White v. McGannon

70 Va. 511
Supreme Court of Virginia·Decided December 13, 1877·Published

Opinion

Moncure, P.

Tins is a suit for the specific execution of a contract for the sale of a tract of land. On the 11th day of February, 1868, McGannon and Bennett, [512]*512then residents of the citvof Wheeling, in "West Virginia, and owners of a tract of land, estimated to contain 800 acres, more or less, lying partly in Frederick county, Virginia, and partly in Morgan county, West Virginia, and recently before, to-wit: in the next preceding month of January, 1868, purchased by them of McIntyre’s heirs, contracted with Robert White, then also a resident of the said city of Wheeling, to sell to Frances White, wife of the said Robert, 200 acres of the said tract, to be taken off the southern end thereof; to convey to her all rights they had to the said portion of the said tract; to give possession of the same as soon as they received it from their vendors, only reserving the crop of wheat then growing thereon, with the right to gather and save the same; to have the land surveyed, and to execute a deed with general warranty to the said Frances White for the same; in consideration of which it was agreed that the said Frances should pay to the said McGannon and Bennett the sum of $6,500, to-wit: $8,025, part thereof, in cash, and the residue, $3,475, in tlnee equal annual payments, for which she was to execute her bonds, payable in one, two and three years from the said date, with interest from said date, and should execute a deed of trust to secure the deferred payments. Accordingly the said cash payment of $3,025 was made; possesion of the said land was delivered to the said White and wife, w!k> removed to the same about the 1st of March, 1868, and have ever since resided thereon. A survey was made on the 14th of April, 1868, and a deed was executed by the said McGannon and wife and the said Bennett, bearing date the 10th day of April, 1869, which was duly acknowledged and certified for record, and tendered to the said Frances White, conveying the said land to her with general warranty of title. But she refused to receive the said deed, and refused to make the first [513]*513deferred payment for the said land when it became payahie; in consequence of which the said McGannon and Bennett brought this suit against the said "White and wife in the circuit court of Frederick county to enforce the specific performance of the said contract. Let it be here remarked that the vendors have been guilty of no default in the performance of their part of the contract, which is always a circumstance in favor of a party who invokes the aid of a court of equity to enforce specific performance. The defendants, in their answer, relied on alleged inadequacy oí consideration and fraud and misrepresentation in the sale, as the grounds on which they had refused to perform the contract on their part, and on which they claimed that the court ought not to decree the specific execution of the same, but ought even to decree its rescisión; and it was agreed by the parties, by counsel, in the cause, that it should be considered by the court as if the defendants had filed their cross-bill, making the allegations contained in their answer, and praying a rescisión of the said contract, and the plaintiffs had answered said cross-bill, denying the alligations on which said relief of rescisión was asked, and there had been a general replication to said answer. Many depositions were taken in the cause on both sides, amona: which were the depositions of the said McGannon and Bennett on the side of the plaintiffs, and the depositions of the said Bobert "White and wife on the side of the defendants; and on the 22d of August, 1870, a decree was entered for the specific execution of the said contract. From that decree the said "White and wife applied for and obtained an appeal from this court. ■

But afterwards, to-wit: in October, 1873, when the said appeal came on to be heard in this court, it appearing to the court that the said decree appealed from was rendered in vacation, beiore the passage of the act approved [514]*514January 14, 1873, entitled “an act to authorize decrees in chancery causes to be entered by consent of parties in vacation, and to validate decrees heretofore rendered in vacation,” (Session Acts of 1872-73, p. 18, ch. 26); and the parties against whom said decree was made not having, either in this court or the court below, entered of record, according to the proviso contained in the second section of said act, a waiver of all objection to the validity of such decree on account of its having been made in vacation: Therefore, without deciding other questions arising in tire cause, it was decreed and ordered by this court that the said decree was invalid and be set aside, reversed and annulled; that the appellees pay to the appellants their costs by them expended in the prosecution of the said appeal; and that the said cause be remanded to the said circuit court for further proceedings to be had therein according to law; which was ordered to be certified to the said circuit court, and the same was accordingly so certified and entered of record in said court.

After the cause was remanded to the said circuit court, further proceedings were had therein in the said cause, including the taking of sundry other depositions in behalf of the appellees; and on the 5th day of April, 1875, the cause came on to be heard in the said circuit court, which thereupon made a decree refusing to rescind the contract referred to in the bill, and directing its specific execution. Trom and to the last-mentioned decree the said White and wife applied for and obtained an appeal to this court, and a supersedeas; which is the case we now have under consideration.

As before stated, there are two, and only two, grounds relied on to show that the contract ought not to be specifically executed, and ought even to be rescinded; and they are: first, inadequacy of consideration; and, sec[515]*515onclly, fraud and misrepresentation in the sale. I veil proceed to inquire whether, on either of these two grounds, or both of them together, the defence relied on by White and wife ought to be sustained; and,

First.. As to the alleged inadequacy of consideration. It was held by this court, in the recent case of Hale v. Wilkinson, 21 Gratt. 75, that specific performance of a contract for the sale of land will not be refused on the sole ground of inadequacy of price, unless it be so great as to shock the moral sense, and thus be in itself evidence of fraud. A fortiori, such a contract will not be rescinded on that sole ground, unless the inadequacy of price goes at least to that extent. The question therefore is, whether there was such an inadequacy of consideration in this case, if the consideration can be properly said to have been inadequate at all; for no consideration of any value at all, upon which parties capable of con'tracting with each other, and in the absence of fraud, may agree, can be said, in a legal sense, to be inadequate.

All the testimony in the cause in regard to the value of the land tends to show that it was actually worth much less per acre than the price stipulated to be paid for it in the contract aforesaid, to-wit: thirty-two dollars and fifty cents per acre. But most of the testimony applies to the time at which it was given, when land in the neighborhood was much lower than at the time of the sale; though some of it applies also to the time of the sale. Of course, the value of the land at the time of the sale is the only material subject of inquiry in regard to such value.

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White v. McGannon, 70 Va. 511 (Va. 1877).

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