No. 3--09--0902
Filed October 22, 2010-Correction IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2010
GREGORY A. WHITE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Rock Island County, Illinois ) v. ) No. 08--MR--118 ) LARRY PHILLIPS, Director of ) Rushville Treatment and ) Detention Facility, ) ) Honorable Michael F. Meersman, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant, Gregory White, is a sexually violent person
and subject to treatment in a secure facility. The
Department of Human Services transferred White to the
Department of Corrections to serve criminal sentences twice.
The Department of Corrections returned White to the
Department of Human Services at the completion of each
sentence
White alleges that he is not lawfully subject to cus- tody by the Department of Human Services because of these
transfers from the Department of Human Services to the
Department of Corrections. He requested habeas corpus
relief from the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed
his application on motion of defendant Larry Phillips,
Director of the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility.
White appeals that dismissal. We affirm.
FACTS
White was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse. The State petitioned to commit White under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS
207/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The court found White to be a
sexually violent person (SVP) and ordered him into the
custody of the Department of Human Services until he is no
longer an SVP.
White committed aggravated battery twice while in the
custody of the Department of Human Services. Each time he
was found guilty in a circuit court proceeding and was
transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve his
sentence.
2 At the completion of each sentence, White was returned
to the Department of Human Services without a court order.
White claims that his release to the Department of
Corrections either conditionally released or fully
discharged him, terminating his civil commitment. As such,
the Department of Human services could not regain custody of
White without a new court order finding him to be an SVP.
White also alleged two violations of the United States
Constitution, a double jeopardy claim and a due process
claim. White recognizes in his brief to this court that
these allegations cannot stand unless this court finds for
him on the first issue.
ANALYSIS
A motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of
a complaint. Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 57, 896
N.E.2d 327, 331 (2008). This court reviews de novo a
circuit court decision on a motion to dismiss. Beacham, 231
Ill. 2d at 57. All well-pleaded facts and reasonable
inferences from those facts are accepted as true and are
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
3 Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58.
Application for habeas corpus relief is statutory in
nature. 735 ILCS 5/10--101 et seq. (West 2008). Habeas
corpus provides relief to those who are wrongfully
imprisoned or restrained. 735 ILCS 5/10--102 (West 2008).
But, relief under habeas corpus is limited in nature.
Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58. The supreme court has said
repeatedly that habeas corpus is available only to a
plaintiff that is restrained by the judgment of a court that
did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction, unless
something has occurred after the court entered judgment that
entitles the plaintiff to release. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at
58. Habeas corpus does not provide relief from a judgment
that is merely voidable and does not suffer from
jurisdictional defects. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58; People
v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1269-70
(2001).
White does not argue any defect exists with the court
order that declared him to be an SVP. He asserts that when
the Department of Human Services transferred him to the
4 Department of Corrections, it was an implied, tacit, or
actual finding by the Department of Human Services that
White was no longer an SVP. Alternatively, he argues that
it was a conditional or full release that terminated his
civil commitment.
The Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) allows the
State to seek civil commitment of someone who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense. 725 ILCS 207/15
(West 2008). After a proper petition is filed, the court
holds a probable cause hearing to determine whether probable
cause exists that the person named in the petition is a
sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/30 (West 2008). The
person is taken into custody if the court finds probable
cause exists, otherwise the petition is dismissed. 725 ILCS
207/30 (West 2008). After a finding that probable cause
exists, a trial is held to determine if the person is a
sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2008). At
the conclusion of the trial, if it is determined that the
person named in the petition is an SVP, the court must issue
an order committing the person to the custody of the
5 Department of Human Services "until such time as the person
is no longer a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/40(a)
(West 2008).
The Act provides only one way for an SVP to be
discharged from the custody of the Department of Human
Services: by court order. 725 ILCS 207/65 (West 2008). A
hearing to request a discharge order can be obtained in two
ways. First, the Secretary of the Department of Human
Services authorizes a person whom he believes is no longer a
sexually violent person to petition the court for discharge.
725 ILCS 207/65(a)(1) (West 2008). Second, a sexually
violent person can apply for discharge at the time of
periodic reviews conducted by the Department of Human
Services. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2008). Upon a proper
petition, a hearing is held to determine whether the person
is still sexually violent. A person is entitled to
discharge upon a finding that he is not a sexually violent
person.
Discharge from the custody of the Department of Human
Services can be obtained in no other way. The legislature
6 has created a comprehensive system to protect the public
from sexually violent people. That system states that a
discharge is obtained when a court or jury finds that an SVP
is no longer sexually violent. This reading of the statute
is in keeping with the canon of construction, expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another. People v. Roberts,
214 Ill.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
No. 3--09--0902
Filed October 22, 2010-Correction IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2010
GREGORY A. WHITE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Rock Island County, Illinois ) v. ) No. 08--MR--118 ) LARRY PHILLIPS, Director of ) Rushville Treatment and ) Detention Facility, ) ) Honorable Michael F. Meersman, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant, Gregory White, is a sexually violent person
and subject to treatment in a secure facility. The
Department of Human Services transferred White to the
Department of Corrections to serve criminal sentences twice.
