F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
GERARD DALE WHITE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6258 H.N. “SONNY” SCOTT; ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 97-CV-439) GENERAL OF THE STATE OF (W.D. Okla.) OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Petitioner Gerard Dale White was convicted by a jury of first degree
murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals in a summary opinion. White then filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma alleging several grounds for relief. The
district court refused to grant the writ and refused to issue a certificate of
appealability. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm
the district court. 1
White initially argues that because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, in affirming his conviction, issued only a summary opinion he was
deprived of due process. There is no merit to this claim. As the magistrate judge
explained, there is no constitutional requirement that an appellate court
accompany a decision with a written opinion. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S.
191, 194 n.4 (1972); see also King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 526 (10th Cir.
1995) (specifically finding no constitutional infirmity in Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision to use summary opinions). This is especially true in
the case of summary affirmances. See Taylor, 407 U.S. at 194 n.4. To the extent
1 Because White filed his habeas petition in the district court on March 27, 1997, we review his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (effective April 24, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997).
-2- White believes that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have made factual
findings regarding his case, he misunderstands the role of appellate review.
Next, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(I) and (ii), White argues that there
were no corrective procedures available to him under Oklahoma law. These two
provisions are exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion of state
remedies in § 2254 cases. Not only do the cited provisions have no application
to White’s case, he failed to raise the issue in the district court and we will not
address it here. See Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.
1995). White’s contention that certain defense witnesses did not testify at his
trial because of duress is similarly waived on appeal for failure to present the
issue to the district court.
White takes exception to the jury instructions, arguing that he should have
received the benefit of a self-defense instruction and that it was error for the court
to give a flight instruction. In order to successfully attack a state court judgment
based on an erroneous jury instruction, White must show that the instruction had
the effect of rendering his trial fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense.
See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); see also Hunter v. New
Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990). Further, to the extent that the jury
instructions reflect matters of state law, the recent amendments to § 2254 specify
that a habeas petition predicated on legal error may be granted only where the
-3- state adjudication of the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
We first examine White’s contention that he should have received an
instruction on self-defense. A defendant is entitled to a particular jury instruction
only if the evidence warrants such an instruction. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 635-36 (1980). The facts of the case and the law of the state must warrant
such an instruction. See Holt v. Deere & Co., 24 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.
1994). Our first inquiry is whether the decision not to give a self-defense
instruction was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
It is clear from our review of the jury instruction conference that the trial
judge understood that a defendant is entitled to a particular jury instruction only
if the facts adduced at trial warrant the instruction. See Vol. II, Transcript of
Jury Trial at 288-92. Thus, this part of the decision was not contrary to Supreme
Court-determined federal law. Secondly, we consider the mixed question of law
and fact, i.e., whether the trial judge’s determination not to give a self-defense
instruction involved an unreasonable application of federal law to the facts of the
case. See § 2254(d)(1).
-4- [A]n application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.
Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996) (overruling on other
grounds recognized by United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262, 264 (5th Cir.
1997)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
GERARD DALE WHITE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6258 H.N. “SONNY” SCOTT; ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 97-CV-439) GENERAL OF THE STATE OF (W.D. Okla.) OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Petitioner Gerard Dale White was convicted by a jury of first degree
murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals in a summary opinion. White then filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma alleging several grounds for relief. The
district court refused to grant the writ and refused to issue a certificate of
appealability. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm
the district court. 1
White initially argues that because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, in affirming his conviction, issued only a summary opinion he was
deprived of due process. There is no merit to this claim. As the magistrate judge
explained, there is no constitutional requirement that an appellate court
accompany a decision with a written opinion. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S.
191, 194 n.4 (1972); see also King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 526 (10th Cir.
1995) (specifically finding no constitutional infirmity in Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision to use summary opinions). This is especially true in
the case of summary affirmances. See Taylor, 407 U.S. at 194 n.4. To the extent
1 Because White filed his habeas petition in the district court on March 27, 1997, we review his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (effective April 24, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997).
-2- White believes that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have made factual
findings regarding his case, he misunderstands the role of appellate review.
