Whitney Engel v. Bunn-O-Matic Corporation
This text of Whitney Engel v. Bunn-O-Matic Corporation (Whitney Engel v. Bunn-O-Matic Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-05-064-CV
WHITNEY ENGEL APPELLANT
V.
BUNN-O-MATIC CORPORATION APPELLEE
------------
FROM THE 342ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION (footnote: 1)
I. Introduction
In one point, appellant Whitney Engel appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Bunn-O-Matic Corporation. We affirm.
II. Background Facts
In her petition, appellant claimed that on August 6, 2000, while she was working as a waitress at the Denny’s Classic Diner on North Cooper in Arlington, Texas, she received an electrical shock while cleaning the restaurant’s model OT-35 coffee maker. Appellee manufactured the coffee maker. Appellant alleges that as a result of the electrical shock, she fell to the floor, was knocked unconscious, and suffered injuries to her head, back, neck, shoulders, and arms. Appellant filed claims against appellee for design, manufacturing, operating, and marketing defects of the coffee maker.
On August 5, 2004, appellee filed a traditional and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellant had presented no evidence of causation. On September 15, appellee filed a supplement to its motions for summary judgment, along with supplemental evidence, (footnote: 2) asserting that there was no medical evidence in support of appellant’s allegations that she received an electrical shock from the coffee maker. On September 22, appellee filed additional supplemental evidence in support of its motions for summary judgment, which contained drawings of the coffee maker and its parts.
On October 28, appellant filed a reply and objections to appellee’s motions for summary judgment. Appellant attached expert reports from Charles Cody Jeffcoat, a senior electrical engineer at Fujitsu Network Communications, his own company, opining that the coffee maker caused appellant’s injuries. In appellant’s reply, she asserted that appellee failed to show as a matter of law that there were no disputed factual issues. On November 4, appellee filed a reply and objections to appellant’s summary judgment evidence. Also on November 4, in response, appellant filed an emergency response to appellee’s reply along with objections stating that although she had not prepared medical affidavits from experts, both she and Jeffcoat reference her injuries. That same day, the trial court heard arguments on the summary judgment motions and on November 15, the trial court entered an order granting appellee’s motions for summary judgment “in their entirety.” The trial court did not expressly rule on appellee’s objections.
III. Assignment of Error
Appellant presents one point on appeal challenging the granting of the summary judgment. Appellee claims that because appellant’s point on appeal focuses on only one ground, we should affirm the trial court’s order on the remaining grounds. See Wright v. Fowler , 991 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. App.སྭFort Worth 1999, no pet.).
Appellee moved for summary judgment on three bases; two under the no-evidence standard and one under the traditional standard: (1) there was no evidence of the essential element of causation for each of appellant’s claims, (2) there was no medical evidence in support of appellant’s allegation that she suffered an electrical shock from the coffee maker, and (3) the evidence in the case conclusively showed that the coffee maker could not have caused appellant’s alleged injuries, the traditional motion.
In the table of contents to appellant’s brief, she states her point on appeal as, “The Trial Court erroneously granted summary judgment to Appellee Bunn-o-Matic Corporation on a basis of no evidence and the trial court erred in not considering the Affidavits and Reports of Appellant’s expert and Appellant’s own sworn testimony as summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact,” citing only rule 166a(i). [Emphasis added.] Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). However, in her argument, appellant states her point on appeal as, “The Trial Court erroneously granted summary judgment to Appellee BUNN-O-MATIC CORPORATION on a basis of no evidence of causation and the Trial Court erred in not considering the Affidavit and Report of Appellant’s expert and Appellant’s own sworn testimony as summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to causation,” again citing only rule 166a(i). [Emphasis added.]. Id. Nowhere in appellant’s brief does she cite the traditional summary judgment rule, rule 166a(c), even though s he discusses the conflicting evidence regarding whether the coffee maker could have ever shorted out. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
We construe the first part of appellant’s argument as a specific challenge to appellee’s rule 166a(i) no-evidence summary judgment motion on causation only and the latter part as a specific challenge to causation under a traditional summary judgment motion. Thus, she failed to assign error to appellee’s only ground that was not related to causationསྭthat there was no medical evidence in support of appellant’s allegations that she suffered an electrical shock from the coffee maker. (footnote: 3)
When the trial court's judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made. Wright , 991 S.W.2d at 349; see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1970); cf. Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortg., Inc ., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex. App.སྭHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that if appellant brings a general point, they must provide argument for each summary judgment bases in the argument of the brief). Because appellant did not assign error to the ground that there was no medical evidence to show that she was shocked and, thus, injured, we overrule appellant’s sole point.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
JUSTICE
PANEL F: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and MCCOY, JJ.
CAYCE, C.J. concurs without opinion.
MCCOY, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
DELIVERED: February 23, 2006
NO. 2-05-064-CV
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION (footnote: 1)
I respectfully dissent.
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