Whitney Robards v. Rubin "Zach" Bruce

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-1032-MR

WHITNEY ROBARDS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM WEBSTER FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE BRANDI H. ROGERS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00129

RUBIN “ZACH” BRUCE APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, MOYNAHAN, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. MOYNAHAN, JUDGE: Appellant, Whitney Robards (“Mother”), appeals an order of the Webster Family Court modifying the parenting time arrangement for the minor child she shares with Appellee, Rubin “Zach” Bruce (“Father”), and designating the elementary school the child will attend. After careful review of the record, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Mother and Father share a minor daughter (“Child”). They parted ways shortly after her birth, and, pursuant to the original custodial decree entered in October 2021, share joint custody. Mother resides in Henderson County with her parents and another daughter while Father resides in Webster County with his wife and son. Father is employed on a full-time basis by Century Aluminum. His employer sometimes calls him into work unexpectedly or requires overtime with little advance notice to meet staffing needs. In 2023, Mother apparently expressed concern about Father’s being at work during his designated parenting time. It is noted that Child was never unsupervised on these occasions since Father’s wife took care of her, and he also has extended family nearby who are available and willing to babysit on short notice. Father’s wife’s family has also been welcoming to Child, supportive of Father’s parenting obligations, and available for occasional childcare. However, Mother sought—and was granted—a new parenting time order that based the schedule solely on Father’s work hours to address her concern about his being at work during part of his allotted parenting time.

Unfortunately, the 2023 parenting time arrangement Mother requested led to problems upon implementation. First, it required Father to submit his schedule one month in advance when his employer would only provide schedules one week in advance, leading to multiple last-minute changes. Second, since his

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employer frequently calls him into work with little advance notice, the unpredictability had the unintended consequence of Child’s not seeing Mother for over a week whenever Father had to delay the start of his scheduled parenting time. Also, the parties began disagreeing about pick-up and drop-off arrangements whenever changes to Father’s work schedule forced him to start his parenting time later than anticipated. Mother acknowledged that Father’s wife has been instrumental in keeping the visitation schedule on track and has stepped up to perform co-parenting responsibilities admirably. However, due to the ongoing challenges, the parties returned to the family court when Child approached kindergarten age. Mother filed a motion in April 2025 requesting modification of parenting time and a decision on school choice. She asked the court to make her the Child’s primary residential parent, significantly reduce Father’s parenting time, and designate A.B. Chandler Elementary in Henderson County as Child’s school. In a filed response, Father requested to keep the current division of parenting time in place and to designate Dixon Elementary in Webster County as Child’s school.

A mediation attempt proved unsuccessful; therefore, the case proceeded to hearing. After hearing the matter, the family court agreed that the 2023 time sharing arrangement’s built-in unpredictability was incompatible with Child’s upcoming school enrollment. It modified the agreement to equalize the amount of time each parent had physical custody of Child. The new schedule is a

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2/2/3 split schedule wherein Father has Child every Monday and Tuesday, Mother has her every Wednesday and Thursday, and the weekends—consisting of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday—alternate between the two parents.1 The family court then weighed the parents’ competing school choices and designated Dixon Elementary in Webster County as Child’s school. It set forth its reasoning for this choice in detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an Order Modifying Parenting Time and Designating School. Mother timely filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the family court’s order. Notably, Mother is not appealing the revised parenting time schedule; she is only appealing the court’s choice of school.2 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Kentucky law, a family court’s decision in these matters must be based on the best interest of the child. Factual findings applying that standard are reviewed for clear error while decisions based upon those factual findings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Young v. Holmes, 295 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Ky. App. 2009) (citations omitted). Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is

1 Holidays and school breaks are evenly split, and each parent gets one week of vacation.

2 Appellant’s Brief at p. 11.

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defined as “evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998) (citing Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972)); see also Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016). Additionally, “[t]he test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

