Whitenack v. Stryker

2 N.J. Eq. 8
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJanuary 15, 1838
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 2 N.J. Eq. 8 (Whitenack v. Stryker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N.J. Eq. 8 (N.J. Ct. App. 1838).

Opinion

The Ordinary.

The principles of law applicable to cases of this character have become well settled, and it is very important to adhere to those rules which long experience iras fully tested to be wise, in considering so important a question as that of the capacity of-a testator. The following general rules and principles (and which are all that are necessary to be ascertained 'for the purposes of this cause) may, 1 think, be considered as well settled. In fact, upon the hearing there seemed to be no difference among tire counsel as to the general principles of law, but the case turned mainly on the evidence. The first principle is, that the presumption of law is in favor of capacity, and that he who insists on tire contrary has tire burden of proof, except where insanity in the testator has been shown to exist at a time previous to the execution of the will; in that case the onus is shifted, and the party offering the will is bound to show that it was executed at a lucid interval. 2. That the time of the execution of the will is tire material period to which tire court must look, to ascertain the state of mind of the testator; that although it is competent evidence to show the testator’s mind at any time previous or subsequent to the execution of the will, yet such proof is always liable to be overcome if it be satisfactorily shown that the testator, at the time he executed the writing, had the possession of his faculties. 3. That of all the witnesses the testamentary witnesses, and their opinions, and tire facts they state as occurring at the time, are to be particularly regarded by the court. They -are placed around the testator for the very purpose of attesting, after his death, to the circumstances under which so solemn an instrument is executed. 4. That the opinions of [12]*12witnesses other than the testamentary witnesses, as to the capacity of the testator, are to be received as the slightest kind of evidence, except so far as those- opinions are based on facts .and occurrences which are detailed before the court. It is most evident, that if the mete opinion of a witness as to the testator’s capacity was to prevail, it would become necessary for the court to become acquainted with the witnesses themselves; for while the view of such a question which a man of strong clear mind and knowledge might take, would be very important, that of another of a different character would have very little weight. Besides, it will b.e found that every witness has a standard of capacity of .his own,, and-he judges'.all cáses by that rule.. Witnesses are to state the facts, and it is the business of the court from those facts to pronounce the opinion, upon settled rules and guides, whether .the testator is competent or not. And 5, That old age, failure of memory, and even drunkenness, do not of themselves necessarily take .away .a testator’s capacity. He may be ever so aged, very infirm in body, and in habits of intemperance, and yet in the eye, of the law possess that sound mind necessary to a disposition .of his estate.

These principles will be found to be fully supported, and more .at large, in the following cases 4 Washington Cir. Ct. Reports, 262, 9; 11 Vesey, 11; 5 Cond. Eccles. Rep. 411; 1 Ibid, 47; 2 Ibid, 371; 1 Swinb. 122; 5 John. Ch. 158-9 ; 2 Phillips on Evidence, 191; 8 Mass. 371.

Holding myself bound by these rules, and which must approve themselves to the judgment of every man, I come to consider the main question in the cause : Was the testator, at the time-he executed the two codicils in question, of sound and disposing mind and memory ? , -

The first .witness whose evidence I shall consider, is Nicholas Williamson. He is a witness to both the codicils, and a neighbor of the testator. He says the testator executed the first and second codicils in his presence, and in the presence of the other subscribing witnesses,; that he frequently called to see the testator as a neighbor, and never perceived his mind failed him. He cannot [13]*13say whether he was sent for, or came in accidentally at the time of executing the first codicil. The testator informed him that he had been to Somerville and consulted governor Yroom about making a codicil to his will, and not having the will with him, the governor told him that he would write a codicil and send him. He handed to witness the copy of the codicil which the governor had drawn, and requested him to draw one according to that form, which he did at once, and having first read it to the testator asked him if it was right, and he said it was. He said the governor told him if there was room enough on the will, he might write the codicil on it, if not it might be written on a separate paper and annexed to it. The testator explained to him his reasons for making this first codicil. One of his executois was dead, and another he wished changed. He wanted Henry ‘Whitenack in the place of judge Stryker. He said judge Stryker had not used him well; that he had requested the judge to do some business for him which he had not done, and further that he had not paid that respect to him which lie thought was due him. The witness says he had considerable conversation with testator on that occasion ; lie seemed impressed that if judge Stryker was continued executor, tilings would not work well with his estate. They talked about the revolutionary war. Testator told him that wlieu the enemy were at Brunswick he acted as pilot to scouting parties; that the enemy found it out, and he dare not stay at home at night. lie says he expressed himself rationally. Witness says testator was as sane as when they were young men together. He appeared to understand perfectly the situation and circumstances of his family, and the disposition of his property. Testator wrote his own name to the first codicil, and published and declared the same as his codicil. ’Witness thinks Mr. Baird came, for him when second codicil was executed. That testator, about, a week before, had told witness he meant to alter his will as it is altered in the second codicil; that he meant to have it done by a lawyer, as it was important to his family. He then stated his reasons; that ho had an estate he had worked hard for, and he could not bear to see it squandered in the way [14]*14he saw it was going by his sons-in-law. That the way they were going on, they would spend all in a short time. He wished his daughters to have a living, and his estate to go to his grandchildren in remembrance of what he had done. He dwelt on the idea that his sons-in-law wanted to make him out an idiot. Testator evinced no want of understanding. Said he had been •advised to cut off his sons-in-law, but he would not. They were all his children. The sons-in-law had used him ill, but be wanted to distribute his property equally among his children. At the time of executing the second codicil, witness says testator repeated the same things. At the execution of the second codicil, it was read to testator by the witness, and he was asked if it was as he wanted, and he said it was. Testator then signed. At that time witness says testator had his reason as well as ever, or he should never have witnessed the codicil. There was considerable conversation. Witness knew testator near fifty years, and lived within a mile of him for thirty years immediately preceding his death. He went to see him often; for the last eight or ten years, every three or four months. Testator was poor in bodily health for the last years of his life; was subject to the asthma. He was close in money matters. Witness drew leases of lands •for testator every winter down to the one preceding his death.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 N.J. Eq. 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitenack-v-stryker-njsuperctappdiv-1838.