Next, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(I) and (ii), White argues that there
were no corrective procedures available to him under Oklahoma law. These two
provisions are exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion of state
remedies in § 2254 cases. Not only do the cited provisions have no application
to White’s case, he failed to raise the issue in the district court and we will not
address it here. See Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.
1995). White’s contention that certain defense witnesses did not testify at his
trial because of duress is similarly waived on appeal for failure to present the
issue to the district court.
White takes exception to the jury instructions, arguing that he should have
received the benefit of a self-defense instruction and that it was error for the court
to give a flight instruction. In order to successfully attack a state court judgment
based on an erroneous jury instruction, White must show that the instruction had
the effect of rendering his trial fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense.
See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); see also Hunter v. New
Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990). Further, to the extent that the jury
instructions reflect matters of state law, the recent amendments to § 2254 specify
that a habeas petition predicated on legal error may be granted only where the
-3- state adjudication of the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
We first examine White’s contention that he should have received an
instruction on self-defense. A defendant is entitled to a particular jury instruction
only if the evidence warrants such an instruction. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 635-36 (1980). The facts of the case and the law of the state must warrant
such an instruction. See Holt v. Deere & Co., 24 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.
1994). Our first inquiry is whether the decision not to give a self-defense
instruction was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
It is clear from our review of the jury instruction conference that the trial
judge understood that a defendant is entitled to a particular jury instruction only
if the facts adduced at trial warrant the instruction. See Vol. II, Transcript of
Jury Trial at 288-92. Thus, this part of the decision was not contrary to Supreme
Court-determined federal law. Secondly, we consider the mixed question of law
and fact, i.e., whether the trial judge’s determination not to give a self-defense
instruction involved an unreasonable application of federal law to the facts of the
case. See § 2254(d)(1).
-4- [A]n application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.
Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996) (overruling on other
grounds recognized by United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262, 264 (5th Cir.
1997)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997).
White’s defense theory was that he and the victim struggled for the victim’s
gun and that the victim accidentally shot himself. The trial judge, in refusing the
self-defense instruction, reasoned that, because there was no evidence from White
that he intended to shoot the victim, the self-defense instruction was not
warranted. See Vol. II, Transcript of Jury Trial at 288-92. In his report
and recommendation to the district court, the magistrate judge thoroughly
and accurately reviewed the evidence adduced at trial relevant to a theory of
self-defense. We agree with the district court that, based on this evidence, the
trial court’s refusal to give a self-defense instruction did not involve an
unreasonable application of federal law to the facts of this case, nor did it
result in a trial fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense.
White’s argument that the inclusion of a flight instruction should serve
as the basis for federal habeas relief is also without merit. As mentioned above,
-5- in order to prevail White has to demonstrate that the giving of this instruction
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense. See Henderson,
431 U.S. at 154. Under Oklahoma law, it has long been appropriate to give a
flight instruction when the defendant interposes a plea of self defense or
justifiable homicide. See Mitchell v. State, 876 P.2d 682, 684 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993) (citing cases), as corrected by, 887 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
Petitioner attempted to establish both of these defenses at trial through the
testimony of Detective Fairchild. Although asserting that the instruction
“diminished” the government’s burden, petitioner does not allege that that burden
was impermissibly shifted or that the instruction misstated or omitted an element
of the offense. Because he offers no factual support to buttress his contention
that the jury was allowed to determine guilt or innocence based on improper
considerations, petitioner has failed to raise an issue of constitutional magnitude
justifying habeas relief.
Finally, White alleges that the trial court’s decision to allow testimony
of a prior shooting incident allegedly involving White was erroneous and supports
the grant of the writ. “In order for habeas corpus relief to be granted by a federal
court based on a state court evidentiary ruling, the rulings must render the trial
so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.”
Vigil v. Tansy, 917 F.2d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). Trial
-6- courts have broad discretion regarding the admissibility of testimony. See United
States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 1994). Our review of the record
reveals nothing constitutionally infirm in the trial court’s decision to admit this
evidence.
The application for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and the
judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge
-7-