Whelen v. Goldman

62 Misc. 108, 115 N.Y.S. 1006
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1909
StatusPublished

This text of 62 Misc. 108 (Whelen v. Goldman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whelen v. Goldman, 62 Misc. 108, 115 N.Y.S. 1006 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1909).

Opinion

Hendrick, J.

This action was brought upon two policies of fire insurance written for $5,000 each to recover the proportionate amount of an'award of arbitrators. The award states the loss by fire to have been $60,933.0-8. The insurance written aggregated $10,000. It may conduce to brevity if we designate the bankrupt corporation of E. Reboulin Fils & Co., incorporated, as the American Company; the three plaintiffs (being said company’s representatives) as the trustees; the French firm, association or corporation of L. Reboulin Fils & Cie and its successor, L. Reboulin Fils & Cie, as the French Company; the Societe Marseillaise, as the French Bankers, and the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, as the Insurance Company. The American Company was incorporated in Hew Jersey on June 13, 1903. It carried on the business of preserving fruits at Elizabethport, N. J. On October 21, 1905, its creditors filed a petition in bankruptcy. On December 4, 1905, it was adjudicated a bankrupt and the plaintiffs were appointed its trustees. The French Company was engaged at Apt, "France, in the same kind of business as the American Company. The persons in control of both companies were substantially the same. Both the French and the American Company found it necessary to borrow funds. These were supplied by defendant Talcott to the American Company and by the French Bankers to the French Company. Both were secured by policies of fire insurance and by pledges of merchandise. One policy of insurance for $5,000 was issued by defendant Insurance Company to the American Company, Hovember 16, 1904, covering merchandise contained in buildings on a certain specified block in Elizabethport. On February 8, 1905, said property was transferred to Talcott as security, and on the same day said policy of insurance was assigned to him so [110]*110far as it covered the merchandise in building No. 7 on said block. On March 6, 1905, defendant Insurance Company issued to Talcott another policy for $5,000 covering the merchandise in said building No. 7. Both policies permitted further insurance provided that defendant Insurance Company should be liable only for its proportionate amount of loss. Other insurance was effected on the same property, amounting to $60,000, so that if the defendant Insurance Company is liable its proportion of liability is as the ratio of $10,000 to $70,000. On March 14, 1905, a fire occurred in said building No. 7 by which a partial loss occurred, and three sets of claimants appeared in this action. The trustees claim, subject to Talcott’s prior right, in behalf of the bankrupt estate; the French Bankers through their agents, the defendants Goldman, Sachs & Co. and defendant Morrisey, their assignee, claim subject to the prior right of Talcott; and Talcott claims-in his own behalf. The defendant Insurance Company denies all liability. For the present we shall lay aside the claims of all other parties and consider whether Talcott has any claim against defendant Insurance Company. The pleadings admit that the first policy was duly issued and assigned to Talcott; that the second policy was issued directly to him, and that both were in force at the time of the fire. But at this point they divide/ Talcott claims that proofs of loss were duly filed in accordance with the requirements of the policies; that two competent and disinterested appraisers were appointed by the, insured and by the Insurance Company; that said appraisers selected a competent and disinterested umpire, as required by the policies; that the board of arbitrators thus constituted examined the damaged merchandise, heard witnesses, considered arguments and made a report in which they found the sound value of the merchandise to be $77,576.87 and the loss to be $60,933.08. On the other hand, defendant Insurance Company claims that neither the appraiser chosen by the insured nor the umpire was disinterested; that the arbitrators' were not always assembled when acting in that capacity; that a fair hearing was denied; that the proofs of loss contained items of damage greatly exaggerated; that the loss did not [111]*111exceed $1,000; that the insured violated a condition requiring them to minimize the damage after the fire, and that the American Company substituted damaged for undamaged merchandise before it was examined by the arbitrators. In support of these claims defendant Insurance Company cites evidence tending to show that the appraiser selected by the insured during the year 1901 or 1902 was in the employment of the predecessor of the American Company; that his uncle at the time of the arbitration was an employee of the American Company; that the umpire was manager óf a business firm which was a customer of the American Company; that the umpire at one time declined to hear a witness produced by the Insurance Company; that the merchandise was permitted to ferment after the fire, thus exaggerating the loss; that some of the merchandise was withdrawn before the appraisal was completed; and the Insurance Company submits computations to the effect that the value of the merchandise was much less than $77,576.87. The requirement of the policies of insurance was that the appraiser and the umpire should be disinterested. Such appraisers were not in the strict sense arbitrators, and it is not probable that either party to the policies contemplated in case of loss that the appraisers should stand absolutely unbiased. It is more than probable that each one selected an appraiser in whom confidence was reposed as an honest man, but that in case of any difference his sympathies would incline toward the party by whom he was chosen. It would be expecting too much in the present stage of progress toward the millennium to assume that either party contemplated when entering into the contract of insurance that the appraisers selected should be absolutely indifferent. These tribunals are home-made, and neither their composition nor their conduct should be more closely scrutinized than is that of the tribunals selected in accordance with the statutes and long standing judicial practice. If such appraisers are honest men who make an honest effort to arrive at an honest award, I believe that nothing further can be.demanded or expected. At the same time all appearances of fraudulent or unfair practice should meet with the disapproval of the courts. How far the parties in[112]*112tended to differentiate between bias and interest is not apparent, but I think there is a distinction; and if each party was satisfied that the opposing appraiser was free from interest he should not have been surprised to find that he was not entirely free from bias. It would not be an extremely easy undertaking to find either an appraiser or an umpire in a business as limited as is that of preserving fruit who would be an entire stranger to both parties in the case. It should be kept in mind, too, that during the last months of the arbitration the American Company was in the bankruptcy courts, and neither appraiser nor umpire could have been influenced by the interested purpose of so conducting the arbitration as to secure approval and future business. In view of the evidence and the appearance of the witnesses during the trial I am satisfied that the board of arbitrators was properly constituted; and, while the hearings were'not characterized by the formal niceties of procedure which are supposed to obtain in a court of justice, there seems to be no substantial ground for declaring that the arbitrators did not. carefully examine the merchandise, listen to all the evidence and consider all the arguments adduced.

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Bluebook (online)
62 Misc. 108, 115 N.Y.S. 1006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whelen-v-goldman-nysupct-1909.