White v. United States of America

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided October 6, 2022·No. 3:18-cv-01682·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIAM A. WHITE, #13888-084, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 18-cv-01682-JPG ) USA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court for a decision on Defendant USA’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution filed August 23, 2022. (Doc. 60). The Government seeks dismissal of the action with prejudice based on William White’s failure to update his address and/or prosecute his claims. (Id.). For the reasons set forth herein, the motion shall be GRANTED. Background Plaintiff William White filed this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, for negligent spoliation of evidence, denial of medical care, and infliction of emotional distress by officials at three facilities in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) dating back to 2008. (See Docs. 1, 14). After screening the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court allowed White to proceed with four claims, identified as Counts 1, 2, 7, and 8, and dismissed three other claims, identified as Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, with prejudice. (Doc. 19). Counts 1 and 2 arose from the negligent spoliation of evidence. The claims survived screening, but they were later dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 33). This dismissal was with prejudice. (Id.). Two claims remained: Counts 7 and 8. Count 7 stemmed from allegations of medical negligence, and Count 8 arose from allegations of negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 19). These claims survived review under Rule 12(b)(6). (See Doc. 33, p. 10) (citing Young v. United States, 942 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2019)). However, the Court warned White that they would be dismissed at summary judgment, if he did not support them with the affidavit and medical report

described in 735 ILCS § 5/2-622. (Id.). The Government then moved for summary judgment on Counts 7 and 8 for noncompliance with 735 ILCS § 5/2-622, prompting the Court to dismiss Count 7, in its entirety, and Count 8, to the extent it duplicated the medical malpractice claim in Count 7. (Docs. 36, 44, 55). The dismissal of both claims was with prejudice. (Docs. 44, 55). As of September 9, 2021, the only remaining claim was the “standalone FTCA claim against the United States for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) resulting from the falsification of White’s medical records in order to conceal his requests for PTSD treatment” in Count 8.1 (Id.). On October 4, 2021, White attempted to file an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s summary judgment decision, but the Court returned the notice of appeal to him citing a districtwide filing restriction that took effect on September 27, 2021.2 White complained about the return of

this notice of appeal in two appeals challenging the filing restriction, in White v. Collis, et al., App. No. 21-2881 and White v. USA, App. 21-2835. However, he did not re-file the notice of appeal in this case. Records show no other filings made or attempted by White since October 4, 2021.

1 On August 30, 2021, White sought leave to file a second amended complaint in order to add a new defendant and eighteen new claims pursuant to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, but his motion was denied. (See Docs. 54, 59). 2 The districtwide filing restriction prohibited White from filing any new civil actions and any pleadings in a pending or new action. See White v. Collis, et al., Case No. 20-cv-01117-JPG (Doc. 24) and White v. USA, Case No. 17-cv-00683-JPG (Doc. 116). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later stayed that portion of the filing restriction extending to notices of appeal pending its review of the districtwide filing restriction. See White v. United States of America, Case Nos. 21-2835 and 21-2881 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022). However, the filing restriction against White was ultimately affirmed. See White v. United States of America, Case Nos. 21-2835 and 21-2881 (7th Cir. June. 16, 2022). Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute Almost a year later, the Government moved for dismissal of this action based on White’s failure to prosecute his remaining claim. (Doc. 60). The Government points out that White has taken no steps to move his remaining claim forward in the past year. (Id.). He has also failed to notify the Court of his address changes. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-7). The motion states: “BOP transferred

Plaintiff from USP Marion to USP Terre Haute on January 16, 2022. (Att. 1). Since then, BOP has also transferred Plaintiff to FCI Cumberland where he is presently housed.” (Id.) (citing White v. Fields, et al., Case No. 20-cv-751-NJR (see Docs. 37, 40)). Even so, the Court has received no address change notification from him in this matter. Because White has evidenced his intent to abandon what remains of Count 8, the Government asks that this case be dismissed with prejudice based on his failure to prosecute his claim herein. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 8-9, 11). Discussion Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may seek dismissal of an action “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with the[ ] rules or a federal court

order.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). However, it is not always necessary for a defendant to file a motion. A district court has inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for want of prosecution. Williams v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998); Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2006); Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 446 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2006). Dismissal is just one of the tools available to a court “to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Williams, 155 F.3d at 857 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). Dismissal is a harsh sanction and should only be used “in extreme situations, when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing.” Williams, 155 F.3d at 857 (quoting Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3d 1297, 1299 (7th Cir. 1998)). In this particular case, the Court deems dismissal appropriate. Beyond filing his notice of interlocutory appeal, White has taken no other action to move this matter forward in the past year. At the same time, he has continued to litigate other cases. See, e.g., White v. Collis, et al., App.

No. 21-2881; see also White v. USA, App. 21-2835. In fact, he has litigated his appeals from start to finish. Id. White has also disregarded Local Rule 3(b) and this Court’s Order to promptly notify the Court of any address change that occurs while a case is pending. See SDIL-Local Rule 3(b). This Court advised White of his ongoing obligation to timely notify the Court of his whereabouts: You are ADVISED that you have a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed of any change in your address.

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