Whitaker v. Texas Co.

176 F. Supp. 395, 11 Oil & Gas Rep. 367, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2805
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 21, 1959
DocketCiv. No. 4466
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 176 F. Supp. 395 (Whitaker v. Texas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitaker v. Texas Co., 176 F. Supp. 395, 11 Oil & Gas Rep. 367, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2805 (E.D. Okla. 1959).

Opinion

WALLACE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Samuel G. and Ann Elizabeth Whitaker, Oklahoma citizens, bring this action against the defendant, The Texas Company, a Delaware corporation, to establish judicially the expiration of an oil and gas lease given by plaintiffs on their undivided fractional mineral interest in some 306 acres in Stephens County, Oklahoma.1 The amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

The lease in question was executed by plaintiffs on March 12, 1948, in favor of one L. A. Edwards; shortly thereafter Edwards assigned the lease to the defendant company. Such lease was granted for a primary term of ten years, “and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee.”2

On December 12, 1957, upon Goff-Leeper Drilling Company’s application, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission entered an order establishing 40-acre drilling and spacing units for the production of oil and gas from the Niles Sand of the Cisco formation common source of supply underlying all of Section 15 and the N/2 of the instant Section 16. Such order designated each governmental quarter-quarter section as the drilling unit and provided that the permitted well should be located in the center of the unit or within a prescribed tolerance. Furthermore, the order provided that “all royalty interest within any spacing unit shall be communitized and each royalty owner within any unit shall participate in the royalty from the well drilled thereon in the relation that the acreage owned by him bears to the total acreage in the unit.” 3

On January 17, 1958, an operating agreement was entered into between Tidewater Oil Company, Gulf Oil Corporation and The Texas Company, the owners of the working interests underlying the SE/4 of the NE/4 of said Section 16, wherein Tidewater, as operator, agreed to commence a well on the 40-acre drilling and spacing unit in question and to drill the same to test the Niles Sand of the Cisco formation or to a total depth of 8500 feet, whichever was lesser.4 This well, the Hervey No. 1, was commenced on January 25,1958, and spudded in at a point on the northwest corner of the SE/4 of the SE/4 of the NE/4, immediately east of plaintiffs’ 10-acre tract embraced in the 40-acre Hervey Unit.5 About February 17th the well reached the Niles Sand at 7510 feet. Two drill stem tests were taken at the interval [397]*397between 7510 and 7533 feet and thereupon drilling was continued until about March 10th when the Upper Wade Sand (located from 8526 to 8589 feet) was encountered.

On March 13th the plaintiffs demanded a release of the lease in suit asserting that such lease had expired.

The Hervey No. 1 was drilled to a total depth of 8912 feet and on March 21st the casing was set at 8706 feet. On March 25th on a natural test of the Niles Sand, the well swabbed dry with a slight show of oil and gas; on March 26th the Niles was treated with sandfrac.

On April 1, 1958, Tidewater’s application for 160-acre spacing of the Upper Wade for gas and gas condensate in the area in question was heard and granted.6 Under said order the NE/4 of said Section 16 was designated as a drilling and spacing unit for the production of gas and gas condensate from the Upper Wade Sand common source of supply and the Hervey No. 1 was designated as the unit well for said 160-acre unit. This order provided that “all royalty interests within any spacing unit shall be communitized and each royalty owner within any unit shall participate in the royalty from the well drilled thereon in the relation that the acreage owned by him bears to the total acreage in the unit.”

From April 2, 1958, until July 24,1958, the Hervey No. 1 well produced 434 barrels of oil from the Niles Sand. By July 24th the oil from the Niles was completely exhausted as evidenced by a 24-hour production test on that date which yielded one-half barrel of oil and one-half barrel of salt water.

Defendant first urges that the sued upon leasehold property was “pooled as to all sands” with the Tidewater lease in the Hervey Unit at the time the Her-vey No. 1 well was initiated and that consequently plaintiffs’ lease was extended beyond the primary term inasmuch as the Hervey No. 1 well was not only commenced within the primary term of plaintiffs’ lease but resulted in the discovery of “commercial production” within such term when the Upper Wade was penetrated on March 10th. On this, the defendant errs.

Plaintiffs’ lease did authorize the defendant to pool such leasehold property with other properties if the lessee deemed such advisable.7 However, in order to exercise such contractual right, the defendant had to “execute in writing an instrument identifying and describing the pooled acreage” and thus evidence its intention to so pool. The operating agreement of January 17, 1958, cannot be construed as a written declaration of pooling executed for the purpose of pooling plaintiffs’ property pursuant to the pooling authority granted to the lessee in the lease. The agreement entered into by the defendant with Gulf and Tidewater was just what it was entitled,- — -an operating agreement. And, there is no language contained therein which implies that such agreement was also intended to effectuate a pooling of all sands embraced by the Texas Company and Tidewater leases. Moreover, significantly, Tidewater did not have a comparable provision in its lease giving Tidewater as lessee the discretionary power to pool such leased property by merely executing a written declaration.

Plaintiffs assert that the lease in question has expired by its own terms due to the failure of the defendant company to drill a well which was physically [398]*398located upon plaintiffs’ leased property. However, this is an over-simplification of the problem at hand. As indicated by this court in overruling plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, when the Hervey No. 1 was commenced and drilled to the Niles Sand of the Cisco formation, the existence of the Commission’s spacing order of December 12, 1957, in legal contemplation placed the Hervey No. 1 well on the plaintiffs’ property as effectively as if such well had been drilled on plaintiffs’ lease insofar as the Niles Sand of the Cisco formation common source of supply was concerned.8

Thus, the critical issue is one of whether sufficient oil was discovered and produced from the Cisco formation to extend the instant lease beyond the primary term of March 12, 1958, through the operation of the “thereafter clause” of this lease.

Although the recovered oil was small in amount as to the Cisco formation, the court can but find, from the evidence of record, that oil “in paying quantities” was extracted from the Cisco, inasmuch as the total production of 434 barrels of oil from April through July resulted in a slight net profit to the working interest owners.9

The instant well, as to the Cisco formation, was commenced prior to the expiration of the primary term of plaintiffs’ lease. This sand was first penetrated on February 17th, at a time still prior to the lease’s expiration. The lessee had a reasonable length of time thereafter to complete the well in such sand and to produce therefrom. When oil in paying quantities

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176 F. Supp. 395, 11 Oil & Gas Rep. 367, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitaker-v-texas-co-oked-1959.