Whitman v. Sunrise Premiere Pool Builders

58 Va. Cir. 293, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 55
CourtVirginia Circuit Court
DecidedMarch 4, 2002
DocketCase No. (Law) 199082
StatusPublished

This text of 58 Va. Cir. 293 (Whitman v. Sunrise Premiere Pool Builders) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Virginia Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitman v. Sunrise Premiere Pool Builders, 58 Va. Cir. 293, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 55 (Va. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

By Judge Arthur B. Vieregg

This action came before me for argument on Friday, February 22, 2002, on the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative to stay plaintiffs’, the Whitmans’, action for damages suffered by the defendants’ breach of “contract” to build a swimming pool.1 Defendants’ motion is based on the fact that the parties agreed in the Contract to resolve any disputes by arbitration. Paragraph 16 provided:

Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled in arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.

The Whitmans opposed defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay pending arbitration by maintaining that the parties’ Contract was unenforceable [294]*294because it was printed in type that was so small as not to conform to Virginia Code § 11-4.2 3That statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

No contract in writing entered into between a citizen of this Commonwealth and any person, firm, company or corporation, domestic or foreign, doing business in this Commonwealth, for the sale and delivery of any good or chattels, machinery or mechanical devices, or personal property ofany kind or sort whatsoever, shall be binding upon the purchaser, where the form is printed and furnished by the person, firm, company or corporation, unless all the provisions of such contract are clearly and plainly printed or written; and, where printed, such provisions and covenants and all stipulations as to the rights of the vendor shall be in type not less than the size known as ten point; and wherever, in such contract, printed on a form furnished by the vendor, it is stipulated that the vendor is not to be bound by any verbal agreement or modification of the terms of such printed contract, then such printed as a separate paragraph or paragraphs and in a type not smaller than pica....

(Emphasis added.)

The statute contains examples of ten-point and pica type. A review of the Contract demonstrates (1) that most of its print is smaller than both ten-point and pica type; and (2) that Section 11 on the reverse side of the Contract, which is written in type smaller than ten-point and pica type, purports to negate the existence of oral agreements. The arbitration provision is also printed in this miniscule type. Because it is printed in such small type, it is plain that z/ Virginia Code § 11-4 |overns the enforceability of the Contract, the Whitmans are not bound by it/

[295]*295Although the Contract is not the model of clarity, it appears to represent an agreement for the construction of a swimming pool. Furthermore, the plaintiff has averred that to be the case. See, Motion for Judgment, ¶ 4.4 The question thus becomes whether or not Virginia Code § 11-4 governs the Contract to construct this swimming pool.

A review of the provision of the Contract discloses that the defendants were to excavate a site on the Whitmans’ land for the pool; construct the pool in accordance with certain plans and specifications; and to install certain equipment related to the pool. The Contract enumerates certain equipment, all of which is apparently to be attached to or incorporated into the pool structure. This equipment, through its incorporation into the pool structure, appears to constitute fixtures to the Whitmans’ real estate. Transco Corp. v. Prince William County, 210 Va. 550, 555 (1970); State Highway & Transp. Comm ’r v. Edwards Co., 220 Va. 90, 94 (1979).

The question dispositive of whether or not Va. Code § 11-4 applies to the Contract is whether or not an agreement to construct a swimming pool constitutes a contract “for the sale and delivery of any good or chattels, machinery or mechanical devices, or personal property of any kind or sort whatsoever.” Va. Code § 11-4. This issue may be decided in accordance with the cardinal “plain-meaning rule” of statutory construction. Vollin v. Arlington County Electoral Bd., 216 Va. 674, 679 (1976). The plain meaning of the statutory language adopted by the General Assembly in enacting § 11-4 demonstrates that the statute refers only to contracts for the sale and delivery of personalty. The statutory language neither purports to deal with personalty that has transformed into fixtures, which by definition constitutes real, not personal, property, nor does the language of § 11-4 purport to relate to personalty incorporated into a construction project, which, as such, is not capable of delivery. Accordingly, § 11-4 simply is inapplicable to the parties’ contract.

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the parties’ construction contract does not fall within the ambit of contracts governed by § 11-4.

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Related

State Highway & Transportation Commissioner v. Edwards Co.
255 S.E.2d 500 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1979)
Vollin v. Arlington County Electoral Board
222 S.E.2d 793 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1976)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Prince William County
172 S.E.2d 757 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
58 Va. Cir. 293, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitman-v-sunrise-premiere-pool-builders-vacc-2002.