White v. Luning

93 U.S. 514, 23 L. Ed. 938, 3 Otto 514, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1404
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 18, 1876
Docket49
StatusPublished
Cited by70 cases

This text of 93 U.S. 514 (White v. Luning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. Luning, 93 U.S. 514, 23 L. Ed. 938, 3 Otto 514, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1404 (1876).

Opinion

Me. Justice Davis

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the case of a mortgagor unable to pay his debt, and getting it satisfied by a judicial sale of the mortgaged premises, who, on the ground that no title passed by reason of misdescription in the deed of the sheriff, seeks to prevent his creditor, who purchased them, from recovering possession. And this, too, when, if there, be any misdescription, it was presumably caused by him, as they were offered for sale in parcels, by his direction ánd for his advantage. As the court does not find that the descriptive errors misled any person, or caused any sacrifice of the property, the presumption is, that no one was injured, and that the property brought a full.price. Obviously, therefore, there are no merits in this defence., It rests alone on the idea that sheriffs’ deeds and ordinary deeds inter partes are subject to different, rules of constructidn. In regard, however, to the description' of the; property conveyed, the rules are the same, 'whether the deed be made by a party in his own right, or by- an officer of. the court. The policy of the law does not require courts to scrutinize' the proceedings- .of a judicial sale with a' view to defeat them. On the contrary, every reasonable intendment will- be made in their favor, so as to secure, if it can be .done consistently with legal rules, the object they were intended to accomplish. Is this deed void for uncertainty of description, or can the property intended to be conveyed be *524 reasonably located by means of' that description ? The court below located it by adopting, except in one instance, the calls for .courses and distances, and rejecting as false and repugnant certain calls for known objects. It is true, that, ás a general rule,'monuments, natural dr artificial, referred to in a deed control, on its construction, rather than courses and distances ; but this rule is not inflexible. ‘It yields whenever, taking all the particulars of the deed together, it would be absurd to apply it. For instance, if the rejection of a call for a monument would reconcile other parts of the description, and leave enough to identify and render certain the land which the sheriff intended to convey,- it would certainly be absurd to retain the false call, and thus defeat the conveyance.-

Greenleaf, in .his Treatise on Evidence (vol. L sect. 301), in speaking -on this subject, in effect says, That where the description in the deed is true in part, but hot true in every particular, so much of it as is false is rejected, and the instrument will take effect if a sufficient description remains to ascertain its application. Applying this rule to the subjeót-mattel of this -deed, we do not think there is any difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the description is sufficiently certain to pass the title to the land.

The court below found, among other things, that if the courses and distances, being the field-notes of the survey, are followed from the • point of - beginning, changing, east into west in the last course, the lines would, by closing, embrace the tract of land sued for, and correspond with all the other calls and monuments mentioned in the deed, except that'there-would be a departure at nearly right angles from the partition fence at the beginning of the call N. 47-|-° Ei 127 chains, and the lines .would not .extend to, nor in any manner correspond with, the north boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes. There are; there-fore, three descriptive errors, which, if removed from the deed, would harmonize all other particulars in it, and leave enough, words of description to identify the demanded premises.

These errors will be noticed in the order stated by the court. The deed closes with these words : and thence S. 41° 37' E. . 17.32 chains to the place of beginning.” This distance was correct, and so, except in one particular, was. the course. It' *525 should have been west instead of east. To follow the course as given would manifestly not close the lines of the survey ; and as, other things being equal, boundaries prevail over courses, the court rejected the latter and adopted the former as the true description in this particular. This was so obviously'right, that further comment is unnecessary.

The next error relates to the “ fence along the line of partition.”

There is a call for this fence as a boundary during the running of seven courses; but it is plainly a false call, after the sixth course has been run, for the- seventh course departs at nearly right angles from the line of the fence, and if this course be rejected and the call for the fence retained, none of the other calls in the deed can be complied with,' and the instrument is wholly unintelligible. On the contrary, if this course be accepted as the true description, and the call for the fence be discarded at' the termination of the sixth course, there is no difficulty of harmonizing the other parts of the deed, with the exception of the northern boundary, and the difficulty there, we think, can be easily removed.' It would therefore be manifestly wrong, not to say absurd, to retain the call for the fence, and reject the call for the course and distance. The reason why monuments, as a general thing, in the determination 'of boundaries control courses -and distances, is, that they are less liable to mistakes ; but the rule ceases with the reason for it. .If they are inconsistent with the calls for other monuments, and it is apparent from all the other particulars in the deed that they were inadvertently ’ inserted, the reason for .retaining them no longer exists, and' they will be rejected as false and repugnant. This applies with equal if not greater force-to the last and.main error in this deed. Adopting the seventh course as the true description, the. calls in the deed proceed as follows : “ N. 47-|° E. 127 chains to the north boundary of the rancho Sal'Si Puedes , on the mountains, thence along said north boundary the following courses,” &c.

The calls for these boundaries are equally -false and mistaken with the call for continuing the line along the partition fence, as is clearly shown in the findings of fact by the court below. Theré are two ranges of mountains in- the direction of the *526 course N. 47-|-° E. The summit of the first range is the northerly boundary line between the counties of Santa Cruz and Santa Clara, and both the summit and county line are about the distance of 127 chains from the point in the partition fence where the course N. 47J° E. begins.

There is another range of mountains in the same northerly direction, in the county of Santa Clara, about three-quai’ters of a mile beyond the summit of the first range, and the northerly boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes is on this range of mountains.

' The calls for courses and distances run along the summit of the first range, and do not apply to the second. Besides this, if the summit of the first be treated as the boundary intended to be called for, all other calls, monuments, courses, and distances in' the deed completely harmonize, except the two descriptive errors which have already been' corrected, and the lines enclose a tract of the precise number of acres sued for, lying wholly within the county of Santa Cruz.

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Bluebook (online)
93 U.S. 514, 23 L. Ed. 938, 3 Otto 514, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1404, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-luning-scotus-1876.