Whitney v. The Empire State

29 F. Cas. 1087, 1 Ben. 57
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 15, 1866
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 29 F. Cas. 1087 (Whitney v. The Empire State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitney v. The Empire State, 29 F. Cas. 1087, 1 Ben. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1866).

Opinion

BY THE COURT.

This action is brought by the owners of the schooner Gold Fish, to recover damages caused by the sinking of that vessel in a collision with the steamboat Empire State, which occurred at Hell Gate, in March, 1864.

The proofs presented by the respective parties, while they are conflicting as to some of the main features of the case, establish without serious conflict the following facts. The schooner was bound to New York, and reached Hell Gate about 4:30 o’clock, p. m., the wind blowing then a six-knot breeze from about W. N. W. and the tide running the strength of the ebb. The steamboat Empire State was proceeding from New York, and when above Blackwell's Island the persons in charge of her saw the schooner approaching the Gate, close-hauled upon her starboard tack, from Negro Point. The steamboat then sheered and proceeded on toward Hallett’s Point, and when near the Point, the wheel of the steamer was put hard-a-port, in order that she might be on a swing to starboard when she should strike the tide at the Point, which, owing to the abrupt turn of the Gate there, flows rapidly past the point, over toward Mill Rock, and at right angles with the channel below. No other change in the helm of the steambont was made, nor was her engine then stopped, and accordingly the steamboat passed round the Point, swinging as she passed it, till she came head to the tide. While the steamboat was on the turn, the schooner was observed to be coming about. The engine of the steamboat was then stopped and backed, but before the vessel could get stemway on her she came in contact with the schooner, striking her on her larboard side, and cutting her down so as to make it necessary to run her ashore on Ward’s Island, where, being loaded with lime, she took fire and burned up. These circumstances make out a case where the burden of proof is upon the steamboat, if she would avoid responsibility for the loss, to show by preponderating evidence, that she was prevented from passing the schooner in safety by some fault in the management of the schooner. This burden has been assumed, and it is contended that the proofs show that the schooner was in fault for not remaining in the wind after she came about long enough to have enabled the steam[1088]*1088boat to pass by outside of ber. There is evidence in the case indicating that «this view of the duty of the sailing vessel was entertained by those in charge of the steamboat, and that, in choosing their course for passing the schooner. they relied in some measure upon the schooner’s aiding them by remaining in the wind. Indeed, one of the witnesses greatly relied on by the respondent makes the failure of the schooner to do this his principal ground of objection to the navigation of the schooner. But this objection rests upon a misapprehension of the duty of a sailing vessel under circumstances like the present. What the law requires of a sailing vessel in a narrow channel is to beat out her tack, and having beat it out, to come about with all proper dispatch upon the other, leaving to the steam vessel the responsibility of being in a position to enable her to do so without danger. This is the general rule, and although there may be cases where a departure from it would be justified, and even required, the present is not one. In the swift tide and dangerous channel of Hell Gate, no sailing vessel can be asked to check her headway to enable a steamboat to pass her at Hallett’s Point. See Twibell v. The Keystone. Kelson, J. [Case No. 14,285]. This objection to the navigation of this schooner must therefore be overruled.

The next objection taken by the respondent is that the schooner, after she came about upon her larboard tack, flowed up her sheets, and so remained, with her broadside to the steamboat, and directly in her course, when by properly handling her sails she could have gone on past the bows of the steamboat in safety.

A careful examination of the testimony offered upon both sides as to this point has satisfied me that the weight of evidence upon the point is clearly in favor of the libellants. The pilot and crew of the schooner are positive in their statement that the schooner filled away and kept full till the instant of collision, all the sheets except that of the gaff topsail being properly trimmed. This testimony being of the persons actually in charge of the sheets, and respecting their own acts, must be considered as outweighing the statements of persons from the other vessel. Moreover, the statement of the crew of the schooner is confirmed by the fact, which is nowhere contradicted, that the main and jib sheets were both made fast with an extra turn which was not intended to be unloosed in tacking, and which- was not unloosed to make the tack in the present case, and which could not, without more delay than here appears, have been unloosed after the vessel came about head to the steamboat. In addition to this, it is to be remarked that the answer makes no allusion to any such fault in the navigation of the schooner, and that the testimony of the crew of the schooner, which was given before the point appeared in controversy, when examined is found incidentally to disprove the charge. I have no hesitation, therefore, in coming to the conclusion that the schooner cannot be held to be in fault in regard to the manage-, ment of her sails after she came about.

The remaining fault charged upon the sailing vessel, and the one most strenuously urged, is that she did not beat out her starboard tack. The duty of a sailing vessel to beat out. her tacks when meeting a steamer in narrow water, is unquestionable; but this rule does not require the sailing vessel in all cases to go as near to the shore as the depth of the water will permit, without reference to the other exigencies of the channel. In beating through a passage like Hell Gate, tacks must be made with reference to the safe passing of points and shoals ahead, and when approaching Hal-lett’s Point with a strong ebb tide, a sailing vessel is entitled to come about in time to insure avoiding the reef at that point, although she may not be at the time of tacking as near the Long Island shore as the depth of the water would permit her to go. The end of the southern tack of sailing vessels from Negro Point is therefore no fixed point, but must vary according to the capacity of each vessel and the strength of the wind and tide at the time. This being so, it seems clear that the opinion of those engaged in the navigation of the sailing vessel, who knew the capacities of their vessel, and can most accurately judge as to the effect which the wind and tide are having upon her, is entitled to more weight, as showing the proper place for the tack, than opinions formed by persons aboard a steamboat approaching from below. In this cáse the testimony of the persons on board tlie schooner is positive and emphatic that they proceeded as far upon the tack as it was safe for them to go. The schooner was in charge of a regular Hell Gate pilot of experience, and no circumstance is proved which would make any departure from this course necessary or proper, or which would be likely to lead to any error of judgment. The steamer was in full view, and there was nothing in her method of approaching the tide at Hal-lett’s Point to indicate that she intended to pass td the southward of the schooner. No alarm upon the schooner at the time is shown. She had a fine working breeze, and, as appears in evidence, was a vessel which worked with unusual celerity. Moreover, the whole tack was necessary for her to insure the passage of the Gate, without reference to the presence of an approaching vessel.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 F. Cas. 1087, 1 Ben. 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitney-v-the-empire-state-nyed-1866.