White v. Guardian Life Insurance Company

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-2681
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM WHITE, No. 24-2681

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01788-L-KSC v.

THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE MEMORANDUM* COMPANY OF AMERICA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 21, 2025 San Diego, California

Before: WALLACE, MCKEOWN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges

Plaintiff-Appellant William White (“White”) appeals from the district court’s

(1) denial of his motion to establish de novo as the standard of review applicable to

Defendant-Appellee Guardian Life Insurance Company’s (“Guardian”) denial of his

insurance claim; and (2) summary judgment in favor of Guardian. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

White’s insurance claim arises out of a motorcycle accident resulting in

White’s loss of his leg. White’s insurance plan (the “Plan”) excludes losses that

occur “while the employee is a driver in a motor vehicle accident, if he or she does

not hold a current and valid driver’s license.” Guardian therefore denied White’s

claim under this exclusion since he only had a Class C California Driver’s License

at the time of the accident and lacked the Class M endorsement required to legally

drive a motorcycle. White sued Guardian, arguing that the exclusion did not apply

because it does not specify that the claimant must be licensed to drive the vehicle

they operated during the accident, and he technically had a driver’s license.

The Plan specifies that it consists of various documents, including a certificate

that grants Guardian the discretion to interpret the terms of the Plan. White moved

to establish the standard of review of Guardian’s denial of his claim as de novo,

arguing that California Insurance Code § 10110.61 voids the discretionary clause.

Guardian countered that the Plan contains a valid choice-of-law clause selecting

Florida law, under which the discretionary clause applies, and the district court must

review Guardian’s denial of benefits for abuse of discretion. The district court

1 We grant White’s motion for judicial notice of the legislative history of California Insurance Code § 10110.6. See Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).

2 applied our court’s decision in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126,

1128–29 (9th Cir. 1993), to conclude that the choice-of-law provision was neither

unreasonable nor unfair, and therefore Florida law applied, and the standard of

review was abuse of discretion. The district court then held that Guardian did not

abuse its discretion by interpreting the exclusion as requiring an insured to be

licensed to drive the vehicle he operated during the accident because doing so

without the proper license violates state law.

On appeal, White argues that (1) the discretionary clause is not part of the

Plan and our court should interpret the exclusionary clause de novo, (2) even if the

discretionary clause is part of the Plan, our court should hold that the choice-of-law

clause is invalid under the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law approach and

that California law applies, and (3) since California law applies, the discretionary

clause is void and our court must interpret the exclusionary clause in White’s favor.

We need not address whether the discretionary clause is part of the Plan or

whether the choice-of-law provision is valid because the district court’s summary

judgment for Guardian was proper regardless of the standard of review. “When the

contract terms are clear, the parties’ intent must be ascertained from the contract,

and the contract terms connote their ordinary meaning.” Tehama-Colusa Canal

Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 721 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, it is clear

that by excluding losses that occur “while the employee is a driver in a motor vehicle

3 accident, if he or she does not hold a current and valid driver’s license[,]” the parties

intended that coverage would be withheld from claimants who were unlawfully

operating a vehicle at the time of the incident, as White was. Thus, whether the

standard of review is de novo or abuse of discretion, Guardian’s exclusion provision

plainly applies to White’s claim. Accordingly, the district court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of Guardian.

AFFIRMED.