White v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 385, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEVON WHITE, § § No. 385, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. N2212005964 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: January 9, 2025 Decided: March 4, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Devon White, filed this appeal from his sentencing for a

violation of probation (“VOP”). The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s

judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the

appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) On October 7, 2023, White resolved multiple charges by pleading

guilty to strangulation 1 and terroristic threatening. The charges arose from conduct

1 According to the plea agreement, White pleaded guilty to strangulation as a class D felony. See 11 Del. C. § 607(b)(1) (effective Aug. 4, 2022, to present) (providing that strangulation is a class that occurred on December 13, 2022. The Superior Court sentenced White as

follows: for strangulation, effective December 14, 2022, eight years of

imprisonment, with credit for twenty-eight days served, suspended after two years

for one year of Level III probation with GPS monitoring; and for terroristic

threatening, one year of imprisonment, suspended for one year of Level III

probation.

(3) On June 28, 2024, a probation officer filed an administrative warrant

alleging that White had violated probation. The VOP report alleged that White was

released from prison at 10:20 a.m. on June 27, 2024, fitted with a GPS monitor.

Approximately an hour and a half later, at 11:57 a.m., White cut off the monitor and

absconded from the state.

(4) At the VOP hearing, White admitted the VOP and the Superior Court

adjudicated White to be in violation of probation. The probation officer explained

that White’s rapid removal of his GPS monitor caused an “uproar,” prompted

officers to assist White’s victim with finding alternate housing while White’s

location was unknown, and led to a “long manhunt involving six different agencies”

across state lines. White was eventually located in Pennsylvania and returned to

Delaware. The officer stated that while searching for White officers listened to his

D felony, unless certain aggravating facts make it a class B felony). The sentencing range for a class D felony is zero to eight years in prison. 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(4). 2 prison phone calls and learned that “he basically had this whole plan when he got

out to do exactly what he did, cut [the monitor] off and flee.” The officer stated that

there had also been threats toward White’s victim and her family. White requested

leniency, stating that his conduct in prison was good; his father had recently died;

he was from New York and did not have family or other support in Delaware; and

he had requested to be released to Level IV Plummer Center, where he could receive

employment and housing assistance, but had been denied because GPS monitoring

is not permitted at Plummer Center.

(5) The court sentenced White as follows: for strangulation, five years and

two months of imprisonment, suspended after three years for six months at Level IV

DOC Discretion, followed by one year of Level III probation with GPS monitoring;

for terroristic threatening, one year of imprisonment, suspended after six months for

one year of Level III probation. On appeal to this Court, White argues that the

Superior Court should have imposed a lower sentence because he told the probation

officer that he had nowhere to live in Delaware but was not provided reentry

services, and the sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines established by the

Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”). He does not claim that he

did not violate probation.

3 (6) “It is well-established that appellate review of sentences is extremely

limited.” 2 Our review of a sentence generally ends upon a determination that the

sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature. 3 If the sentence

falls within the statutory limits, we consider only whether it is based on factual

predicates that are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability; judicial

vindictiveness or bias; or a closed mind.4 When sentencing a defendant for a VOP,

the trial court may impose any period of incarceration up to and including the

balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on the original sentence. 5

(7) White does not assert that the Superior Court imposed more Level V

time than remained on his original sentences. The SENTAC guidelines are non-

binding and do not provide a basis for appeal if the sentence falls within prescribed

statutory limits. 6 Moreover, the sentencing judge found aggravating factors,

including a continued threat to the victim of White’s crimes, repetitive criminal

conduct, and flagrant defiance of the court’s authority. White has not established

any basis to conclude that his VOP sentences exceeded the Level V time remaining

on his original sentences or are otherwise subject to reversal.

2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006). 3 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 4 Kurzmann, 903 A.2d at 714. 5 11 Del. C. § 4334(c). 6 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 845. 4 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice