COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00200-CR
WHISKEY WILLIAMS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. F-2013-1198-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
In three issues, Appellant Whiskey Williams appeals the trial court’s
judgment adjudicating him guilty of manslaughter and sentencing him to thirteen
years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). We will
affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Williams was indicted for manslaughter after he struck Edron Slaughter in
the head with a loaded firearm causing the firearm to discharge, hitting and killing
Ashley Walters. Williams pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a five-
year term of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a
motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Williams had violated
the following conditions of his community supervision:
(a) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other state or of the United States;
....
(s) . . . complete 200 hours of Community Service Restitution at a community service project or projects for an organization or organizations approved by the judge and designated by the Denton County Supervision Department to be completed at a rate of not less than four hours per week starting by but not later than 60 days from the date of community supervision;
(t) Submit to testing for alcohol or drug usage at the request of a community supervision officer. Pay the cost for these tests within thirty (30) days of giving the specimen;
(u) Within sixty (60) days, . . . complete a drug/alcohol evaluation through an agency which offers such services and approved by his/her community supervision officer and provide written proof of compliance to the supervision officer within 10 days of completion. If treatment is deemed necessary, the defendant shall abide by any and all treatment directives, comply with the rules and regulations of the approved agency, pay all costs incurred for such services. Continue in said treatment until successfully completed as stated by the counselor with the agreement of his/her community supervision officer; [and]
2 (cc) [Attend] Individual counseling, no less than three (3) sessions specifically addressing the offense.
Williams’s probation officer, Christy Martin, testified at the hearing on the
State’s motion to proceed to adjudication. Martin testified that Williams did not
complete the community service hours required by condition (s) of his community
supervision. She testified that Williams failed to perform the required four hours
of weekly community service for the months of July, September, October, and
November of 2014, as well as for the month of January 2015. Martin also
testified that Williams did not submit to testing for drug usage as required by
condition (t) of his community supervision. She testified that Williams did not
submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November
13, December 18, and December 30, 2014. Martin also testified that Williams
failed to timely submit to the drug/alcohol evaluation required by condition (u) of
his community supervision. She further testified that Williams failed to attend the
three counseling sessions specifically addressing the manslaughter offense as
required by condition (cc) of his community supervision.
The State also presented evidence regarding Williams’s alleged violation
of condition (a) of his community supervision—that he commit no offense against
the laws of Texas or any other state. Terry Brooks testified that he was a deputy
with the Kerr County Sheriff’s Department and a former officer of the Denton
Police Department. Deputy Brooks testified that on January 12, 2015—while
working as a Denton police officer—he conducted a traffic stop on Williams.
3 During the stop, Deputy Brooks observed Williams pull into a parking lot, and he
saw a clear bag fly out of the window of Williams’s vehicle. Williams was the sole
occupant of the stopped vehicle. Deputy Brooks testified that he walked over to
the bag and saw that it contained “a green, leafy substance consistent with
marijuana” and that based on the smell and appearance of the substance, in his
opinion, the bag contained marijuana.
Officer Craig Fitzgerald of the Denton Police Department testified that he
was with Deputy Brooks during Williams’s traffic stop and that he picked up the
bag that came from Williams’s vehicle. Officer Fitzgerald testified that the bag
contained “a green, leafy substance [he] believed to be marijuana” and that, in
his opinion, the contents of the bag contained marijuana. He further testified that
the marijuana collected during the traffic stop weighed one ounce.
Detective Jeffrey Laughlin of the Denton Police Department testified that
on December 30, 2014, he set up a controlled buy for narcotics between Williams
and a confidential informant. Detective Laughlin testified that he outfitted the
informant with a live wire so that he could hear the narcotics transaction taking
place, and he verified prior to the transaction that there was no contraband on
the informant or in the informant’s vehicle. He testified that he set up
surveillance on the location of the transaction, and he observed Williams arrive in
a vehicle. Detective Laughlin then observed the informant exit his vehicle and
get into Williams’s vehicle, and Detective Laughlin heard a conversation between
Williams and the informant in which Williams sold marijuana to the informant.
4 Detective Laughlin then observed the informant get back into his vehicle, and he
followed the informant to a nearby location where he was handed a bag
containing what he recognized to be marijuana. The marijuana collected from
the controlled buy weighed fourteen grams.
After the parties rested their respective cases-in-chief, Williams’s counsel
brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that Williams had not entered a plea
to the State’s motion. Williams then waived the reading of the motion and
entered a plea of not true to the allegations contained in the State’s motion. The
trial court then found the State’s allegations (a-1), (a-2), (s), (t-4), (t-6), (t-8),
(t-11), (t-12), (u), and (cc) to be true. After a subsequent punishment hearing,
Williams was adjudicated guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to thirteen years’
confinement.
III. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HEARD TESTIMONY BEFORE HE ENTERED HIS PLEA
In his first issue, Williams argues that his due-process rights were violated
because the trial court heard testimony before he entered his plea. He contends
that this circumstance brings into doubt whether he was fully aware of the
allegations against him and whether he was properly able to defend himself, but
he cites nothing in the record indicating that he was confused by or unaware of
the allegations. Citing Detrich v. State, 545 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977), Williams candidly acknowledges that “the current status of the law
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00200-CR
WHISKEY WILLIAMS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. F-2013-1198-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
In three issues, Appellant Whiskey Williams appeals the trial court’s
judgment adjudicating him guilty of manslaughter and sentencing him to thirteen
years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). We will
affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Williams was indicted for manslaughter after he struck Edron Slaughter in
the head with a loaded firearm causing the firearm to discharge, hitting and killing
Ashley Walters. Williams pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a five-
year term of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a
motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Williams had violated
the following conditions of his community supervision:
(a) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other state or of the United States;
....
(s) . . . complete 200 hours of Community Service Restitution at a community service project or projects for an organization or organizations approved by the judge and designated by the Denton County Supervision Department to be completed at a rate of not less than four hours per week starting by but not later than 60 days from the date of community supervision;
(t) Submit to testing for alcohol or drug usage at the request of a community supervision officer. Pay the cost for these tests within thirty (30) days of giving the specimen;
(u) Within sixty (60) days, . . . complete a drug/alcohol evaluation through an agency which offers such services and approved by his/her community supervision officer and provide written proof of compliance to the supervision officer within 10 days of completion. If treatment is deemed necessary, the defendant shall abide by any and all treatment directives, comply with the rules and regulations of the approved agency, pay all costs incurred for such services. Continue in said treatment until successfully completed as stated by the counselor with the agreement of his/her community supervision officer; [and]
2 (cc) [Attend] Individual counseling, no less than three (3) sessions specifically addressing the offense.
Williams’s probation officer, Christy Martin, testified at the hearing on the
State’s motion to proceed to adjudication. Martin testified that Williams did not
complete the community service hours required by condition (s) of his community
supervision. She testified that Williams failed to perform the required four hours
of weekly community service for the months of July, September, October, and
November of 2014, as well as for the month of January 2015. Martin also
testified that Williams did not submit to testing for drug usage as required by
condition (t) of his community supervision. She testified that Williams did not
submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November
13, December 18, and December 30, 2014. Martin also testified that Williams
failed to timely submit to the drug/alcohol evaluation required by condition (u) of
his community supervision. She further testified that Williams failed to attend the
three counseling sessions specifically addressing the manslaughter offense as
required by condition (cc) of his community supervision.
The State also presented evidence regarding Williams’s alleged violation
of condition (a) of his community supervision—that he commit no offense against
the laws of Texas or any other state. Terry Brooks testified that he was a deputy
with the Kerr County Sheriff’s Department and a former officer of the Denton
Police Department. Deputy Brooks testified that on January 12, 2015—while
working as a Denton police officer—he conducted a traffic stop on Williams.
3 During the stop, Deputy Brooks observed Williams pull into a parking lot, and he
saw a clear bag fly out of the window of Williams’s vehicle. Williams was the sole
occupant of the stopped vehicle. Deputy Brooks testified that he walked over to
the bag and saw that it contained “a green, leafy substance consistent with
marijuana” and that based on the smell and appearance of the substance, in his
opinion, the bag contained marijuana.
Officer Craig Fitzgerald of the Denton Police Department testified that he
was with Deputy Brooks during Williams’s traffic stop and that he picked up the
bag that came from Williams’s vehicle. Officer Fitzgerald testified that the bag
contained “a green, leafy substance [he] believed to be marijuana” and that, in
his opinion, the contents of the bag contained marijuana. He further testified that
the marijuana collected during the traffic stop weighed one ounce.
Detective Jeffrey Laughlin of the Denton Police Department testified that
on December 30, 2014, he set up a controlled buy for narcotics between Williams
and a confidential informant. Detective Laughlin testified that he outfitted the
informant with a live wire so that he could hear the narcotics transaction taking
place, and he verified prior to the transaction that there was no contraband on
the informant or in the informant’s vehicle. He testified that he set up
surveillance on the location of the transaction, and he observed Williams arrive in
a vehicle. Detective Laughlin then observed the informant exit his vehicle and
get into Williams’s vehicle, and Detective Laughlin heard a conversation between
Williams and the informant in which Williams sold marijuana to the informant.
4 Detective Laughlin then observed the informant get back into his vehicle, and he
followed the informant to a nearby location where he was handed a bag
containing what he recognized to be marijuana. The marijuana collected from
the controlled buy weighed fourteen grams.
