Whitney v. Mowry

29 F. Cas. 1105, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 207
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio
DecidedAugust 15, 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 29 F. Cas. 1105 (Whitney v. Mowry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitney v. Mowry, 29 F. Cas. 1105, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 207 (circtsdoh 1870).

Opinion

SWAYNE, Circuit Justice.

This case was finally heard upon the merits by my Brother Leavitt, the district judge holding the circuit court. He decreed that a perpetual injunction should be awarded, and that an account should be taken of the profits made by the defendant in violation of the rights secured to the complainaut by his patent. The case was referred to a master to take the account. The master performed this duty, and reported the results. Both parties excepted, and the case is now before me upon these exceptions. They have been fully and ably discussed by the counsel upon both sides. At the hearing, a preliminary motion was submitted by the defendant for leave to amend his answer by setting up that the extension of the patent was obtained by the complainant by means of fraud and perjury. This motion also was very fully argued. Upon that subject, it is sufficient to remark, that the extension can not be questioned in this proceeding. .Such an inquiry can be gone into only in a proceeding had directly for that purpose. The action of the commissioner was judicial in its character, and can not he collaterally brought under review as matter of defense in a suit against an alleged infringer. The question was fully considered in the ease of Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. [76 U. S.] 788. Such was the unanimous judgment of that tribunal.

The complainant filed two exceptions to the supplemental report of the master, dated September 17, 1S6S. They are as follows: “First exception. The evidence does not warrant the master in finding, as matter of fact, [1106]*1106'tliat the defendant did not, when he began the use of said process, nor afterwards, while he continued its use, make any difference in the quality of iron used for the manufacture of car-wheels, nor in the weight or form of ear-wheels, nor tiy reason of the use of such process, in their price.’ Second exception. The evidence does not warrant the master in finding, as matter of fact, ‘that the defendant was unable to discover that his business was increased by the use of said process; that it was with a great deal of difficulty that he introduced the annealed wheels; that the railroad companies purchasing from defendant preferred the old wheels, thát is to say, those manufactured by the process used by the defendant prior to April, 1S61, for one or two years after the new annealed wheels, that is to say, the wheels annealed by the process complained of in this cause, were first introduced; and that since the defendant has been enjoined in this cause, and has abandoned the use of the process complained of, he has had the same customers — excepting the Little Miami and the Columbus and Xenia Railroad Companies, and it does not appear that said companies have withdrawn their custom on account of said abandonment — and has sold the wheels he has since manufactured without the process complained of as readily as those manufactured by the use of said process, and at the same prices.’ "

The ground of these exceptions is, that the facts found are not warranted by the evidence before the master. In my judgment they are sustained by that evidence, and the exceptions are. therefore, overruled.

The complainant also excepted to certain parts of the supplemental report of the master of March 23, 1809. The parts of the report to which these exceptions refer are as follows: “ Tl. If, as is claimed by the defendant’s counsel, there is no infringement of the complainant's patent unless the wheels are subjected to the process of reheating, that is to say, if the process of slow cooling used in connection with the reheating is old. and not a part of the complainant’s invention, nor included in his patent, the master finds that no part of the profits realized by the defendant from the manufacture and sale of said wheels was due to the use by him of the complainant’s invention.' ‘V. The master finds that the wheels aforesaid' could have been removed from the molds and finished without being subjected to the reheating process — (1) by placing them in pits as soon as they could be handled, covering them with hot sand, and thereby slow cooling them; (2) by placing them in like manner in pits, without any fuel, covering the pits, and thereby slow cooling them.’ The master finds that wheels so manufactured have, and did have from April 1. 1861, to April 7, 1807. a market value equal to that of wheels manufactured by the use of the process complained of in this cause. But I find that wheels of the material, size, shape, and weight of those manufactured by the defendant, could have been manufactured without the use of extraneous heat, and at less cost by either of the methods described in finding V of this report, and that wheels so manufactured would have had the same market value, in the market where the defendant sold said nineteen thousand eight hundred and nineteen car-wheels, as if extraneous heat had been applied to them, as described in the complainant’s patent, or as used by the defendant.”

The first part of the report covered by these exceptions is not very clearly expressed. It was not denied or questioned by the defendant’s counsel until very recently — so far as I am advised — that the patent does cover the entire process which it describes, of slow cooling in connection with reheating. At the hearing upon the merits, it was expressly admitted by one of the counsel for the complainant, that reheating alone, in connection with subsequent slow cooling, was the invention or discovery of the patentee and what the patent was for. It was conceded that slow cooling was in prior use and previously well known. It was also conceded that slow cooling without reheating would not be an infringement of the patent. The language of the counsel referred to was: “If he Olowry) does not think, as his counsel have argued, that there is any thing in Whitney's idea of reheating, let him adopt Lob-dell’s dry sand process, or some other that is obviously different from ours, so that,” etc. This construction was not dissented from by the other counsel upon the same side who participated in the argument.

It has since been, and is now. claimed by the complainant that the patent covers not only the reheating and slow cooling in combination, making the entire process described, but also the several parts of the process taken separately, including slow cooling without reheating, as where slow cooling alone is used by the alleged infringer. On the other hand. I understand it was claimed before the master by the defendant. that the patent is to be so construed as to limit its effect to reheating, and that if the defendant used slow cooling in connection with reheating, as described in the specification, he is to be held liable only so far as his profits are shown to have been increased by the element of reheating; hence the finding of the master under consideration. To this view of the subject I can not accede.

Whatever else the patent may be for, it is clearly for the process described as an entirety. All the wheels to which the master’s account relates were finished by both reheating and slow cooling. This brings the case clearly within the patent

I do not deem it proper to consider open any question which was foreclosed by my learned brother in settling the decree by which the [1107]*1107case was referred to the master. Whether slow cooling without reheating is covered by the patent, and whether the patentee was the original and first inventor of that process as applied to car-wheels, are inquiries wholly outside of the ease and not necessary to be considered in its proper determination. This hypothetical finding of the master ought not, therefore, to be in the record.

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Bluebook (online)
29 F. Cas. 1105, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitney-v-mowry-circtsdoh-1870.