The Department of Corrections returned White to the
Department of Human Services at the completion of each
sentence
White alleges that he is not lawfully subject to cus- tody by the Department of Human Services because of these
transfers from the Department of Human Services to the
Department of Corrections. He requested habeas corpus
relief from the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed
his application on motion of defendant Larry Phillips,
Director of the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility.
White appeals that dismissal. We affirm.
FACTS
White was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse. The State petitioned to commit White under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS
207/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The court found White to be a
sexually violent person (SVP) and ordered him into the
custody of the Department of Human Services until he is no
longer an SVP.
White committed aggravated battery twice while in the
custody of the Department of Human Services. Each time he
was found guilty in a circuit court proceeding and was
transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve his
sentence.
2 At the completion of each sentence, White was returned
to the Department of Human Services without a court order.
White claims that his release to the Department of
Corrections either conditionally released or fully
discharged him, terminating his civil commitment. As such,
the Department of Human services could not regain custody of
White without a new court order finding him to be an SVP.
White also alleged two violations of the United States
Constitution, a double jeopardy claim and a due process
claim. White recognizes in his brief to this court that
these allegations cannot stand unless this court finds for
him on the first issue.
ANALYSIS
A motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of
a complaint. Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 57, 896
N.E.2d 327, 331 (2008). This court reviews de novo a
circuit court decision on a motion to dismiss. Beacham, 231
Ill. 2d at 57. All well-pleaded facts and reasonable
inferences from those facts are accepted as true and are
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
3 Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58.
Application for habeas corpus relief is statutory in
nature. 735 ILCS 5/10--101 et seq. (West 2008). Habeas
corpus provides relief to those who are wrongfully
imprisoned or restrained. 735 ILCS 5/10--102 (West 2008).
But, relief under habeas corpus is limited in nature.
Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58. The supreme court has said
repeatedly that habeas corpus is available only to a
plaintiff that is restrained by the judgment of a court that
did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction, unless
something has occurred after the court entered judgment that
entitles the plaintiff to release. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at
58. Habeas corpus does not provide relief from a judgment
that is merely voidable and does not suffer from
jurisdictional defects. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58; People
v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1269-70
(2001).
White does not argue any defect exists with the court
order that declared him to be an SVP. He asserts that when
the Department of Human Services transferred him to the
4 Department of Corrections, it was an implied, tacit, or
actual finding by the Department of Human Services that
White was no longer an SVP. Alternatively, he argues that
it was a conditional or full release that terminated his
civil commitment.
The Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) allows the
State to seek civil commitment of someone who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense. 725 ILCS 207/15
(West 2008). After a proper petition is filed, the court
holds a probable cause hearing to determine whether probable
cause exists that the person named in the petition is a
sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/30 (West 2008). The
person is taken into custody if the court finds probable
cause exists, otherwise the petition is dismissed. 725 ILCS
207/30 (West 2008). After a finding that probable cause
exists, a trial is held to determine if the person is a
sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2008). At
the conclusion of the trial, if it is determined that the
person named in the petition is an SVP, the court must issue
an order committing the person to the custody of the
5 Department of Human Services "until such time as the person
is no longer a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/40(a)
(West 2008).
The Act provides only one way for an SVP to be
discharged from the custody of the Department of Human
Services: by court order. 725 ILCS 207/65 (West 2008). A
hearing to request a discharge order can be obtained in two
ways. First, the Secretary of the Department of Human
Services authorizes a person whom he believes is no longer a
sexually violent person to petition the court for discharge.
725 ILCS 207/65(a)(1) (West 2008). Second, a sexually
violent person can apply for discharge at the time of
periodic reviews conducted by the Department of Human
Services. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2008). Upon a proper
petition, a hearing is held to determine whether the person
is still sexually violent. A person is entitled to
discharge upon a finding that he is not a sexually violent
person.
Discharge from the custody of the Department of Human
Services can be obtained in no other way. The legislature
6 has created a comprehensive system to protect the public
from sexually violent people. That system states that a
discharge is obtained when a court or jury finds that an SVP
is no longer sexually violent. This reading of the statute
is in keeping with the canon of construction, expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another. People v. Roberts,
214 Ill. 2d 106, 117, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (2005). The
legislature, by providing a clear method for release from
custody, denied all others.
White has not attacked the original order that found
him to be a sexually violent person and placed him in the
custody of the Department of Human Services. He alleges
that his transfer to the Department of Corrections
terminated his custody by the Department of Human Services.
Only a court order can discharge White from the custody of
the Department of Human Services. White has not challenged
the original order and the only thing that can authorize his
release has not happened; habeas corpus relief is not
available. Since White has pled no facts upon which he is
entitled to relief, we affirm the decision of the circuit
7 court dismissing his application for habeas corpus.
From a commonsense standpoint, the theory urged by
plaintiff is a dangerous one: to terminate a civil
commitment, one need only attack a Department employee or
fellow detainee. We are not inclined to declare an open
season on employees and detainees of the Department of Human
Services. See People v. Webb, 393 Ill. App. 3d 478, 913
N.E.2d 1074 (2009).
This court need not reach the constitutional issues
raised by White in his brief. White conceded that his
second and third issues cannot stand without a finding that
his commitment to the Department of Human Services has been
lawfully terminated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOLDRIDGE, P.J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.