1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEITH WHITE, CDCR #T-74230, Case No.: 3:22-cv-01428-RSH-BGS 12
Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING RAYMOND MADDEN, FRANK 15 ORDER SHARPE, J. GALLEGOS, and
16 KATHLEEN ALLISON, [ECF No. 3] 17 Defendants. 18
19 On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff Keith White filed this civil rights action under 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 21 (“RJD”), in which Plaintiff is incarcerated, violated his Eighth Amendment right against 22 cruel and unusual punishment. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 23 On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 24 (the “Motion”), seeking to prevent the California Department of Corrections and 25 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from transferring Plaintiff from the Level III facility at RJD 26 where he is currently housed, to any Level IV facility in the State of California. See TRO 27 Mot., ECF No. 3. Defendants, who have not yet appeared in the case, filed an opposition. 28 ECF No. 8. On October 13, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. ECF No. 9. The 1 Parties then filed additional briefing relating to the Motion. ECF Nos. 10, 13. As explained 2 below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion. 3 I. Factual Background 4 Plaintiff brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants employed 5 by CDCR: (1) RJD Warden Raymond Madden; (2) Frank Sharpe, a classification and 6 parole representative; (3) J. Gallegos, an RJD correctional counselor; and (4) Kathleen 7 Allison, Secretary of the CDCR. See ECF No. 1. 8 Plaintiff claims that prison officials have labelled Plaintiff a “snitch” and made it 9 known within the prison population that Plaintiff was incarcerated for a sexual offense. Id. 10 at 3-4. He further alleges that, despite knowing about safety concerns, prison officials 11 transferred him to a Level IV facility at RJD, where other inmates attacked him on July 2, 12 2022. Id. He claims that gang members subjected him to unspecified sexual harassment 13 and extortion in addition to the assaults. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he has since been 14 transferred to a Level III facility at RJD where he is currently safe, but that officials are 15 now considering him for transfer to another Level IV facility, where they allow gang 16 members to operate openly and carry out attacks and murders. Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint 17 seeks damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 10. 18 II. Legal Standard 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that the Court may issue a temporary 20 restraining order where “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show 21 that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the 22 adverse party can be heard in opposition.” A movant must demonstrate that: “(1) it is likely 23 to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 24 preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 25 26 27 28 1 public interest.” Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before a 3 preliminary injunction hearing and prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. 4 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 5 423, 439 (1974). Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 6 upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 7 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 8 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“PRLA”), courts 9 in “any civil action with respect to prison conditions” may enter a temporary restraining 10 order only if it is “narrowly drawn, extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the harm 11 the court finds requires preliminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to 12 correct that harm.” Congress enacted the PLRA to “revive the hands-off doctrine” and 13 restore “judicial quiescence derived from federalism and separation of powers concerns” 14 to remove the judiciary from prison management. Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 15 996-97 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the PRLA requires courts to “give substantial weight 16 to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused 17 by the preliminary relief . . . .” Id. at 998 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). 18 III. Analysis 19 A. Likelihood of Success on The Merits 20 “The first factor [] is the most important—likely success on the merits.” Garcia v. 21 Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). While a plaintiff carries the burden of 22 demonstrating likelihood of success, the plaintiff is not required to prove their case in full 23 at this stage, rather, only the parts that enable them to obtain the injunctive relief they seek. 24 See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 25 26 27 1 The standard for a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John 28 1 Plaintiff claims a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. “[A] prison 2 official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 3 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’; a prison official’s act or 4 omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimum civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” 5 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted). Second, “a prison official 6 must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” and act with “‘deliberate indifference’ 7 to inmate health or safety . . . .” Id. 8 Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the 9 merits on his claim. The incident that is the focus of Plaintiff’s Complaint is a July 2, 2022, 10 attack on Plaintiff by two other inmates, identified in an exhibit to the Complaint as 11 “Hagan” and “Jackson.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants were 12 aware in advance of the attack that either inmate was an enemy of Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff 13 submitted a list of 11 of his documented enemies, as of January 26, 2022, and neither 14 inmate is on the list. ECF No. 10-4 at 2. Plaintiff has not provided evidence of any 15 communication or notice to Defendants regarding inmates Hagan or Jackson preceding the 16 attack.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEITH WHITE, CDCR #T-74230, Case No.: 3:22-cv-01428-RSH-BGS 12
Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING RAYMOND MADDEN, FRANK 15 ORDER SHARPE, J. GALLEGOS, and
16 KATHLEEN ALLISON, [ECF No. 3] 17 Defendants. 18
19 On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff Keith White filed this civil rights action under 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 21 (“RJD”), in which Plaintiff is incarcerated, violated his Eighth Amendment right against 22 cruel and unusual punishment. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 23 On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 24 (the “Motion”), seeking to prevent the California Department of Corrections and 25 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from transferring Plaintiff from the Level III facility at RJD 26 where he is currently housed, to any Level IV facility in the State of California. See TRO 27 Mot., ECF No. 3. Defendants, who have not yet appeared in the case, filed an opposition. 28 ECF No. 8. On October 13, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. ECF No. 9. The 1 Parties then filed additional briefing relating to the Motion. ECF Nos. 10, 13. As explained 2 below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion. 3 I. Factual Background 4 Plaintiff brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants employed 5 by CDCR: (1) RJD Warden Raymond Madden; (2) Frank Sharpe, a classification and 6 parole representative; (3) J. Gallegos, an RJD correctional counselor; and (4) Kathleen 7 Allison, Secretary of the CDCR. See ECF No. 1. 8 Plaintiff claims that prison officials have labelled Plaintiff a “snitch” and made it 9 known within the prison population that Plaintiff was incarcerated for a sexual offense. Id. 10 at 3-4. He further alleges that, despite knowing about safety concerns, prison officials 11 transferred him to a Level IV facility at RJD, where other inmates attacked him on July 2, 12 2022. Id. He claims that gang members subjected him to unspecified sexual harassment 13 and extortion in addition to the assaults. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he has since been 14 transferred to a Level III facility at RJD where he is currently safe, but that officials are 15 now considering him for transfer to another Level IV facility, where they allow gang 16 members to operate openly and carry out attacks and murders. Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint 17 seeks damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 10. 18 II. Legal Standard 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that the Court may issue a temporary 20 restraining order where “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show 21 that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the 22 adverse party can be heard in opposition.” A movant must demonstrate that: “(1) it is likely 23 to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 24 preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 25 26 27 28 1 public interest.” Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before a 3 preliminary injunction hearing and prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. 4 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 5 423, 439 (1974). Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 6 upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 7 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 8 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“PRLA”), courts 9 in “any civil action with respect to prison conditions” may enter a temporary restraining 10 order only if it is “narrowly drawn, extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the harm 11 the court finds requires preliminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to 12 correct that harm.” Congress enacted the PLRA to “revive the hands-off doctrine” and 13 restore “judicial quiescence derived from federalism and separation of powers concerns” 14 to remove the judiciary from prison management. Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 15 996-97 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the PRLA requires courts to “give substantial weight 16 to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused 17 by the preliminary relief . . . .” Id. at 998 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). 18 III. Analysis 19 A. Likelihood of Success on The Merits 20 “The first factor [] is the most important—likely success on the merits.” Garcia v. 21 Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). While a plaintiff carries the burden of 22 demonstrating likelihood of success, the plaintiff is not required to prove their case in full 23 at this stage, rather, only the parts that enable them to obtain the injunctive relief they seek. 24 See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 25 26 27 1 The standard for a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John 28 1 Plaintiff claims a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. “[A] prison 2 official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 3 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’; a prison official’s act or 4 omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimum civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” 5 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted). Second, “a prison official 6 must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” and act with “‘deliberate indifference’ 7 to inmate health or safety . . . .” Id. 8 Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the 9 merits on his claim. The incident that is the focus of Plaintiff’s Complaint is a July 2, 2022, 10 attack on Plaintiff by two other inmates, identified in an exhibit to the Complaint as 11 “Hagan” and “Jackson.