White (Steven) v. State

Nevada Supreme Court

White (Steven) v. State

DecidedSeptember 18, 2014

Docket64503

StatusUnpublished

This text of White (Steven) v. State (White (Steven) v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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White (Steven) v. State, (Neb. 2014).

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prejudice or a miscarriage of justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). First, White contends that the State committed misconduct during its cross-examination of him by (1) continually commenting on his "ancillary actions" prior to the shooting, (2) commenting on his failure to show remorse, (3) using inflammatory language, and (4) portraying him as a bad person. Having reviewed the questions and answers cited by White as examples of this kind of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that it is not plain or clear from the record that the State's cross-examination was improper. Therefore, White has not demonstrated plain error. Second, White contends that the State committed misconduct by using leading questions during direct examination of a witness and the district court erred by failing to limit the leading questions sua sponte. See NRS 50.115(3)(a). We conclude that any prejudice that may have resulted from the leading questions did not rise to the level of affecting White's substantial rights. Therefore, White is not entitled to the reversal of his conviction based on the State's examination of this witness. Third, White contends that cumulative error requires the reversal of his conviction. One error, however, cannot cumulate. See State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (Idaho 2010); United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A Having considered White's contentions and concluded that he is not entitled to relief, we' ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

traAl n Hardesty

01241. J. Douglas # Cherry

cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge Patti, Sgro & Lewis Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

'The fast track statement fails to comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it does not contain 1-inch margins on all four sides. Counsel is cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1941A e

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prejudice or a miscarriage of justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). First, White contends that the State committed misconduct during its cross-examination of him by (1) continually commenting on his "ancillary actions" prior to the shooting, (2) commenting on his failure to show remorse, (3) using inflammatory language, and (4) portraying him as a bad person. Having reviewed the questions and answers cited by White as examples of this kind of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that it is not plain or clear from the record that the State's cross-examination was improper. Therefore, White has not demonstrated plain error. Second, White contends that the State committed misconduct by using leading questions during direct examination of a witness and the district court erred by failing to limit the leading questions sua sponte. See NRS 50.115(3)(a). We conclude that any prejudice that may have resulted from the leading questions did not rise to the level of affecting White's substantial rights. Therefore, White is not entitled to the reversal of his conviction based on the State's examination of this witness. Third, White contends that cumulative error requires the reversal of his conviction. One error, however, cannot cumulate. See State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (Idaho 2010); United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997).