Wheeler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 7, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-07773
StatusUnknown

This text of Wheeler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Wheeler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wheeler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DAVID WHEELER, Case No. 24-cv-07773-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 19 10 THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff David Wheeler’s motion to remand, Dkt. No. 19. The 14 Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed 15 submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 16 motion to remand. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff, a citizen of California, filed this action in Lake County Superior Court on July 3, 19 2024, alleging that a leader within the Highlands Ward of the Church of Latter-day Saints sexually 20 abused him from 1977 to 1978. Dkt. No. 1-1. Consistent with California Civil Code of Procedure 21 (“CCCP”) § 340.1(l), Plaintiff’s complaint named all the Defendants as “Does.” The complaint 22 identifies Defendant Doe 1 as a “foreign religious corporation, incorporated in the state of Utah 23 [and] registered to conduct business in the State of California.” Id. at 3. And it identifies 24 Defendants Doe 2 and Doe 3 as “foreign religious corporation[s], incorporated in the state of 25 California [and] registered to conduct business in the State of California.” Id.1 The remaining 26 Does 4 through 10 are “individuals, corporations, and/or other entities whose true names and 27 1 capacities are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time” but who are “negligent or in some other manner 2 liable or responsible for the events and happenings alleged in this Complaint.” Id. at 4. 3 On November 6, 2024, the Defendants filed a response to the complaint, appearing in the 4 action using their unmasked identities. Dkt. No. 1-2.2 The following day, Defendants removed 5 the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff now moves to 6 remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 19 (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 25 (“Opp.”), Dkt. 7 No. 26 (“Reply”). 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would 10 have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. 11 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 12 in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at any time before final 13 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 14 remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing 15 federal jurisdiction. See Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 16 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff argues that the Court must disregard the citizenship of Defendants because they 19 were fictitiously named. Mot. at 6. The parties agree that CCCP section 340.1 required Plaintiff 20 to name Defendants under the fictitious “Doe” title. Mot. at 6; Opp. at 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) 21 plainly states that “[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of [diversity 22 jurisdiction], the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” But 23 according to Defendants, “[s]ection 1441(b)(1) does not require the Court to disregard the 24 citizenship of Defendants who have appeared in an action.” Opp. at 7. Defendants contend that 25 they were “no longer Does at the time of removal” because “Plaintiff had served each of the 26 2 Defendants identified themselves as: (1) The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, (2) 27 Temple Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and (3) and Corporation 1 Defendants, and all of the Defendants had appeared in the action by answering the Complaint in 2 their own names.” Id. 3 Courts assess diversity at the time a complaint is filed. See Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. 4 Ass’n. of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Diversity] is determined (and must exist) as 5 of the time the complaint is filed . . .”). When Plaintiff’s complaint was filed, Defendants were 6 Does, and it was not until four months later that they appeared using their true identities. Dkt. 7 Nos. 1-1, 1-2. The Ninth Circuit instructs that “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed.” 8 Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). Strictly construing it 9 here, the Court disregards “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names.” 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1441(b)(1).3 Accordingly, a “rare scenario” exists here, in that the “sole plaintiff is a citizen of 11 one state, and every single defendant (for purposes of assessing removal based on diversity 12 jurisdiction) is effectively a citizen of no state” such that “the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction.” 13 Geppert v. Doe 1, No. 23-CV-03257-SVK, 2023 WL 5804156, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2023); 14 Mot. at 7. See Bisagno v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 24-CV-04414-HSG, 2024 WL 4733511, 15 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2024). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. No. 19, is granted.4 16 Finally, as an aside, the Court notes that CCCP section 340.1, the California statute at issue 17 here, sets forth specific procedures through which a plaintiff can “unmask” a defendant’s identity, 18 enabling plaintiffs to sue defendants under their true names rather than the “Doe” moniker. See § 19 340.1(k)-(n). But the statute’s default “Doe” naming requirement incentivizes plaintiffs to keep 20 defendants’ identities masked in order to stay in state court. This potentially unintended statutory 21 consequence is not relevant for purposes of the analysis here. It will fall to the California 22 legislature to address this issue if it finds it problematic. 23 3 Other courts in this Circuit have recently conducted the same analysis and reached the same 24 result. See Roe DC 57 v. Doe 1, No. CV 24-9542-GW-AGRX, 2025 WL 484809 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025); Roe MG 60 v. Doe 1, No. 24-CV-07666-RFL, 2025 WL 472291 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 25 2025). 4 The Court need not and does not reach the alternative arguments that Plaintiff and Defendants 26 raise. However, the Court notes that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, a defendant is not fraudulently joined ‘if there is any possibility that the state law might impose liability on a resident defendant under 27 the circumstances alleged in the complaint.’” Tuuholoaki v. Bayer AG, No. 2:20-CV-05391- 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion, Dkt. No. 19, and REMANDS this action to the 3 Superior Court of California for the County of Lake. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: 4/7/2025 7 . ° HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12

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Related

Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
553 F.3d 1241 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.
582 F.3d 1083 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Strotek Corp. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America
300 F.3d 1129 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Wheeler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-the-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-cand-2025.