Whistler Energy II, LLC

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedJune 30, 2020
Docket16-10661
StatusUnknown

This text of Whistler Energy II, LLC (Whistler Energy II, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whistler Energy II, LLC, (La. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: CASE NO, 16-10661

WHISTLER ENERGY II, LLC SECTION “B”

DEBTOR CHAPTER 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has remanded this case to the court for further consideration consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s directives in its opinion, In the Matter of Whistler Energy II, LLC, 931 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2019). The Fifth Circuit vacated part of this court’s earlier decision regarding the administrative expense claim that creditor Nabors Offshore Corporation has made against the debtor’s estate. Nabors’ claim for an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C § 503(b)(1)(A) concerns services it provided after the debtor rejected the platform drilling contract between the debtor and Nabors. The parties agreed to file briefs on the remand issue and have briefed the matter thoroughly. The parties have also agreed that all citations used in their briefs will be to the record created on appeal (“ROA”) in the Fifth Circuit. This court will also use the record on appeal as its reference point unless otherwise noted. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Nabors has shown it is entitled to an administrative expense claim for the time from September 8 to October 20, 2016. The Fifth Circuit held that “when the debtor-in-possession induces availability and the bankruptcy estate derives a benefit from it, the ordinary cost of ensuring such availability qualifies as an administrative expense.”1 The Fifth Circuit has asked this court to determine: 1) whether Whistler induced Nabors to stay on the platform; 2) the length of time Nabors stayed on

1 Matter of Whistler, 931 F.3d at 443. the platform because of Whistler’s post-petition needs; and 3) the actual and necessary costs of staying on the platform during this time period.2 In their post-remand briefing, the parties are no closer to agreement than they were at the outset of this case. Nabors argues that Whistler induced it to stay on the platform for the entire period in question. Whistler disagrees and argues that Nabors stayed for its own benefit, and it

did not induce Nabors to remain for any of the time in question. As the Fifth Circuit noted, an administrative expense classification allows the creditor, here Nabors, to be paid at the expense of the debtor’s other unsecured creditors.3 Thus, “the claimant seeking administrative expenses bears the burden of proof.”4 The words “actual” and “necessary” have been construed narrowly: “the debt must benefit [the] estate and its creditors.” NL Indus., Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp., 940 F.2d 957, 966 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S.Ct. 873, 116 L.Ed.2d 778 (1992). A prima facie case under § 503(b)(1) may be established by evidence that (1) the claim arises from a transaction with the debtor-in-possession; and (2) the goods or services supplied enhanced the ability of the debtor-in-possession's business to function as a going concern.

Matter of TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992). After the movant has established a prima facie case, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the objector; but the burden of persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, remains with the movant. TransAmerican, 978 F.2d at 1416. A. Whether Whistler induced Nabors to remain on the platform. In its opinion remanding this case, the Fifth Circuit stated: “Consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits, we hold that a creditor can establish that its expenses are attributable to the

2 Id at 446. 3 Matter of Whistler, 931 F.3d at 441, citing Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. 258 F.3d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2001). 4 Matter of Whistler, 931 F.3d at 441, citing In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir, 1992). actions of the bankruptcy estate through evidence of either a direct request from the debtor-in- possession or other inducement via the knowing and voluntary post-petition acceptance of desired goods or services.”5 A brief factual summary is in order. The matter on remand concerns the drilling contract between Whistler and Nabors. The time period at issue is June 20, 2016 to October 20, 2016.

Nabors filed a motion to require Whistler to assume or reject the drilling contract on June 17, 2016. Three days later on June 20, 2016 Whistler filed a notice into the record that it intended to reject the drilling contract. The matter was set for hearing, and on July 20, 2016 the court entered an order rejecting the contract retroactive to June 20, 2016, which was the day that Whistler declared it intended to reject the contract. On July 25, 2016, Whistler sent a formal demand letter to Nabors requesting that it provide Whistler with a demobilization plan.6 On September 8, 2016 Nabors sent the demobilization plan. On October 20, 2016 demobilization commenced. It finished approximately 28 days later.7 Nabors argues that during the entire period between contract rejection and

demobilization, Whistler induced Nabors to keep it’s drilling rig on the platform and so it is entitled to a total administrative claim in the amount of $3,631,282.90. Some of this was already awarded by this court and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, so Nabors now seeks an additional $3,132,758.90.8 Nabors argues that Whistler delayed demobilization until BSEE approved a

5 Id. at 443. 6 ROA 6239. 7 Trial transcript dated 12/12/16 at p. 111, R. Doc 636 in bankruptcy case. 8 Nabors does not provide the court with an explanation of how it arrived at this amount other than to refer to ROA 5020, which was a stipulation the parties entered into at the trial setting forth the amounts of the various claims made by Nabors. Nabors states that these are “Pre-Demobilization Day Rate Charges” during the Subject Time Period, which it defines as the time between June 21, 2016 and October 20, 2016. Nabors asserts it is entitled to a reduced day rate of $28,000 per day for this time period. According to the court’s calculations, that time period is 121 days, which at a day rate of $28,000 should equal $3,388,000. Nabors made some deductions to this to reach the $3,132,758.90 figure. The court suspects the deductions are to account for money already paid by Whistler for the use of Nabors’ cranes and living quarters, but the court does not know this for certain. production shut in waiver and confirmed that the preservation order issued in connection with the death of Nabors’ worker on the drilling rig was lifted. Nabors also argues that it was trying to accommodate Whistler’s need to maintain its production operations while demobilization was occurring, and this caused delay in commencing demobilization. Additionally, Nabors argues that demobilization was delayed because it was in negotiations with Whistler and Apollo,

Whistler’s secured creditor, to determine whether the rig could or should be left on the platform in case Whistler eventually decided to resume drilling operations. The court will first address Nabors’ arguments that it was trying to accommodate Whistler’s need to maintain its production operations during demobilization, and that Whistler delayed demobilization until BSEE approved a production shut in waiver and confirmed that the preservation order was lifted.

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