Whitney Industries, Inc. v. Board of Assessors

48 Misc. 2d 422, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1965 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1292
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 7, 1965
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 48 Misc. 2d 422 (Whitney Industries, Inc. v. Board of Assessors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitney Industries, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 48 Misc. 2d 422, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1965 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1292 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1965).

Opinion

Michael E. Sweeney, J.

These four independent petitioners seek a review under article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law of certain assessments of lands owned by them in the Town of Long Lake, Hamilton County. The matters were argued at the same time since they all pertain to certain alleged illegal assessments made by the Assessors for the 1966 tax roll. The objections to the various assessments, hoivever, are not identical in all four petitions.

The general objections to the assessments are: (1) that the assessments of certain of the lands were illegally increased in violation of section 480 of the Real Property Tax Law (this particular statute will hereafter be referred to as the “ Fisher Act”); (2) that the methods and procedures used by the Assessors in establishing assessments of other properties by including shore frontage values were illegal; and (3) that assessments of property described as “ shore line values of all waters ” in certain townships do not relate to or adequately describe property that may be lawfully assessed.

[424]*424Subdivision 1 of section 720 of the Eeal Property Tax Law provides as follows: “1. If the court determines from the pleadings for any of the reasons alleged in the petition that the assessment being reviewed is illegal it shall order the assessment stricken from the roll, if erroneous or unequal, it shall order a reassessment of the real property of the petitioner or the correction of the assessment upon the roll, in whole or in part, in such manner as shall be in accordance with law or as shall make it conform to other assessments upon the same roll and secure equality of assessment.”

Most of the land in question has been designated “ Fisher Act ” property and it is the legality of the assessments of those lands and allied problems relating to the Fisher Act which will be discussed first. The pertinent parts of the Fisher Act are as follows:

“ § 480. Forest and reforested lands.

“1. In view of the benefits to the state and the municipal corporations therein which will accrue through the reforestation of idle lands, eligible tracts of forest land may be granted an exemption from taxation as hereinafter provided.

“2. As used in this section:

“ (a) ‘Eligible tract ’ means a tract of forest land of at least fifteen acres which has been planted with an average of not less than eight hundred trees per acre, or which has been underplanted with an average of not less than three hundred trees per acre, or upon which the majority of the mature timber has been removed in such a manner as to insure a crop of merchantable timber or pulpwood or upon which, at the time of classification, there is an immature stand sufficient to produce such a crop within thirty years. Any part of such tract covered by water, or consisting of a bog or ledge, or otherwise unsuitable for planting or underplanting, shall be excluded in determining the average number of trees planted or underplanted per acre.

“ (b) ‘ Forest land ’ includes not only lands on which there is tree growth, but also lands which are best adapted to tree growth.

“ (c) ‘ Planted ’ means the setting of suitable forest tree species.

“ (d) ‘ Underplanted ’ means the setting of suitable forest tree species upon land that at the time of planting has some natural forest growth.

“(e) ‘ Immature stand ’ means trees which are left primarily for forest crop production after the removal of a majority of the mature stand.

[425]*4253. Eligible tracts shall be separately assessed for purposes of taxation upon the basis of the value of the land, including the value of any buildings or structures thereon, but excluding the value of such planted or underplanted trees or natural reproduction. The assessment of an eligible tract shall be no higher than the valuation of similar lands without substantial forest growth situated in the same town and at no time shall it exceed the valuation fixed at the time of application for classification is filed as hereinafter provided. Such land shall be so assessed so long as the forest growth shall remain uncut. Upon the removal of the forest growth, it shall be assessed without regard to the provisions of this section.”

Prior to the making up of the 1966 tax roll some 44,217 acres of forest land owned by the petitioner, Whitney Industries, Inc., hereinafter referred to as “Whitney”, and some 13,119 acres of forest land formerly owned by the petitioner Whitney which are presently owned by the petitioner Litchfield Park Corporation, were certified by the Conservation Department of the State of Ñew York as being eligible Fisher Act property. The tax records clearly indicate that the 1966 assessments of the so-called “ Fisher Act ” properties have been increased by the respondent Assessors subsequent to the land being certified by the Conservation Department.

It is the contention of the petitioners that the statute prohibits any increase in the assessed valuation after the land has been certified as Fisher Act property. It is the contention of the respondent Board of Assessors that its procedures were legal; that it did not increase the prior assessment, but simply placed a value on an attribute of the land not previously included. More specifically, the Assessors contend they designated certain areas of the forest properties owned by the petitioners as ‘‘ shore line property”, maintaining, at least inferentially, that this attribute increases the value of the particular area, and, while they had not used this method in previous assessments, they had the legal right to resort to it if they so desired. In other words, it is the position of respondent that the Fisher Act is not applicable to shore frontage lands within private forest lands which have been certified by the Conservation Department.

To justify their method of assessing shore line values ”, the Assessors point out that this method is recommended by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment. It is suffice to say that this circumstance in and of itself does not justify or legalize respondent’s method of assessing if the method otherwise violates an existing statute such as the Fisher Act.

[426]*426By the enactment of the Fisher Act the Legislature desired to encourage the preservation and reforestation of land in the State of New York. The act seeks to accomplish this by offering a tax concession to the owner of lands so designated. The act further provides the manner of obtaining a certification of lands as Fisher Act land and prescribes various conditions, restrictions and prohibitions in the use of the land.

This phase of the proceedings, therefore, narrows to a determination of whether once a tract of land has been duly certified as Fisher Act property, portions of that tract which border on water can be considered exempt from the Fisher Act by the taxing authority. This court cannot find where this precise question has ever been passed upon by our courts. The act itself does not answer the question by specifically referring to “shore line property”. The act does, however, refer to eligible tracts, defining same, and provides: ‘ ‘ Any part of such tract covered by water, or consisting of a bog or ledge, or otherwise unsuitable for planting or underplanting, shall be excluded in determining the average number of trees planted or underplanted per acre.”

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Bluebook (online)
48 Misc. 2d 422, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1965 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitney-industries-inc-v-board-of-assessors-nysupct-1965.