After the parties rested their respective cases-in-chief, Williams’s counsel
brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that Williams had not entered a plea
to the State’s motion. Williams then waived the reading of the motion and
entered a plea of not true to the allegations contained in the State’s motion. The
trial court then found the State’s allegations (a-1), (a-2), (s), (t-4), (t-6), (t-8),
(t-11), (t-12), (u), and (cc) to be true. After a subsequent punishment hearing,
Williams was adjudicated guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to thirteen years’
confinement.
III. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HEARD TESTIMONY BEFORE HE ENTERED HIS PLEA
In his first issue, Williams argues that his due-process rights were violated
because the trial court heard testimony before he entered his plea. He contends
that this circumstance brings into doubt whether he was fully aware of the
allegations against him and whether he was properly able to defend himself, but
he cites nothing in the record indicating that he was confused by or unaware of
the allegations. Citing Detrich v. State, 545 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977), Williams candidly acknowledges that “the current status of the law
provides that due process was afforded [him] even though his plea came after
5 the evidence was submitted,” but he “submits that this current status ought to be
reexamined.”
In Detrich, the court of criminal appeals held that due process does not
require that a plea be entered in a probation revocation hearing. 545 S.W.2d at
837. Other Texas courts, including our own, have followed Detrich and extended
its holding to situations involving motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt.
See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 14-14-00350-CR, 2015 WL 4141100, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant on community
supervision enter a plea to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate.”); Licerio v.
State, No. 13-04-00211-CR, 2005 WL 2560228, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
Oct. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[W]e conclude
there was no error in the trial court’s failure to elicit a plea from appellant
regarding the violations of community supervision.”); Anthony v. State, 962
S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“[D]ue process does not
even require appellant be given the right to enter a plea to an alleged community
supervision violation.”).
Because the court of criminal appeals and this court have held that due
process does not require a defendant to enter a plea to the allegations contained
in a State’s motion to adjudicate and because Williams has not raised any
convincing reasons for us to reexamine those holdings, we decline Williams’s
invitation to reexamine precedent on this issue, and we hold that there was no
6 error here when Williams’s plea was entered after testimony was presented. See
Detrich, 545 S.W.2d at 837; Moore, 2015 WL 4141100, at *3; Licerio, 2005 WL
2560228, at *2; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246.
We overrule Williams’s first issue.
IV. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT REGARDING EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION AND DELIVERY OF MARIJUANA
In his second and third issues, Williams challenges the trial court’s finding
that he violated condition (a) of his community supervision by possessing and
delivering marijuana. His second issue contends that there was no credible
evidence that he possessed and delivered marijuana, and his third issue
contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
asked Officer Fitzgerald if a lab had confirmed that the substance taken from the
January 12, 2015 traffic stop was marijuana. While he challenges the trial court’s
finding that he violated condition (a), Williams does not challenge the trial court’s
findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc).
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the
same manner as the determination on a motion to revoke community
supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp.
2016). We review an order revoking community supervision under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a
7 revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision.
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged
violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a
revocation order. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1980). Consequently, when there is one sufficient ground, we do not need to
address the other contentions. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Long v. State,
No. 02-12-00090-CR, 2013 WL 1337975, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.
4, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding that Williams Violated the Conditions of His Community Supervision
Here, Williams only challenges the trial court’s finding that he possessed
and delivered marijuana. His second and third issues do not challenge the trial
court’s findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc). The State
8 presented testimony from Williams’s probation officer to support the allegation
that Williams had violated these conditions of his community supervision. His
probation officer testified (1) that he failed to perform required community service
for the months of July, September, October, and November of 2014, as well as
for the month of January 2015; (2) that he did not submit to drug testing that she
requested on October 10, October 31, November 13, December 18, and
December 30, 2014; (3) that he failed to timely submit to drug/alcohol evaluation;
and (4) that he failed to attend counseling sessions.
Based on this evidence, the trial court could have found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Williams violated a condition of his
community supervision. Because any one of these violations could have
provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial court to adjudicate guilt, we need
not address the merits of Williams’s second and third issues. See Moore, 605
S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Pope v. State, No. 06-16-00128-
CR, 2017 WL 378765, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 27, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because Pope does not challenge all
of the trial court’s violation findings, we must conclude a preponderance of the
evidence supported the trial court’s findings with respect to those unchallenged
violations.”); Chamberlain v. State, No. 02-10-00447-CR, 2011 WL 5009859, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding court need not address appellant’s arguments as to one
9 violation of community supervision when appellant did not challenge four other
violations).
We therefore overrule Williams’s second and third issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Williams’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
SUE WALKER JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 27, 2017