Whitehouse v. Pine

163 F. Supp. 888, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4056
District Court, E.D. New York·Decided July 15, 1958·No. Civ. A. No. 14026·Published

Opinion

BYERS, Chief Judge.

This controversy in which the plaintiff seeks an accounting from the defendant, has to do with his stewardship concerning his handling of a reserve fund originally stated at $50,000, which existed on the books of a partnership of which the defendant, and Alfred E. Whitehouse (who died in February of 1946) were the members; it terminated on May 31,1944, as its terms recite.

The defendant was the general partner and the said Whitehouse a special partner.

The partnership agreement constitutes Exhibit B attached to the complaint, and the portion which is material to this controversy is found in Subdivision VIA-3:

“The establishment of a reserve fund in the sum of $50,000, of which ‘Whitehouse’ and ‘Pine’ shall each have a one-half interest, to be established specifically for the purpose of meeting any contingent claims which may arise from or through the dissolution of the corporation known as Whitehouse & Pine, Inc. Upon dissolution, termination or expiration of the partnership, the balance in this fund herein established shall be [889]*889divided equally between ‘White-house’ and ‘Pine’.”

The partnership purpose was to effectuate the distribution of the corporate assets of the said corporation, of which these partners had been equal owners of the entire capital stock.

The corporate business was to act as commission broker in the foreign and domestic sale of products manufactured by others. The corporation was organized January 1, 1940, and its earnings were commissions on sales of the said products which averaged 10% ; the company prospered for about two years, at the end of which time dissolution was decided upon as the result of differences of opinion between Whitehouse and Pine.

It is of importance that the corporation assets then consisted almost entirely of commissions receivable arising from sales made during the said two years. There was no tangible property, such as plant or merchandise inventory, and the evidence that there was such a thing as corporate capital, was found in books and records.

The distribution of the corporate assets obviously meant the collection of commissions receivab’e, and such distribution was to be contrived through the operations of the said partnership.

This reserve account was identified as such upon the books of the partnership. As to this, Pine has testified as follows:

“Q. But there did come a time when that fund was established ?
“A. Yes. The fund was established in the books of the partnership.”

The foregoing means that the reserve account was identified as such in the financial records of the partnership; it never existed in the form of, for instance, funds separately invested, but of course its legal existence was as complete as though a special bank account had been established for the deposit of the reserve, or other steps had been taken to segregate it.

This is a convenient place to note that by the agreement of counsel the balance in the capital account as to which the plaintiff demands an accounting, is most recently agreed to be the sum of $38,-621.49.

One reason for the formation of the partnership was to lend credence to the theory that the receivables of the corporation being distributed by the partnership, were by that process transmuted from income into capital, and therefore taxable as for capital gains.

As might have been anticipated, that theory did not command acceptance by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue; in 1943 a redetermination of the corporate and individual income tax liabilities was made, with the result that a sum in excess of $900,000 was assessed against the corporation. That development is the main explanation of the present controversy, because the position of the Government involved not only a deficiency in the corporate income taxes, but asserted transferee liability on the part of these two stockholders; the asserted increased liability of the latter with reference to their personal income taxes was of course a separate thing, and so far as Whitehouse was concerned, it is not argued that any duty arose on the part of Pine with respect thereto..

The partnership agreement provided for the payment of reasonable expenses and outlays in connection with the conduct of its affairs, including a $20,000 annual salary to Pine, payable monthly; then, the establishment of the reserve fund above referred to, and thereafter the distribution of capital to the partners.

The testimony is that Whitehouse received his first $100,000 in December of 1942, and so did Pine; a second distribution occurred soon thereafter (probably early in 1943) to Whitehouse of a second $100,000, and a like sum to Pine (less an unexplained deduction of some $1,200) but his testimony is that he left his share in the business.

Another claim made by the Government was under the renegotiation clause of one or more of the contracts under [890]*890which the corporation had done business with various departments of the Government.

That claim seems to have been advanced in 1945 and without discussing the testimony in detail, I am convinced that Whitehouse was apprized of both the asserted tax liabilities and the renegotiation claim, prior to his death; that he was in communication with the defendant Pine in connection with those matters; further that he specifically agreed that as to the sum of $7,500 paid to an accounting firm in connection with tax matters, a deduction therefor was proper from the reserve account. It does not follow, however, that Pine was given a free rein to expend Whitehouse’s half of the remaining portion of the reserve fund, entirely at his own discretion.

Pine’s status as contemplated by the partnership agreement, was clearly of a fiduciary nature with respect to the Whitehouse share of the distribution through the functioning of the partnership; Pine thus was a liquidating partner in a firm which itself was a liquidating medium of the corporation. This means that it is proper to exact from him a clear and coherent statement of the items which he disbursed' from the reserve fund, in order that a conscionable portion of the total sum may be found to be justly chargeable to the account of the deceased Whitehouse.

In general the defense to the action is that all disbursements which he has made are properly deductible, and therefore half of the total should be charged against the plaintiff.

In the effort to simplify the issues presented in this action, a stipulation of record was entered into as follows:

“It is stipulated and agreed by the attorneys for the respective parties that the following amounts have been paid to the following persons; that these amounts constitute the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered by these persons; that these amounts were paid for services rendered in the tax and renegotiation matters arising 'from and through the dissolution of Whitehouse & Pine, Inc. as follows:
N. R. Caine & Co., accountant $17,500.
* * * But as to this payment it is further stipulated that if this amount is in error, a further stipulation correcting the same will be filed with this Court.
Lawrence Baker, attorney 6,732.30
Robert Riffkin, accountant 354.

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Whitehouse v. Pine, 163 F. Supp. 888, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4056 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).

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