ANALYSIS

At the outset we note that the controlling principle here, as correctly recognized by the family court, is that the best interests of the child must be served by any decision. Young, 295 S.W.3d at 146 (citing Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Ky. App. 1984)). The family court herein did not alter the underlying 2021 decree that granted the parties joint custody of Child; it modified the visitation agreement used to effectuate that joint custody. Per KRS3 403.320(3), a family court may modify visitation arrangements at any time if doing so is in the child’s best interest. See also Shafizadeh v. Bowles, 366 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Ky. 2011); Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Ky. 2008). Further, parental agreement on school choice is a major component of joint

3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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custody, and when parents cannot agree, the court must determine which school meets the best interests of the child. Swan v. Gatewood, 678 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. App. 2023).

Mother contends that A.B. Chandler Elementary is the better choice for Child. To support this contention, she proffers the U.S. News Rankings of Kentucky elementary schools. Per this for-profit ranking company, A.B. Chandler was ranked Number 171 and Dixon Elementary was ranked Number 469. She states that A.B. Chandler has a better overall student-to-teacher ratio and lists a full page of test scores in the subjects where Henderson County schools outscored Webster County schools on standardized testing metrics. Moreover, Mother alleges that the family court committed clear error and abused its discretion when it brushed aside the fact that Henderson County schools are “head-and-shoulders better” than Webster County schools.

We decline to stoke county rivalries in school matters. A.B. Chandler and Dixon are both small rural elementary schools, and both likely have caring staff who want the best for their students. A.B. Chandler’s test scores are commendable. However, the best interest of the individual child—not parental preference or test scores—is the controlling factor. Here, the family court listed multiple factors that make Dixon the better choice for Child at this stage in her life. There is an existing support system for Child at Dixon where she already knows

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several children. Two of her cousins also attend Dixon as well. Father himself attended Dixon and knows many of the teachers and staff there. His wife has family members working at Dixon, including the vice-principal. In contrast, A.B. Chandler is completely unknown to Mother and Child.4 Finally, there is no evidence in the record that Dixon Elementary is an unsafe physical environment. Nor is there any evidence in the record that Dixon Elementary is significantly understaffed, overcrowded, or subject to state or federal supervision or monitoring. Child does not require special accommodations or services that Dixon would be unable to provide. Ultimately, there is nothing in the record that objectively supports Mother’s statement that her daughter has been “sentenced to” Dixon Elementary as if it were a county jail.

Mother asserts the family court based its choice of school solely on Father’s convenience. However, careful review of the order reveals no intention of accommodating Father over Mother whatsoever. In fact, the subject of convenience to either parent is not mentioned at all. Rather, the order is centered on determining the parenting time arrangement and school that will best meet Child’s needs at this stage in her life. Mother also accuses the family court of engaging in “impermissible speculative reasoning” because it stated she may move

4 Mother’s other daughter, Child’s half-sister, does not attend A.B. Chandler. However, Child’s half-brother will be attending Dixon in the future.

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out of her parents’ house at some future point. Notably, though, the family court also acknowledged that Father may change jobs at some future point.

The family court’s careful delineation of the facts it considered in arriving at its school choice decision constitutes substantial evidence. Therefore, the findings of fact it tendered in this matter are supported by substantial evidence and, thus, not clearly erroneous. Nor is the resulting decision favoring Dixon Elementary an abuse of discretion. The family court based its decision on the best interests of the child in question, and, given the record thoroughly reviewed by the Court, the decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.

A court might have undertaken a different analysis if the parents were debating high school options, because differences in academic, extracurricular, and athletic offerings at that level can directly impact a student’s future opportunities. However, at Child’s age, stability and familiarity have a more direct bearing on creating a positive foundation for her future. Accordingly, we agree with the family court’s sound reasoning, finding Dixon Elementary is the school that can best offer Child this stability and security. With the start of a new school year imminent, both Mother and Father are encouraged to focus their energy on supporting Child’s education at Dixon rather than continuing the pattern of non- cooperation the family court observed.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the order of the Webster Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Austin P. Vowels Patricia A. Corino Henderson, Kentucky Henderson, Kentucky