Whitcomb v. Koechel

158 P.2d 496, 117 Mont. 329, 1945 Mont. LEXIS 57
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 9, 1945
Docket8567
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 158 P.2d 496 (Whitcomb v. Koechel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitcomb v. Koechel, 158 P.2d 496, 117 Mont. 329, 1945 Mont. LEXIS 57 (Mo. 1945).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE MORRIS

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

This action was commenced by the administrator of the estate of William Peters, deceased, to quiet title to three lots located in the town of Saco, Phillips county. The complaint alleges that Peters gave a quitclaim deed to the lots to a neighbor, George C. Koechel, May 22, 1939, pursuant to an agreement to the *331 effect that Koechel would, hold title to the lots in trust for Peters and reeonvey the same to him on demand. It appears that Peters being unable to pay the taxes on the lots, title thereto had been taken by Phillips county and the conveyance to Koechel was made for the purpose of having Koechel purchase the lots for and on account of Peters at a tax sale advertised by the county. It is further alleged that Koechel gave no consideration for the quitclaim deed; that Koechel and Peters together attended the tax sale at Malta, May 22, 1939, at which time Koechel bought the lots for $325, making a down payment of $130 and entering into a contract with Phillips county to pay the balance in annual installments. It is further alleged by plaintiff that the money for the down payment was furnished by Peters and that all the subsequent installments were paid by him, and that all taxes levied against the lots after the sale were likewise paid by Peters, and that he exercised dominion over the property up to the date of his death, collecting the rents and making necessary repairs to the cottage located on the lots. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that after qualifying as administrator he and his attorney visited Koechel at the latter’s home near the town of Saco and demanded a reconveyance of the property to the administrator which was refused. Plaintiff prays that the defendants be required to set forth their claims of title to the property and that such claims be determined to be without merit and that defendants be forever barred from asserting any claim to the premises described and further prays for costs.

Lis pendens was filed at the time the action was begun. A general demurrer to the complaint was overruled; the answer is in the nature of a general denial followed by an affirmative defense wherein it is set up that Peters was indebted to a certain building and loan company on a mortgage note secured by the lots which had been given prior to the time that the county took the tax deed and that Peters claimed to have paid practically all, if not all, of the mortgage but the building and loan company having become involved in financial troubles had transferred Peters’ note and mortgage to another concern and Peters *332 desired Koecliel to hold the title to the lots in order to avoid the obligation to the building and loan company. Koechel pleads this alleged “fraud” as grounds for estoppel against the administrator to claim any interest in the lots. By a cross-complaint defendant alleges that after the purchase of the tax title from Phillips county he obtained the quitclaim deed from Peters in order to clean up any possible flaw in the tax title proceedings and that he paid Peters a consideration of one dollar for the deed. The defendants conclude their answer, affirmative defense and cross-complaint with the prayer that title in the lots be quieted in George C. Koechel. A copy of the contract of sale between Koechel and Phillips county was made Exhibit A to the answer and cross-complaint. By reply all affirmative matter set up in the answer and cross-complaint was denied.

The matter came on for hearing before the court sitting without a jury. Witnesses were sworn and testified; documentary evidence was introduced by both parties; briefs were submitted and, in due course, judgment was made and entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants were enjoined from asserting any claim to the lots adverse to the William Peters estate. The defendants appealed.

The first assignment of error is on the court’s giving judgment for the plaintiff; the second alleges error as to a court finding; the third is not clearly stated but in substance is that by reason of the statute of frauds an estate in real property cannot be created except by an instrument in writing; the fourth is that by reason of the alleged fraud against the loan company by the decreased the plaintiff is estopped to claim any interest in the lots.

The defendants do not argue the assignments in the order submitted but proceed under certain contentions. We will take the matter up as brought before us under the assignments. Practically all the arguments advanced revolve around assignment one.

In a long line of decisions by this court the rule has been applied in actions such as this that where there is sub *333 stantial evidence to support the lower court its findings will be accepted on appeal and findings of fact by a trial court based upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. (Gazette Printing Co. v. McConnell, 45 Mont. 89, 122 Pac. 561, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1327; Alywin v. Morley, 41 Mont. 191, 108 Pac. 778; Williard v. Campbell Oil Co., 77 Mont. 30, 248 Pac. 219; Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Featherly, 74 Mont. 531, 241 Pac. 322; Nelson v. Wilson, 81 Mont. 560, 264 Pac. 679; Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Jordan, 85 Mont. 375, 278 Pac. 832, 65 A. L. R. 968; Fousek v. DeForest, 90 Mont. 448, 4 Pac. (2d) 472.)

No findings were expressly made by the court in this case, but in such circumstances “every finding necessary to support the judgment of the court will be implied.” (Steiner v. McMillan, 59 Mont. 30, 195 Pac. 836, 837; In re McLure’s Estate, 63 Mont. 536, 208 Pac. 900; Town of Cascade v. County of Cascade, 75 Mont. 304, 243 Pac. 806; Clark v. National Surety Company, 81 Mont. 113, 261 Pac. 618; Sawyer v. Somers Lumber Company, 86 Mont. 169, 282 Pac. 852; Blaser v. Clinton Irr. Dist., 100 Mont. 459, 53 Pac. (2d) 1141.

We will leave the first assignment until we give such consideration to the others as we deem essential. What we have just said as to the rule on findings when none are asked nor made we think sufficient answer to the second alleged error and that assignment will not be noticed further.

The third assignment is “the trial court erred in holding that in the absence of a written agreement or memoranda to that effect, no trust under the evidence here was created or existed in favor of Peters.” The argument is made that the statute of frauds deprives the plaintiff of the right to establish his claim of title to the lots fpr the reason that a trust estate in real property can be created only by an instrument in writing. In this connection sections 6859, 6860, 10611, 6783 and 6784, Revised Codes, are cited. Sections 6859, 6784 and 10611 have some bearing on this controversy in that each of those sections refers to trust estates created “by operation of law.” The see *334 tion which controls here, however, is section 6785, which provides : “When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration thereof is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.” The trust estate in the lots which the plaintiff claims in behalf of the Peters estate came to life “by operation of law” pursuant to section 6785.

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Bluebook (online)
158 P.2d 496, 117 Mont. 329, 1945 Mont. LEXIS 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitcomb-v-koechel-mont-1945.