White v. Hager

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 24-6836
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TONEY A. WHITE, No. 24-6836 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:21-cv-01259-RFB-MDC v. MEMORANDUM*

ROBIN HAGER,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

JEREMY BEAN, GREGORY BRYAN, RYAN CLAY, RASHEED CURRY, CHARLES DANIELS, BOB FAULKNER, WILLIAM GITTERE, Warden, CALVIN JOHNSON, RIO MANALANG, MICHAEL MINEV, ROBERT OWENS, MANUEL PORTILLO, MONIQUE HUBBARD-PICKETT, JENNIFER NASH, JACQUES GRAHAM, THERESA WICKHAM, BRIAN WILLIAMS, Warden, G. CARPENTER, RADEK DVORAK, LARRY DEAN WILLIAMSON, ERIC LOPEZ, HOLLY CROSBY, LARRY HALL, RHYS LIM, TED HANF, SCOTT MATTINSON, SIA ASIMIDAKIS, NAPHCARE, INC.,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Richard F. Boulware, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 4, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Appellee Toney White brought an Eighth Amendment claim against Nevada

Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) officials including Medical Administrator,

Robin Hager, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hager now appeals the district court’s

denial of her motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. Her notice of

appeal was filed 31 days after entry of the district court’s order. Because the 30-

day appeal deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) applies, this court lacks jurisdiction to

hear Hager’s untimely interlocutory appeal.

1. Hager argues that her appeal was timely because the “separate document

rule” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) afforded her 180 days to appeal.

We disagree. When a separate document is required for entry of a district court

judgment but no separate document is filed, judgment is considered “entered” after

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 24-6836 150 days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). The clock

then begins to run for the 30-day appeal deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

However, our recent precedent confirms that when the district court files a

collateral order, the order is considered “enter[ed] . . . when [it] appears on the

docket.” McNeil v. Gittere, 150 F.4th 1205, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2025) (dismissing

an untimely appeal of a district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds).

Here, the district court filed its order denying Hager’s motion to dismiss on

September 29, 2024. The denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds is an immediately appealable collateral order. Id. at 1208; see Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that “a district court’s denial of a claim

of qualified immunity . . . is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of

28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment”). And the

“‘entry’ of an immediately appealable collateral order occurs when the district

court files the order on the civil docket.” McNeil, 150 F.4th at 1210–11. The order

was therefore “entered” on September 29, 2024, and the deadline was 30 days

later—October 29, 2024. Hager filed her notice of appeal one day late, on October

30, 2024. We lack jurisdiction to review the late-filed appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a);

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) (“[S]tatutory limitations on the timing

of appeals” are “limitations on [a court’s] own jurisdiction.”).

3 24-6836 2. Hager alternatively argues that because the district court entered its order

on a Sunday, it should be considered “entered” the following Monday, but she cites

no binding or persuasive case law supporting that proposition. When computing a

deadline, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1)(A) states that “the day of the

event that triggers the period” is excluded, so time begins to run the following day.

The Rule also establishes that every day in the period is counted, including

intermediate weekends and holidays, and specifies that the last day is included

unless it is a weekend or holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(B)–(C). The Rule does

not make such an exception for the first day of the period. In the instant case,

Sunday, September 29, 2024 “trigger[ed]” the 30-day appeal period. The 30-day

clock began to run on Monday, September 30, 2024, and the final day of the period

was Tuesday, October 29, 2024. Hager’s notice of appeal was untimely filed the

following day.

DISMISSED.

4 24-6836