Whipple v. Middlesex Co.

29 F. Cas. 940, 14 Fish. Pat. Cas. 41
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 15, 1859
StatusPublished

This text of 29 F. Cas. 940 (Whipple v. Middlesex Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whipple v. Middlesex Co., 29 F. Cas. 940, 14 Fish. Pat. Cas. 41 (circtdma 1859).

Opinion

SPKAGUE, District Judge,

Referee. This suit is founded wholly upon the second claim. This claim is “forming and arranging the teeth of cylinders for burring wool.” It is not a claim for a machine, but for a cylinder, or j rather for the forming and arranging the teeth of a cylinder.

The claim, then, states two limitations upon the generality of the previous language, viz: that the forming and arranging of the teeth is to be “in such a manner that their outer convex sides shall be substantially concentric with the axis of the cylinder, for the purpose of seizing and holding the fibres, and presenting a surface against which the guard can act in removing burrs and other foreign matter therefrom.”

The outer convex side of the teeth are to be concentric, etc. What is meant by the outer side of the teeth? Again, these teeth are to present a surface against which the guard can act in removing burrs, etc. What kind of surface? and what action of the guard against the surface?

These questions, and others that may arise upon the meaning of the claim, can be solved only by reference to the specification in which the invention is fully set forth and explained.

If, by examination of the specification, and applying it to the then existing state of the art, we can learn what the invention was. then the claim, which was designed to be a condensed summary of the invention, is to be construed so as to be co-extensive with the invention, if that can be done without doing violence to its language.

What, then, was the invention? So far as •is necessary for the present inquiry, it may be stated to be, to form and arrange the teeth with points which would seize and hold the fibre; with a smooth surface in rear of the points, firm and non-elastic to support or float the burrs, so that the guard could remove them, and these teeth to be in such succession around the cylinder that their points should be protected by the heels or smooth surface, in rear of the preceding teeth, sc as to prevent burrs from being taken hold of bj- the points of the teeth, and also so as to prevent too many fibres of the wool being seized.

This smooth surface, or, as it is called in one place, this “plain surface,” is made by what in the claim is called the outer convex side of the teeth. Forming and arranging the teeth, within the moaning of the claim, includes not merely their points or projections, but also the plain surface in rear, and against which, as stated in the claim, the guard is to act in removing the burrs.

In the specifications, the smooth surface is sometimes spoken of as distinguished from the teeth. Thus it is said: “Upon this roller I affix a combination of teeth and smooth surface.” But then it is declared, “these teeth may be made in various ways, but I prefer the plan of combs reaching lengthwise of the roller.” And it is added, “but the main object is to have both teeth and surface in com-, bination, the teeth to seize and hold the fibres, and the smooth surface to aid the guard." etc.

It is clear that the claim regards the smooth surface as a part of the teeth, or an essential ingredient in the arrangement of the teeth, [941]*941and, by the specification, it is emphatically made an essential part of the invention. Thus it is said, “The main object is to have both teeth and surface in combination.” And again, “The teeth, when thus protected, by the preceding plain surface;” and again, “These protected teeth form an essential feature in my machine.”

The defense is placed on two grounds: First, that the patent is void for want of novelty, and second, that the defendants have not infringed it. And it is insisted that the plaintiff must fail upon one or the other of these grounds. That if such a construction be given as to sustain the invention as new, then there is no infringement; or if so construed as to show an infringement, then there was no novelty.

On the point of novelty, it is first insisted that the plaintiff’s patent is defeated by Whitney’s cotton-gin. That in the drawings annexed to his patent specimens of teeth are shown, having concentric backs, constituting a plain surface, and that these teeth are cut from a metallic ring, so that their points are successively protected by the preceding heel or smooth surface of the other.

In giving a construction to the plaintiff’s patent, we are to ascertain what he intended. Now it is certain that he intended not to embrace Whitney’s invention. For he says expressly, “these teeth differ from .... the teeth of the saw-gin in being combined with a convex, smooth surface, to facilitate the removal of burrs and seeds.”

It is said that the saw-gin in use did not contain teeth having convex backs, or any smooth surface in rear-of the points, and that this formation of the teeth was never put in practice, nor was even theoretically beneficial for ginning cotton. However that may bé, I think that the convex backs of those teeth in Whitney’s specification and model are not the smooth surface of the plaintiff’s patent, which he emphatically declares is to be in combination with his teeth, for the purpose not merely of protecting the points, but of .supporting or floating the burrs, and presenting a surface against which the guard is to act in removing them. Now, the Whitney teeth, instead of being so arranged as to prevent seeds of cotton from falling between them, that is, presenting a surface which will support or float foreign matter, are designedly so arranged as to create no such surface, but to permit the seeds and foreign matter to fall between the rows of the teeth; and it is in this respect the plaintiff’s patent says that its teeth are distinguishable from those of the saw-gin, in the language already quoted.

The plaintiff’s teeth differ from Whitney’s in their arrangement.

But is this a material difference? Does it involve such invention or discovery as to be patentable? There is a mechanical or physical change, by bringing the metallic rings, from which the teeth are cut, so near together that burrs or cotton seeds will not fall into channels between them. This change of arrangement creates a surface which supports or floats the burrs, so that the guard may remove them, which could not be done if they fell into channels between the rings.

This result is important. Indeed, it is the attainment of the whole object of the machine, viz: the removing the buns, by bearing them on this surface to meet this guard. This mechanical change, and its effects, are, I think, so considerable as to be patentable.

The next invention relied upon, as prior to the plaintiff’s, is the Shly patent. No machine or model, pursuant to this patent, has been produced, and no witness ever saw one that he knew to be such. We have only the patent.

The only difference from the Whitney invention, which has been relied upon or pointed out by the defendants, is, that in Skly’s, “the-saws are to have eight or ten teeth, cut in the space of an inch, on the circumference of the saws. Then three inches on the circumference of the saw is to be left uncut, and so continue until the saw is cut around.”

But this change from Whitney's is not material in the present case. It does not make Silly’s any more like the plaintiff’s. The blank space does not protect the tooth that follows it, and the saws or circles of teeth are not brought any nearer together than in Whitney's. Indeed, it is said in the specification, that they are to be one inch apart.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 F. Cas. 940, 14 Fish. Pat. Cas. 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whipple-v-middlesex-co-circtdma-1859.