White v. Henderson Implement Co.

879 S.W.2d 575, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 662, 1994 WL 133517
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 19, 1994
DocketWD 48419, WD 48456
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 879 S.W.2d 575 (White v. Henderson Implement Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. Henderson Implement Co., 879 S.W.2d 575, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 662, 1994 WL 133517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

FENNER, Judge.

Appellant, Henderson Implement Company (Henderson), appeals the award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) which reversed the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Roger White’s claim for compensation. White also appeals. He claims the Commission erred in denying him compensation for medical care.

The record reflects that White was a small engine mechanic employed at Henderson. On December 29,1987, at approximately 9:30 a.m., White carried a lawn mower, still in its shipping box, from a shed to the shop at Henderson in order to “set it up” for sale. The shed was approximately 200 feet from the shop and the mower weighed approximately 75 pounds. White began to remove the mower from its shipping box and, as he bent over and lifted it up, he “twitched” his eye. He could not see. He attempted to continue to work, but after an hour, he informed his employer of the injury and sought medical attention.

White was examined by Dr. L.D. Schoen-garth, an ophthalmologist, on the day of the incident. On August 22, 1988, White was examined by Dr. King Y. Lee, also an ophthalmologist.

On July 15, 1992, the ALJ entered his award denying employee compensation. The ALJ found that the medical testimony of the two physicians established “no medical causal relationship between the alleged accident and Claimant’s condition.” White’s theory of causation is that he caused a Valsalva maneuver when he bent over and lifted the lawn mower and this caused the loss of vision in his right eye. Dr. Lee described a Valsalva maneuver as “a mechanism that decreased the flow of blood to where it is supposed to go, whether it’s actual constriction by pressure physically or pressure by just congestion of something blocking the fluid flow.”

The ALJ believed that a Valsalva maneuver was “too temporary” an occurrence to have caused White’s condition. White appealed to the Commission which reversed the ALJ’s award. The Commission found:

This case revolves around whether or not the claimant’s loss of sight in his right eye was caused by the work-related incident on December 29,1987. There was conflicting testimony between physicians and we find Dr. Lee’s opinion to be more credible ... Dr. Lee testified that more probably than not, the Valsalva maneuver had triggered a branch artery occlusion, causing the claimant’s disability. His observations were more consistent with branch artery occlusion than a central vessel occlusion. He did indicate, however, that they could also be consistent with central venal occlusion. He indicated it was possible for one to experience both a venal and arterial occlusion. Claimant’s Dr. Schoengarth, on the other hand, believed a central venal occlu *577 sion had caused the optic atrophis. However, Dr. Sehoengarth acknowledged that Dr. Lee was in a superior position to opine on whether there had been an arterial occlusion since Dr. Lee had administered the test calculated to best diagnose this particular condition. A workers’ compensation claim does not have to establish the elements of the case absolutely, but is sufficient if the elements are shown by reasonable probability founded upon reason and experience, inclining the mind to believe, but leaving room for doubt.

In its sole point on appeal, Henderson argues that the Commission erred in entering its Final Award Allowing Compensation because “the testimony of the physicians does not provide sufficient competent evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that employee’s condition resulted from a cause for which the employer would be liable.” Specifically, Henderson complains that the evidence “demonstrates that employee’s physician was speculating about the cause of the employee’s condition and did not relate the alleged cause to the actual condition suffered by the employee, while employer’s physician was certain about such cause.” Henderson concludes that “the Commission misread the doctors’ testimony and misstated the doctors’ conclusions in its final award.”

Section 287.495, RSMo 1986, sets forth the grounds for setting aside a final award of the Commission as follows: (1) the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the award was procured by fraud; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or (4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Henderson’s argument on appeal centers around the fourth ground for setting aside the Commission’s final award.

The Commission is charged not only with reviewing the record but, when appropriate, determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, resolving any conflicts in the evidence, and reaching its own conclusions independently of the ALJ’s findings. Jones v. Jefferson City School Dist., 801 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Mo.App.1990). After the Commission has determined an award in a workers’ compensation case, this court will review the Commission’s award and not the findings of the ALJ. Id The Commission’s final award may be set aside only if there is no substantial and competent evidence to support it or if it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at 488.

This court must view the evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s award. Id. at 488. We will not substitute our judgment on issues of fact for that of the Commission even if we would have made a different initial conclusion. Lawson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 833 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Mo.App.1992). The Commission is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight and value of the evidence. Id. at 470-71.

The claimant has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim and must establish a causal connection between the accident and the injury. Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App.1990) (citations omitted). The claimant does not, however, have to establish the elements of his case on the basis of absolute certainty. Id. It is sufficient if he shows them by reasonable probability. Id. “Probable means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room for doubt.” Id. at 198-99. In a workers’ compensation proceeding, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the employee and in favor of coverage, but a claim will not be validated where some essential element is lacking. Gudde v. Heiman Grain, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.App.1992).

In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s award, the evidence was insufficient to show a medical-causal connection between White’s employment and the injury. The Commission relied on Dr. Lee’s testimony to find causation and his testimony regarding causation amounts to nothing more than speculation.

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Bluebook (online)
879 S.W.2d 575, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 662, 1994 WL 133517, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-henderson-implement-co-moctapp-1994.