White v. Rewerts

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided August 24, 2020·No. 4:18-cv-13691·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION RICKEY WHITE,

Petitioner, Case No. 18-cv-13691 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman v.

RANDEE REWERTS, Respondent. ________________________________________________________________/ ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR BOND PENDING CONCLUSION OF HABEAS PROCEEDINGS (ECF No. 8)

Petitioner Rickey White is a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (the “MDOC”). White is currently incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility (“Carson City” or “DRF”). White has served approximately 8 years of his sentence of 23 to 40 years imprisonment for his convictions of conducting a criminal enterprise and obtaining money by false pretenses with intent do defraud. (See Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 8, PageID.4485.) On November 26, 2018, White filed a petition for habeas corpus. (See Habeas Pet., ECF No. 1.) On May 27, 2020, White filed a Motion for Bond Pending Conclusion of Habeas Proceedings. (See Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 8.) White argues that his habeas petition rasies a substantial claim of law and that the COVID-19 pandemic is an exceptional circumstance justifying his release. The Court, however, concludes that White has not shown that exceptional circumstances warrant his release. Accordingly, White’s Motion for Bond (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.

I On July 26, 2012, White pleaded guilty in the 6th Judicial Circuit Court for the County of Oakland to one count of conducting a criminal enterprise and two

counts of obtaining money by false pretenses. (See Plea Hr’g Tr. at 14:18–15:5, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.963–964.) On October 3, 2012, White was sentenced to concurrent terms of 23 years, 4 months to 40 years imprisonment for the criminal enterprise offense and 3 months to 30 years imprisonment for each of his false pretenses

offenses. (See Habeas Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 25:13–25, ECF No. 5-4, PageID.1012.) White was also ordered to pay $283,245 in restitution to his victims. (See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 26:1–3, ECF No. 5-4, PageID.1013.)

White has served approximately 8 years of his prison term. (See Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 8, PageID.4485.) White filed a habeas petition in this Court on November 26, 2018. (See Habeas Pet., ECF No. 1.) White claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

at both the trial stage and on direct appeal from his conviction. (See id., PageID.7– 8.) On May 27, 2020, with White’s habeas petition still pending, White filed a

Motion for Bond Pending Conclusion of Habeas Proceedings (ECF No. 8). White argues that his habeas petition presents a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 8, PageID.4485–4486.) White also asserts

that he is “at particular risk of serious illness from COVID-19” because he is a prisoner who suffers from “diabetes, hypertension/high blood pressure, [and] obesity,” and White argues that his increased susceptibility to COVID-19 is an

exceptional circumstance warranting his release on bond. (Id., PageID.4481–4485.) Warden Rewerts responded to White’s motion on June 5, 2020. (See Gov’t Resp. to Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 9.) The Court held a hearing on White’s motion on June 29, 2020.

II The Court applies the following legal standard to a petitioner’s motion for bond while his habeas petition is under review:

This Court has “inherent authority” to grant bond to a habeas petitioner while his petition is under review. Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 526, n. 10 (6th Cir. 2006). But that authority is narrow. “Since a habeas petitioner is appealing a presumptively valid state court conviction, both principles of comity and common sense dictate that it will indeed be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to bail prior to a decision on the merits in the habeas case.” Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). “In order to receive bail pending a decision on the merits, prisoners must be able to show not only a substantial claim of law based on the facts surrounding the petition but also the existence of ‘some circumstance making [the motion for bail] exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.” Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5, 13, 13 L.Ed.2d 6 (1964) (Douglas, J., in chambers)). Simply put, “[m]erely to find that there is a substantial question is far from enough.” Lee, 989 F.2d at 871 (quoting Glynn v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972)).

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has provided definitive guidance for determining whether a petitioner’s “circumstances” are so “exceptional” as to justify release pending review of his habeas claims. Unpublished decisions from this Court suggest that “exceptional circumstances” warranting release during review “have been limited to situations where (1) the prisoner was gravely ill, (2) the prisoner committed a minor crime and is serving a short sentence, or (3) possibly where there was an extraordinary delay in processing the habeas petition.” Scheidler v. Berghuis, 07–cv–01346, 2008 WL 161899 (E.D.Mich. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Milstead v. Sherry, 07–cv–15332, 2009 WL 728540 (E.D.Mich. 2009) (citation omitted). This much is clear: federal courts very rarely find “exceptional circumstances” and very rarely release petitioners before ruling on the merits of their claims. Indeed, there seem to be but a handful of decisions in which federal courts have released petitioners pending review of their claims.

Blocksom v. Klee, No. 11-cv-14859, 2015 WL 300261, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2015); see also Pouncy v. Palmer, No. 13-cv-14695, 2020 WL 2513094, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2020). In short, White is entitled to release on bond only if he shows that (1) his petition raises a substantial legal claim and (2) exceptional circumstances justify his release. III White contends that the combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, his health

issues, and his status as a prisoner constitutes exceptional circumstances warranting his release on bond. According to White, he “is at particular risk of serious illness from COVID-19 because he suffers from diabetes, hypertension/high blood

pressure, [and] obesity.” (Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 8, PageID.4481.) And White contends that COVID-19 “has invaded Carson City West and Mr. White will suffer serious consequences, even deadly, if he becomes ill.” (Addendum to Pet.’s Mot. for Bond, ECF No. 19, PageID.4724.)

White’s contentions about COVID-19 having entered Carson City West and posing an immediate threat to his health and safety rest upon an affidavit, dated July 19, 2020, that he has submitted. (See White Aff., ECF No. 19.) White is currently

incarcerated in the 900 Building at Carson City. (See Rewerts Second Aff. ¶ 15, ECF No. 21-1, PageID.4772.) White’s building is nearby the 300 and 400 Buildings. (See id. ¶ 16.) White’s affidavit details why he believes there is a risk that COVID-19 will spread beyond the “COVID-19 Units” that prison officials set up in the 300 and

400 Buildings to house prisoners who tested positive for the virus or who might have the virus: It is my understanding that the [MDOC’s COVID-19] protocols . . .

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

White v. Rewerts, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

White v. Rewerts (White v. Rewerts) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related