included the “usual orders” concerning social services.
The “usual orders” added to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment read as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED:
That the question of alimony is held open, to be reviewed only in the event either party becomes a public charge in the State of Wisconsin and any such alimony review shall be held upon the merits — except that no alimony shall be awarded which is in excess of the amount of public assistance which may have been furnished or may thereafter be furnished, it being the intention of this Interlocutory Order to be solely for the protection of the public.
That the Department of Social Services has heretofore paid unrefunded public assistance in the sum of $9,233.23 in behalf of the dependents of the parties in this action, and that the present monthly grant by said Department for said dependents is $218.00; that the parties herein shall repay said Department for all sums advanced heretofore and hereafter, in the amount and form required by law.
That in the event at any time hereafter any real estate, in which the parties or either of them have an interest,
shall be sold, the net proceeds of any such sale shall be paid over to the Clerk of Courts and held by said Clerk pending further order of the Court; that any application by either party to withdraw any such real estate sale funds shall be on written Notice of Motion to the Department of Social Services. . . .
On March 8, 1978, Mr. Whitwam moved that the judgment be amended to delete these provisions. The motion was denied April 14, 1978, and Mr. Whitwam appealed.
The issues presented on this appeal are (1) may a future grant of alimony be conditioned on the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance and limited to the amount of such assistance received, (2) did the trial court have the authority to order the parties to repay the welfare department for all unrefunded public assistance provided before or after the divorce judgment, and (3) did the trial court have the authority to encumber the parties’ current and after-acquired real estate for the benefit of the local welfare department.
CONDITIONAL ALIMONY
A future grant of alimony may not be conditioned upon the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance. A family court judge’s power to make judgments and orders regarding alimony or maintenance is limited to what the statutes allow.
Factors to be considered by the family trial court in making a determination of alimony are fixed on the basis of the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay. These needs are ordinarily established by considering the wife’s assets, income, her special needs, her age and health, and her customary station in life. The ability of the husband to pay is usually determined by his income, assets and debts, as well as his age and health. These determinations are to be made upon
the basis of circumstances existing at the time of the divorce.
The Family Code of Wisconsin
provides for certain instances when social welfare agencies become active parties in marital actions. A welfare agency is permitted to maintain a separate cause of action for maintenance (alimony) when a recipient of aid refuses to proceed against a divorced spouse who is under a family court order for maintenance (alimony) of the recipient.
A welfare agency can also, by assignment and with the approval of the family court, become a real party in in
terest for the sole purpose of collecting unpaid alimony.
These provisions are obviously for the protection of the general public and the taxpayers.
These statutory requirements have not been satisfied in this case. Therefore, the inclusion of this paragraph conditioning alimony on the dependent spouse’s receipt of public assistance and the subsequent order denying the motion to strike this paragraph finds no support in either the family code or case law. The judgment must therefore be amended to delete this provision.
REPAYMENT OF UNREFUNDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
The divorce judgment ordered the parties to pay the Waukesha County Department of Social Services the un-refunded amount of $9,233.23 paid heretofore on behalf
of the dependents of the parties. That judgment also noted that the social service’s grant was in the amount of $218 per month and ordered the parties to pay all sums hereafter owed to the department. Mr. Whitwam filed a motion under sec. 806.07(1) (d), Stats., for a modification of the judgment with this paragraph deleted. This motion was denied.
We note that there was a temporary order for support of $20 per week and that such order held open the issue of alimony. We note further that the divorce judgment grants custody to Mrs. Whitwam and ordered support payments in the amount of $25 per week, which judgment adopted the written stipulation of the parties. The record reflects that Mr. Whitwam was current with the court ordered support payments at the time of the divorce judgment and at the time of the denial of the motion to amend.
In the case of Mr. Whitwam, this paragraph of the judgment of divorce amounts to a judgment requiring retroactive support. In essence, it required Mr. Whitwam to pay for public assistance received prior to the divorce for the support of his child. Imposing liability for that assistance made Mr. Whitwam retroactively liable for more than $20 per week. Twenty dollars per week was all Mr. Whitwam was required to pay for child support, prior to the divorce. The order denying the motion to amend accomplished the same purpose. A family trial court has discretion to reduce or eliminate support ar-rearages with cause or justification.
