White v. Marty

540 P.2d 270, 97 Idaho 85, 1975 Ida. LEXIS 365
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 30, 1975
Docket11681
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 540 P.2d 270 (White v. Marty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. Marty, 540 P.2d 270, 97 Idaho 85, 1975 Ida. LEXIS 365 (Idaho 1975).

Opinion

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

This dispute concerns transportation of water across another’s land. Respondents sought to condemn an easement, in the form of an existing irrigation ditch, across appellants’ land. Respondents also sought compensation for damage to their crops allegedly caused when appellant, Charles Marty, filled in a ditch and respondents were thereby deprived of water for irrigation of their lands. The trial court condemned an easement through the Martys’ property to carry water to respondents’ lands, and assessed against appellants $2.00 actual damages and $1390.00 punitive damages, plus costs. We vacate the decree and judgment, holding that the trial magistrate did not have the requisite authority to try the case.

During May or early June 1973, a dispute arose between respondents and appellants over the use of a ditch to convey water through the Marty property to respondents’ respective parcels to irrigate crops. Charles Marty proceeded to interfere with the flow of water going across his property to respondents’ parcels. He contended that respondents’ use of the ditch had caused flooding on appellants’ property. After more controversy and a failure at attempted settlement of the dispute, Charles Marty filled in the ditch at the front of his property, stopping flow of water to respondents’ respective parcels. Respondents commenced this action to condemn an easement for transportation of water to their respective lands.

The case was originally assigned to District Judge Boyd Thomas. Attorney Magistrate Black, however, presided at the pre-trial hearing. According to respondents, at that hearing Magistrate Black advised counsel he had been requested to try the case and asked if there were any objections. No objection was made. At the beginning of trial on the merits, and in the presence of their respective clients, counsel orally stipulated that the court would have jurisdiction to try the case and that the case would be heard as a district court case with direct appeal to this Court. Following trial, judgment was entered for the respondents.

Appellants urge two assignments of error: (1) The trial court had no jurisdiction to hear this case; and (2) the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. We hold that Magistrate Black did not have the authority to try this case. We vacate the judgment for that reason. Therefore, we need not decide appellants’ second assignment of error.

Chapter 11 of Title 42, Idaho Code, deals with ditch rights of way for the irrigation of land. I.C. § 42-1102 gives to landowners a right to an easement or right of way across the lands of others to supply irrigation water. If the landowner of an adjacent parcel refuses to allow such access for irrigation water, the owner of land may condemn a right-of-way under the law of eminent domain. I.C. § 42-1106. 1 The law of eminent domain is gov *87 erned by I.C. § 7-701 et seq. I.C. § 7-706 provides that jurisdiction for actions for eminent domain is in the district court. 2

Respondents argue that this case was commenced and proceedings were had in the district court. The amended complaint and summons and answer thereto were filed in the district court, and other initial proceedings were held under the auspices of the district court. The pretrial hearing, as ordered by the district court, was held before Attorney Magistrate William W. Black. The case was then set for trial be- ■ fore “. . . the Court (Hon. Wm W. Black) . . . ”, again at the order of the district court. Magistrate Black heard the case and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment. 3 The order denying appellants’ motion for a new trial was denied by Magistrate Black as “Judge Pro Tempore.”

I.C. § 1-2208 provides that subject to rules promulgated by this Court, the administrative judge or other designated district judge in each judicial district may assign certain enumerated cases to magistrates. 4 I.C. § 1-2210 further provides that this Court may by rule specify additional categories triable by magistrates and makes certain exceptions for cases that are to be assigned only to attorney magistrates. 5 This Court promulgated *88 rules, which were in effect at the time of the trial of this case specifying the additional jurisdiction of magistrates, 6 and of attorney (law) magistrates in particular, 7 to try certain cases. We have examined the statutes and court rules as then applicable, and find no authority therein granting jurisdiction to magistrates to try eminent domain cases. Former Rule 25(a) did not grant jurisdiction to magistrates to try title to real property or adjudicate claims in eminent domain proceedings. Magistrate Black was acting in excess of his defined power and authority as a magistrate when he tried this case.

In acting in excess of his designated authority, Magistrate Black was without jurisdiction to try this case, and any purported judgment entered by Magistrate Black is void and of no effect. 8 Respondents contend that appellants consented to the jurisdiction of Magistrate Black, or alternatively, that appellants are now estopped *89 from denying Black’s authority to try the case, and therefore, that the decision and judgment rendered by Magistrate Black is valid. While it is clear that personal jurisdiction may be gained by a court through consent of the parties, neither estoppel nor consent will confer subject matter jurisdiction on a judge to try a case which by statute and court rule is clearly in excess of his authority to adjudicate. 9

Magistrate Black was not serving in the role of a master as contemplated under Rule 53, I.R.C.P., and therefore the judgment cannot be sustained on that ground. It also appears that Magistrate Black did not act as a district court judge pro tempore, as provided in Article 5, Section 12, of the Idaho Constitution, 10 in trying the instant case. Our constitution specifies that a case in the district court may be tried by a judge pro tempore who is: (1) a member of the bar; (2) agreed upon in writing by the parties or their attorneys of record; and (3) is sworn to try that case. The appointment of a district judge pro tempore, as contemplated by our state constitution, is to be made on a case by case basis. 11 This clause differs from the part of Section 12 which authorizes the assignment of district judges from other judicial districts, or the assignment of retired district court judges or retired justices of this Court, to hold a district court in any particular district.

Since Magistrate Black was without jurisdiction to try this case and was not a properly constituted district judge pro tempore, the purported judgment is vacated.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
540 P.2d 270, 97 Idaho 85, 1975 Ida. LEXIS 365, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-marty-idaho-1975.