Whitman v. United States Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-0478
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KEVIN LEWIS WHITMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-478 (TSC)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Kevin Lewis Whitman, a self-proclaimed “Sovereign Israelite Principal”

and “Treaty Beneficiary of the House of David,” filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking

to compel the Justice Department “to investigate treaty violations” arising out of the “ethnic

cleansing, medical neglect, and genocide against 30 million Israelites.” See Pl.’s Mot. for

Contempt & Sanctions at 1, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff has since filed five motions, including one which

falsely claims that the court entered a sealed order on April 23, 2025, directing the Government to

disburse $100 million to Plaintiff’s escrow account “for emergency medical relief to mitigate

genocide harm”—an order the court never issued. Id. at 2. Because the court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s patently insubstantial mandamus petition, it will sua sponte DISMISS

this case and DENY as moot all pending motions. See Cherdak v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 443 F.

Supp. 3d 134, 158 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because the court lacks jurisdiction over this case, the court

cannot resolve the other pending motions.”).

Although “pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than other complaints,

even a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Carmichael v. Pompeo, 486 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Curran

Page 1 of 3 v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009)). Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction

over any complaint that is “patently insubstantial,” such that it “present[s] no federal question

suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best

v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)

(“Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to

entertain claims . . . if they are . . . wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, [or] plainly

unsubstantial[.] (cleaned up)). Claims qualify as “patently insubstantial” if they rely on “any

bizarre conspiracy theories.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330. In evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court “may consider materials outside the pleadings.” Leopold v. Manger, 630 F. Supp. 3d 71, 77

(D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir.

2005)). Thus, to understand Plaintiff’s near unintelligible mandamus petition, the court will

consider Plaintiff’s more comprehensible expression of his request for mandamus as set forth in

his Motion for Contempt and Sanctions. See Pl.’s Mot. for Contempt & Sanctions at 2–3.

The court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s mandamus petition because it fails to present a

federal question suitable for decision. Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1010. Plaintiff relies on the bizarre

conspiracy theory that a group of 30 million “sovereign Israelites,” of which he is a “Principal,”

are being subject to ethnic cleansing, medical neglect, and genocide, in violation of an assortment

of treaties including the Paris Treaty of 1763, which ended the French and Indian War, and the

Lateran Treaty of 1929, under which Italy recognized the sovereignty of Vatican City. See Pl.’s

Mot. for Contempt & Sanctions at 2–3. Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations are so fanciful and his

legal theories so insubstantial that Plaintiff’s petition is “absolutely devoid of merit” and therefore

insufficient to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536 (cleaned up).

Page 2 of 3 Even if the court had jurisdiction, it would dismiss Plaintiff’s mandamus petition for failure

to state a claim. A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim

when “it is patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.

Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Rollins v.

Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (same). A “writ of mandamus is an

extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988). Thus, a “party seeking mandamus has the burden

of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff

“does not have a clear and indisputable right” to a writ of mandamus ordering the Justice

Department to investigate alleged treaty violations “because the Executive Branch has absolute

discretion to decide whether to conduct an investigation or prosecute a case.” Berry v. FBI, 464

Fed. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 2012) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,

693 (1974)). Therefore, it is patently obvious that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the

extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, ECF

No. 1, is DISMISSED and all pending motions are DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall close

this case.

SO ORDERED.

Date: December 17, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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