White v. RPM Management, Inc.

186 S.W.3d 497, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 336, 2006 WL 759664
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 27, 2006
Docket26948
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 186 S.W.3d 497 (White v. RPM Management, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. RPM Management, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 497, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 336, 2006 WL 759664 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

PHILLIP R. GARRISON, Judge.

Sunterra Corporation (“Sunterra”) and RPM Management, Inc., (“RPM”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) appeal from the trial court’s judgment finding that Vernon White (“Plaintiff”) was not a member of Fall Creek Resort and therefore was not required to pay resort maintenance fees to Defendants. For reasons specified below we dismiss the appeal.

This action surrounds certain provisions of declarations recorded with the Taney County Recorder of Deeds pertaining to membership in Fall Creek Resort. The first of these declarations, filed on February 28, 1989, by Treasure Resorts, Inc, titled “Declaration as to Covenants and Restrictions as to Use and Occupancy,” (“Declaration A”), provides no legal description of the real property subject to its terms. Declaration A was later amended to subject the following property to its terms:

Lots 1-67, FALL CREEK R-V ESTATES, Phase I, a subdivision per the recorded plat thereof, Plat Book 23, page 53 of the Taney County Recorder’s Office.
Lots 1-15, FALL CREEK R-V ESTATES, Phase II, a subdivision per the recorded plat thereof, Plat Book 23, page 87 of the Taney County Recorder’s Office.

On March 23, 1992, Fall Creek Development, Inc., recorded its “Declaration as to Covenants and Restrictions as to Use and Occupancy” (“Declaration B”), while providing no legal description of property subject to that declaration. Declaration B set forth substantially the same provisions as Declaration A with the exception that Declaration B refers to and defines membership in “Fall Creek Resorts” rather than “Treasurer Resorts, Inc.”

Plaintiff purchased his first lot in the Fall Creek R-V Estates on June 14, 2001. He later purchased three additional lots, the last of which occurred on May 8, 2003. In early 2003, RPM mailed to Plaintiff a “Fall Creek Resort 2003 Assessment Billing and Collection Policy,” which set forth procedures that would be followed to collect unpaid assessments from its members. *499 Plaintiff, under the impression that he was not a member of Fall Creek Resort, went immediately to the recorder of deed’s office, and reviewed the declarations on file covering his lots.

Plaintiff then filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Taney County, requesting that the court enter a declaratory judgment finding that: (1) he is not a member of Fall Creek Resort solely by virtue of the declaration; (2) Defendants have no right to assess, bill and collect dues from him for Fall Creek Resort membership solely by virtue of the declaration; (3) Defendants have no right to act in any respect as Successor Declar-ant under the declaration; and (4) Defendants have no right to enforce any of the affirmative covenants and restrictions contained in the declaration. The case, consisting of the petition as well as Defendants’ answer and counterclaim, was tried by the court and resulted in a judgment for Plaintiff.

Defendants filed a “Motion for New Trial, to Reopen Judgment, to Take Additional Testimony, to Make New Findings and Enter New Judgment Pursuant to Missouri Rule of Court 78.01.” The court sustained the motion “only to the extent of setting aside the original Judgment, and requiring the submission of a new Judgment containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and disposing of all claims, including those raised in Defendants’ Counterclaim.” The amended judgment states in pertinent part:

2.Neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, impose upon the Plaintiff an affirmative covenant that runs with the Lots requiring Plaintiffs mandatory membership in and to any resort facilities and amenities, including those presently known as Fall Creek Resort.
3. Neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, provide the Defendants, individually or jointly, with any authority or right to determine, assess, bill and/or collect from the Plaintiff any fees or dues for a mandatory membership in and to any resort facilities and amenities, including those presently known as Fall Creek Resort.
4. Neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, provide the Defendants, individually or jointly, with the right to act in any respect as successor to the original declarants under the Declarations.
5. Neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, confer upon the Defendants, individually or jointly, any right to administer and enforce the declarations.
6. The language of the Declarations is vague and ambiguous relative to the issues presented, and neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, entitle the Defendants to the relief they seek, individually or jointly, in the Defendants’ Counterclaim.

Defendants now appeal.

Defendants present four points relied on in their brief. In order to assist in explaining the dismissal of Defendants’ appeal, we set out each point verbatim:

I. The trial court erred in applying the law, declaring that neither the language of the Declarations, nor any other evidence presented, impose upon the Plaintiff an affirmative covenant that runs with the lots requiring Plaintiffs mandatory membership in and to any resort facilities and amenities including those presently known as Fall Creek Resort. The trial court failed to properly apply contract law to determine whether the Declarations impose an implied contract *500 requirement that [Plaintiff] be a member of Fall Creek Resort. The trial court’s conclusion of law is contrary to the express terms of each Declaration requiring mandatory membership and nullifies Article III, Section I, of each Declaration which expressly states that fee site ownership is indivisible from the membership in the resort. Furthermore, the covenant runs with the land without a declaration to that effect.
II.The trial court erred in applying the law, declaring that neither the language of the declarations, nor any other evidence presented, provide [Defendants] with any authority to assess and collect from [Plaintiff] any fees for a mandatory membership in and to any resort facilities and amenities, including those presently known as Fall Creek Resort. The trial court failed to properly apply contract law to determine whether the Declarations impose an express or implied contract requirement that [Plaintiff] be obligated to pay fees for a mandatory membership in Fall Creek Resort. The trial court’s conclusion of law is contrary to the terms of Sections D and E of Article XIV and XIII, respectively, of each Declaration which expressly state that fee sight owners are subject to the rights and duties of membership and obligated to pay all related fees and renders as incomprehensible Article III, Section I, of each Declaration since fee site ownership and resort membership cannot be severed and the declarant would be obligated to provide resort services without compensation. Furthermore, the covenant runs with the land without a declaration to that effect.
III.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
186 S.W.3d 497, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 336, 2006 WL 759664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-rpm-management-inc-moctapp-2006.