Whittle & Kavanaugh's Third Co. v. Reynolds

69 S.W.2d 181
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 14, 1934
DocketNo. 9934.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 69 S.W.2d 181 (Whittle & Kavanaugh's Third Co. v. Reynolds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whittle & Kavanaugh's Third Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934).

Opinion

LANE, Justice.

J. A. Reynolds and Pred Bowen, who held a contract to purchase a certain oil and gas lease, sold the same to Claude Kavanaugh. In part payment for such sale, Claude Kav-anaugh executed two notes, one for $3,000, payable to J. A. Reynolds on or before the 16th day of June, 1931, and the other for $500, payable to Pred Bowen on or before the same date, and to secure payment of said notes Kavanaugh gave a lien upon the oil and gas lease assigned to him. The obligation to pay and to secure such payment was without interest.

The oil and gas lease mentioned was assigned by Claude Kavanaugh to Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., which assumed payment of the above-mentioned notes.

Por reasons satisfactory to J. A. Reynolds and Fred Bowen, J. A. Reynolds carried his interest in the two notes in the name of E. L. Arnold, and Pred Bowen carried his interest therein in the name of his brother, Dallas Bowen.

On or about August 25, 1931, Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., executed and delivered to J. A. Reynolds, as attorney for E. L. Arnold and Pred Bowen, two notes, one for $337.50, payable to J. A. Reynolds as attorney for E. L. Arnold, and the other for $112.50, payable to said Reynolds as attorney for Pred Bowen. The two notes were payable on or before the 15th day of September, 1931. On August 25, 1931, Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., received the following instrument:

“Houston, Tex/is, August 25, 1931.
“Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Houston, Texas.
“Gentlemen: Thi^ is to advise that we, as the owners of a lien on your Willis Smith 6.881 acres of land, in the James S. Caruthers-survey in Gregg County, Texas, as per description in the lien given by Claude Kav-anaugh on the 16th day of May, A. D. 1931, have for a valuable consideration this day agreed with you and your assigns, that the. balance due of $1,480!00 payable to E. L. Arnold 'by assignment from J. A. Reynolds, and approximately $500.00 due Dallas Bowen by assignment from Pred Bowen, has been extended for payment by you on the 15th day of September, A. D. 1931, at which time it is-agreed that you will pay in full the.balance-as due each of the above parties.
“Witness our hands, the 25th day of August, A. D. 1931.
“Interlineation of date above is understood to be September 15, 1931.
“E. L. Arnold
“By J. A. Reynolds, Attorney-
“Witness: J. A. Reynolds
“Dallas Bowen
“By Pred Bowen
“Pred Bowen.”

It is apparent that at the time of the extension of the $3,000 note it had been reduced by payments to $1,480.

The note for $337.50 was transferred to, and became the property of, B. Frank Reynolds.

On the 18th day of September, 1931, B. Prank Reynolds brought this suit against. Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., a corporation, and against E. L. Arnold and Lynn Arnold.

The plaintiff alleged the execution and delivery of the $337.50 note by Whittle Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., as here-inbefore stated, and specially alleged that the note for $112.50 is not involved in the suit, as the same was the personal property of Pred Bowen. He alleged that in due course of business and for a valuable consideration he became the owner of the $337.50 note. He prayed for a recovery of the sum due on said note, together with an attorney’s fee of $33.75 provided for in said note, against the Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc.

*183 Neither of the other parties defendant have appealed from the judgment rendered against them; therefore it becomes unnecessary to further mention them at this point.

Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., after pleading a general demurrer and general denial to plaintiff’s cause of action, alleged and set up as a defense to plaintiff’s cause of action on said note that the note represented an usurious interest charge made by plaintiff against defendant growing out of the transaction alleged and set forth in defendant’s second amended original answer, as follows:

That on or about May 15, 1931, Claude Kavanaugh executed and delivered unto J. A. Reynolds and Fred Bowen an instrument in writing wherein he agreed to pay unto J. A. Reynolds and Fred Bowen the sum of $3,500 on June 15, 1931, of which said sum $3,000 was to be paid to J. A. Reynolds and the sum of $500 to be paid to Fred Bowen, and in said instrument a lien was retained upon what is known as the Willis Smith 0.881 acres of land in the Jas. S. Caruthers survey in Gregg county, Tex.; that thereafter the property securing said indebtedness was transferred and assigned unto defendant, who assumed and agreed to pay said indebtedness of $3,500 to the said J. A. Reynolds and Fred Bowen, and thereby became primarily bound and obligated to pay the same.

That thereafter, on to wit: August 25,1931, the maturity date of the balance then due on said obligation last above mentioned was extended, to the 15th day of September, 1931, by a written instrument.

On the 2d day of September, 1932, the cause was tried before the court without a jury, and upon the pleadings and evidence the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, B. Frank Reynolds, against Whittle & Kav-anaugh’s Third Company, Inc., for the sum of $337.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum from the 15th day of September, 1931, to date of judgment, and for 10 per cent, on such judgment as attorney’s fee, and it was also decreed that defendants E. L. Arnold and Lynn Arnold take nothing by their claim, and that plaintiff recover against them such costs as he incurred by reason of their asserted claim.

Whittle & Kavanaugh’s Third Company, Inc., only has appealed.

Appellant contends that the court erred in rendering judgment against it upon the note sued upon, and in not rendering judgment for it, in that the undisputed evidence shows that the note for $337.50 was given as a consideration for a fixed extension of time, to wit, from August 25, 1931, to September 15, 1931, which consideration was for the use of $1,480 for the time mentioned; and that the amount contracted to be paid for such extension and use exceeds 10 per cent, of the amount of said $1,480 debt per annum, and clearly shows that the note represents a usurious interest charge, and therefore the contract evidenced by the note is wholly void.

We overrule appellant’s contention. In the fifth paragraph of the court’s finding of facts filed in the trial court the court recites as follows: “That said note in so far as it covered the $337.50 payable to the said J. A. Reynolds as attorney for E. L. Arnold, and which was given as a part of the consideration for the extension of said indebtedness by the agreement hereinbefore set out. * * * >t

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69 S.W.2d 181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whittle-kavanaughs-third-co-v-reynolds-texapp-1934.