Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Commission

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Commission

160 S.E. 827, 201 N.C. 539, 1931 N.C. LEXIS 30

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 28, 1931

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 160 S.E. 827 (Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 160 S.E. 827, 201 N.C. 539, 1931 N.C. LEXIS 30 (N.C. 1931).

Pincite

Opinion

Clarkson, J.

Plaintiff, in bis request to tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission that bis claim be allowed, states: “We have been unable to agree because I believe tbe accident happened while I was in tbe performance of my duties to tbe State Highway Commission, and therefore, I am entitled to compensation.” Plaintiff’s contention was correct, in part, be was on duty when tbe unfortunate accident happened by which be lost tbe vision of bis left eye. An unfortunate and deplorable occurrence and tbe sorrow of tbe party who did tbe injury is thus expressed: “I am willing to do' anything, for him I can. I bated tbe accident so bad. I have never bit anything when I bunted before. I would not have done it for anything in tbe world. I did not sleep any for two or three nights worrying about it.”

Recovery by tbe workman can be only “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in tbe course of tbe employment,” etc. Public Laws 1929, chap. 120, part sec. 4.

From plaintiff’s request it may be noted that be says “tbe accident happened while I was in the performance of my duties.” This is correct, but tbe law goes further — it must not only be when be is 'on duty “in tbe course of tbe employment,” but tbe compensation is “for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in tbe course of tbe employment.” Humanitarian ideals prompted the passage of tbe act and *541 this Court in considering tbe bigb purpose, has given it a liberal construction, but we cannot stretch tbe act to say tbe unfortunate accident to plaintiff arose out of tbe employment. Tbe general principle stated by plaintiff in cases cited is correct, but not applicable to tbe facts in tbis actipn.

We tbink there is no causal relation between tbe accident and tbe employment. For tbe reasons given tbe judgment of tbe court below is

Affirmed.

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Clarkson, J.

Plaintiff, in bis request to tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission that bis claim be allowed, states: “We have been unable to agree because I believe tbe accident happened while I was in tbe performance of my duties to tbe State Highway Commission, and therefore, I am entitled to compensation.” Plaintiff’s contention was correct, in part, be was on duty when tbe unfortunate accident happened by which be lost tbe vision of bis left eye. An unfortunate and deplorable occurrence and tbe sorrow of tbe party who did tbe injury is thus expressed: “I am willing to do' anything, for him I can. I bated tbe accident so bad. I have never bit anything when I bunted before. I would not have done it for anything in tbe world. I did not sleep any for two or three nights worrying about it.”

Recovery by tbe workman can be only “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in tbe course of tbe employment,” etc. Public Laws 1929, chap. 120, part sec. 4.

From plaintiff’s request it may be noted that be says “tbe accident happened while I was in the performance of my duties.” This is correct, but tbe law goes further — it must not only be when be is 'on duty “in tbe course of tbe employment,” but tbe compensation is “for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in tbe course of tbe employment.” Humanitarian ideals prompted the passage of tbe act and *541 this Court in considering tbe bigb purpose, has given it a liberal construction, but we cannot stretch tbe act to say tbe unfortunate accident to plaintiff arose out of tbe employment. Tbe general principle stated by plaintiff in cases cited is correct, but not applicable to tbe facts in tbis actipn.

We tbink there is no causal relation between tbe accident and tbe employment. For tbe reasons given tbe judgment of tbe court below is

Affirmed.

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160 S.E. 827, 201 N.C. 539, 1931 N.C. LEXIS 30, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitley-v-north-carolina-state-highway-commission-nc-1931.

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