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants were 12 aware in advance of the attack that either inmate was an enemy of Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff 13 submitted a list of 11 of his documented enemies, as of January 26, 2022, and neither 14 inmate is on the list. ECF No. 10-4 at 2. Plaintiff has not provided evidence of any 15 communication or notice to Defendants regarding inmates Hagan or Jackson preceding the 16 attack. Absent a showing that Defendants knew of a danger posed to Plaintiff and were 17 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety — or further evidence in support of his other 18 theories of liability that are articulated in a more generalized manner in his Complaint — 19 Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.2 20 B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 21 Plaintiff claims that he cannot be placed at any Level IV facility because he has 22 enemies at all Level IV facilities. See ECF No. 3. In briefing after the hearing, the State 23 reported that a classification staff representative has endorsed Plaintiff for a transfer to 24 Facility B at California State Prison, Los Angeles County (“Lancaster”) in Lancaster, 25 26 27 2 Plaintiff’s briefing also alleges that he suffered a second attack later on July 2, 2022, from two other inmates, “Branch” and “Major.” ECF No. 10 at 2. The same analysis applies 28 1 California, a Level IV, Sensitive Needs, Enhanced Outpatient yard. ECF No. 13 at 2. 2 According to a declaration submitted by Defendant Gallegos, Plaintiff does not have any 3 known enemies at Facility B in Lancaster. ECF No. 13-2 at 1-2. This is further supported 4 by CDCR’s current list of separation alerts for Plaintiff, which does include any individuals 5 housed at Lancaster Facility B. ECF No. 13-3 at 3. Furthermore, although Plaintiff 6 identified at the hearing additional “undocumented” enemies of his, even taking his 7 assertion at face value none of these individuals are housed in Facility B at Lancaster. ECF 8 No. 13-2 at 2. As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. 9 C. Balance of Equities & The Public Interest 10 Where the government is the party opposing an injunction, the remaining two factors 11 — balance of the equities and public interest in injunctive relief — tend to merge. See Nken 12 v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009); Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 13 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). Both factors weigh in the State’s favor. 14 First, Plaintiff’s requested injunction — a statewide ban on placement in a Level IV 15 facility — is unduly broad. The PRLA requires courts to ensure that prospective relief in 16 any civil action related to prison conditions be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than 17 necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means 18 necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Given 19 that the State has identified a Level IV facility that does not house any of Plaintiff’s known 20 enemies, or even those particular individuals he describes as undocumented enemies, 21 Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief does not comply with the PRLA. 22 Second, courts must give a degree of deference to prison administrators. See Griffin 23 v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10, 21 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Courts are ‘particularly deferential’ to prison 24 administrators’ regulatory judgments,’ if ‘[a]ccommodating [a prisoner’s] demands 25 would . . . impair the ability of corrections officers to protect all who are inside a prison’s 26 walls.’” (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003)). This deference weighs 27 against the requested temporary restraining order. 28 1 Third, the PRLA requires the Court to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact 2 |{on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 18 3 ||U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Here, Plaintiff is not the only one affected by his requested 4 || injunctive relief. Plaintiff has a classification score of 255, is classified as a sensitive needs 5 inmate, and is a participant in the Enhanced Outpatient Program for inmates with severe 6 ||mental health issues. ECF No. 8 at 8-9. The State notes that a prisoner must have a 7 placement score of 59 or less to be eligible for a Level III yard. /d. Placing prisoners with 8 || Plaintiffs classification score and additional programing needs in lower-level yards places 9 || those inmates at risk as well. See ECF No. 13 at 7. 10 Accordingly, both the balance of equities and the public’s interest lean in favor of 11 || Defendants. 12 IV. Conclusion and Order 13 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary 14 || Restraining Order. 15 SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: November 1, 2022. febkut G Low 17 Hon.RobertS.Huie 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 ee