White v. Palmer

16 S.C. Eq. 115
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 15, 1841
StatusPublished

This text of 16 S.C. Eq. 115 (White v. Palmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. Palmer, 16 S.C. Eq. 115 (S.C. Ct. App. 1841).

Opinions

These causes were heard together, on exceptions to thé report of the commissioner, and the equity reserved. In order to understand the points submitted, it may be proper to state some of the prominent facts of the case. In June, 1813, James White, the father of the complainant, intermarried with Martha Leger. In contemplation of the marriage, a settlement was duly executed on 7th June, 1813, by which the estate of the future wife, consisting of her interest in certain lands and thirteen' slaves, (by name) was settled to her sole use for life, with power to dispose of the same by will, and in default of such will, to the children of the marriage. This settlement was never recorded; nor was it proved until Dec. 4th, 1813. Martha White died before her husband, without having made any testamentary disposition of the property, and leaving two children of the marriage, to wit, the complainant, and a brother, Henry White, who died in 1832 or 1833, unmarried and intestate. In 1821, James White, the elder., intermarried with Eliza Palmer, the daughter of the defendant, Jesse Palmer. Both husband and wife died within a short time of each other, and prior to 8th March, 1824. James White dying intestate, letters of administration were granted to the defendant, about the period last mentioned. The defendant, and Sarah Ann, now the wife of Valentine Richardson, are the only children of the second marriage. The object of the bill is, to require an account [116]*116from the defendant, Jesse Palmer, of the negroes included in the marriage settlement, which it is alleged came into his possession: as also an account of the estate of the complainant’s father: and that the said defendant may he compelled to comply with the terms of sale of certain real estate, made under the order of this court, procured at the instance of the defendant, and at which sale he became the purchaser.

■ It may be proper to consider these claims in their order. The answer of the administrator, Jesse Palmer, insists that if the marriage settlement was executed, (which he does not admit,) it is inoperative, because it was never recorded. He states that his intestate was largely indebted, and that his personal estate, including eleven negroes and other property, was sold by permission of the Ordinary, and the proceeds applied to the payment of his debts, and that a balance is due to him on his accounts, as administrator. On comparing the sales with the testimony of the witness, (J. M. Lerrebour,) it appears that a large part, if not all, of the negroes sold as of the estate of White, were included in the marriage settlement. It is inaccurate to assume that this settlement is inoperative, because it is not recorded. It is certainly obligatory on the parties. Neither they, nor the personal representatives of either of them, can take advantage of the omission. “An administrator is the mere representative of his intestate. Wherever the intestate would be bound, the administrator is bound.” King vs. Clarke, 2 Kill C. R., 613.) But the administrator may have been, and probably was, himself, a creditor of the intestate. Although the settlement was perfectly valid between the parties, yet the personal estate of the wife, intended to be secured, became liable to the payment of the husband’s debts. How far an administrator would be warranted in anticipating the judgment of a court, and treating that as assets of the intestate, because it may be subjected to the payment of his debts, is very questionable both in principle and expediency. It may certainly be assumed, however, that he would not be justified until the entire estate of the intestate had been exhausted; and strict proof of this would be required, to authorize the Court in sanctioning such proceeding. In any event, no more of [117]*117the settled estate should be appropriated than was necessary to satisfy the balance due after the estate of the intestate had been exhausted. In order to apply these principles, it becomes necessary to solve the next question submitted by the pleadings.

Immediately after the marriage of James White, with the defendant’s daughter, he placed in White’s possession two negroes — Nancy, about eleven years old, and Fanny, about five or six years old. They remained in White’s possession till his death. On the part of the complainant it was said, these negroes were given to White, and were assets in the hands of the administrator at his death. The defendant insisted that it was only a loan to his daughter; that he intended at his convenience to make a deed of them to some friend, for the use of his daughter, and that on 30th April, 1822, he executed such deed to L. Palmer, by which the life-interest or use, was secured to his daughter, and on her death to her children. It was also declared that the slaves should not be liable for White’s debts. The original deed could not be found, and the subscribing witness was dead. A copy from the Register’s office was given in evidence, by which it appeared to have been recorded on 18th June, 1822. The witness (Lerrebour,) testified that White was married to the defendant’s daughter in 1821 — that he (the witness) was told by Palmer that he had given these two girls to his daughter, immediately after the marriage. The girls were then in his possession, two or three days after the marriage. Palmer said those were the girls he had given to his daughter after marriage. Witness was frequently at the house : never heard any thing of a loan; understood it to be a gift without any condition. White was not at that time in debt, as far as witness knew.

The Court has been much embarrassed as to the character which should be given to this transaction. I suppose a parol transfer of personal property might be made with such restrictions and limitations; and yet, as was said by Judge Nott in Brashears vs. Blessingham, if such a loan can be made by a father to his children, on marriage, it is a species of loan not much to be encouraged. I think it should be clearly shewn, that it was the understanding [118]*118of all parties, and especially of the husband, that it Was merely a loan, and not a gift. The presumption should be against such restriction or condition. Regarding the testimony of Lerrebour alone, the gift is abundantly established. The negroes were the absolute property of the husband, long anterior to the date of the deed. He further says, it was a loan, “ and that he intended at his convenience to make a deed of these negroes to some friend, in trust,” &c. It is not stated that this intention was communicated to the husband and acceded to by him, or that he so understood it when he received the negroes. No evidence was given to show that the husband had any knowledge of the deed of April, 1822, unless this may be presumed from the fact of recording; although he was not interested to inquire, and the fact being known could not have influenced his conduct. But it is hardly necessary to repeat what was said by the Court in McDonald vs. Crockett, (2 McCord’s C. R., 130,) that the original transaction cannot receive its character from this subsequent deed. This too, is substantially the claim of creditors; for if the settled estate has been taken to pay the husband’s debts, it would seem very clear, that those interested under the settlement, which was obligatory on the husband, would be subrogated to the rights of creditors whose demands they had satisfied. But from the state of facts presented, I am of opinion, that for all purposes, these negroes and their increase were assets of James White, deceased, in the hands of his administrator.

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Bluebook (online)
16 S.C. Eq. 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-palmer-scctapp-1841.