However, a family trial court in Wisconsin has no authority to make an order directing the retroactive increase of support payments.
Therefore, this portion of the judgment must be deleted.
The family trial court also lacked authority to impose liability on Mr. Whitwam for prospective public assistance in this manner. A noncustodial parent of any dependent who is unable to maintain himself shall maintain such dependent person as far as able. If the noncustodial parent refuses to supply maintenance funds for a dependent person as far as able, he can, on application to the appropriate court, with proper notice, be compelled to so maintain the dependent person.
This procedure protects
the general taxpaying public. Mr. Whitwam is subject to these statutes as well as future modification or revision of the original judgment concerning. support. The appropriate procedures and prerequisites must occur, however, before Mr. Whitwam’s liability for public assistance can be established.
In the case of Mrs. Whitwam, there is no common law right of a county to obtain repayment of public relief. The right of a county to recover for relief payments is statutory.
A county may sue the recipient of public assistance for the value of aid furnished if the recipient acquires property.
It may also sue specifically to re
cover aid to families with dependent children from recipients who acquire property through gift, inheritance, sale of assets, court judgments, or settlement of damage claims.
These statutory remedies are for the protection of the general public and the taxpayers, but the department must initiate an action in order to employ these remedies.
Thus, that paragraph of the judgment of divorce requiring both parties to repay the Waukesha Department of Social Services $9,233.23, and noting the grant was in the amount of $218 per month and ordering both parties to pay all such sums due hereafter to the Waukesha Department of Social Services, is a nullity. The family court has no statutory authority or case law authority to buttress its judgment in this manner.
ENCUMBRANCE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE REAL ESTATE
This paragraph of the disputed judgment and order applies to any real estate owned by either of the parties at the time of the divorce judgment as well as any after-acquired real estate of either party. The effect of this provision is to establish a judicial lien in favor of the Waukesha County Department of Social Services on all of the parties’ present or future real estate holdings. The judgment provided that the proceeds of any sale of real estate are to be held by the Clerk of Court and not dis
tributed until the department has, by notice of motion, been notified and presumably been given an opportunity to assert any claim it may have. Here again, the family trial court has made the department a party to the action by judicial fiat with no statutory or common law supporting authority.
A family trial court has authority to divide and distribute the real estate owned by the parties on the date of the divorce.
This authority does not extend to disposing of or limiting the parties from disposing of real property acquired after the divorce judgment.
The family trial court can place a lien on real estate jointly or separately owned by the parties before the divorce is final, at the divorce judgment date, and thereafter. However, it is only authorized to do so under the
following conditions: 1. There is a past order for alimony and/or support; 2. The lien is imposed upon
specific
real estate; and 3. The real estate belongs to
the party liable
for alimony or support.
On failure to pay such alimony or allowance, the court may enforce the payment by execution or under sec. 295.02, Stats, (civil contempt).
This judgment was not aimed at any specific real estate. It could not have been mandated to secure alimony or support since alimony was held open and Mr. Whitwam was current with his ordered support. This type of judgment or order could not affect Mrs. Whitwam since she was not under any court order for alimony or support. Such a judgment and order could not affect Mr. Whitwam at the time of the divorce judgment since he had been divested of any interest in specific real estate by that same judgment, even though he was the obligor for alimony and support payments under that judgment.
As discussed above, the statutes allowing the recovery of public assistance from a recipient require the department to start an action for that purpose.
The protection of the general taxpaying public and the reduction of welfare costs are laudable goals. The legislature has provided many ways in which these goals can be attained. The family trial court attempted to accomplish the same result, but its effort failed to comply with the statutory requirements and procedures. Those statutory requisites must be observed not only because they are the law, but also because they afford the procedural safeguards required by due process. Therefore, these three paragraphs of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment cannot be upheld.
By the Court.
— Judgment and order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.