OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
Sherri Wheeler (Wheeler) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) denying her petition to reinstate a civil action against Red Rose Transit Authority (Authority) that had been terminated by the trial court because of inactivity. Wheeler claims that because her attorney did not receive notice of the termination proceeding, the trial court erred in refusing to grant her petition to reinstate her action.
On March 4, 2002, Wheeler commenced a civil action against the Authority by writ of summons. On May 19, 2004, the trial court initiated proceedings to terminate Wheeler’s case because there had been no activity of record for over two years. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2.1 Accordingly, the trial court notified Wheeler’s counsel of record, Howard H. Brown, Esq., of the proposed termination 60 days before it was to occur. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(b)(1). The written notice given to Brown stated that he could stop the court from terminating Wheeler’s case by filing a “Statement of Intention to Proceed” with the Prothonotary. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(e) (prescribing the form of notice of termination to be sent to counsel of record). Brown did not file the statement, and the Prothonotary entered an order terminating Wheeler’s case on August 23, 2004.
On October 20, 2004, Brown filed a petition to reinstate the action. Such a petition will automatically be granted if filed within 30 days of the termination order. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(d)(2).2 A reinstate[1230]*1230ment filed later can still be granted, but only if there is a “reasonable explanation or a legitimate excuse” for the failure to file (1) the statement of intention and (2) the petition to reinstate the action within 30 days of its termination. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(d)(3)(ii). The trial court gave Wheeler two opportunities for demonstrating a “reasonable explanation of a legitimate excuse” for not filing either the statement or the petition to reinstate within the prescribed time limits. When she failed to do so, her petition to reinstate the action was dismissed. This appeal followed.
On appeal,3 Wheeler asserts that the trial court erred. She contends that the trial court’s termination order should have never been issued because the trial court never gave Wheeler’s counsel proper notice of the proposed termination of her action. A fortiori, then, her petition to reinstate should have been granted. Wheeler contends that her due process rights will be denied if she does not get a hearing on the merits of her case.
Wheeler’s case turns on one point: whether the Prothonotary mailed the termination notice to her attorney of record at the correct address. At the hearing on March 28, 2005, Wheeler’s attorney, Brown, asserted that the prothonotary mailed the notice of proposed termination to 4 Garrett Road in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, an office that Brown vacated in 1992. In that year, he moved his office to 235 East Lincoln Highway; thereafter, he moved his office to its present location at 345 Scarlet Road in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania.4 Brown stated at the hearing that 235 East Lincoln Highway would have been a “good address because ... it would have been forwarded to me.” Reproduced Record at 43a (R.R. — ). However, Brown stated that he did not receive the written notice of proposed termination. Evidence of his current address and his statement that he did not receive notice of the termination was evidence sufficient to reinstate Wheeler’s action, according to Brown.
The Authority offered the testimony of the Deputy Prothonotary of Lancaster County, Lori Groff.5 She testified that the Prothonotary’s Office has established a system for tracking the addresses of both parties and attorneys with matters pending in the court. An index of addresses is updated periodically to show an address of a litigant or counsel that is listed on the most recent filing with the court. Groff explained that at the time the notice of termination was mailed to Brown, the Pro-thonotary’s Office had two addresses for his law office: 4 Garrett Road, Upper Darby, Pa. 19082, and 235 East Lincoln High[1231]*1231way, Coatesville, Pa. 19320.6 The Protho-notary sent the notice of termination to both addresses. The notice sent to the Garrett Road address was returned by the postal service, and the returned envelope was entered into evidence.7 The notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address in Coatesville was not returned, indicating it had been delivered.8 A file copy of the notice sent to Coatesville was also entered into evidence.
Groff testified that the procedure in her office is to send a notice of termination proceedings to every address for an attorney listed on the address file, not just the one used on the attorney’s entry of appearance for the action subject to termination. The Prothonotary’s Office keeps a copy of every notice of termination indicating the address to which it was sent. Consistent with that procedure, the office records contained a copy of the termination notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address, which was admitted into evidence.
Pa. R.C.P. No. 440(b) provides that service is complete upon mailing, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that the notice was received. This shifts the burden to the recipient to prove that the notice was not received. Notably, testimony alone will not rebut the presumption. Sheehan v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Supermarkets General), 143 Pa.Cmwlth.624, 600 A.2d 633, 636 (1991).
The facts in this case are virtually identical to those in Samaras v. Hartwick, 698 A.2d 71 (Pa.Super.1997), which is persuasive precedent. In Samaras, the court of common pleas terminated a case after two years of docket inactivity. Two years later, a petition for reinstatement was filed. Petitioner claimed his attorney never received the termination notice; the termination, therefore, violated petitioner’s due process rights. The Superior Court held that proof of mailing, such as testimony by the court administrator responsible for mailing the notice, raised a rebuttable presumption of receipt. The mere assertion by counsel that the notice was not received was held insufficient to overcome the presumption. Samaras, 698 A.2d at 73-74. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s grant of reinstatement.
Because Brown stated that any mail sent to the East Lincoln Highway address would have been forwarded to his current address, the determinative issue was whether the notice of termination was ever sent to Brown at that address.9 In finding that it was, the trial court relied on Groffs testimony about the procedure in her office for updating the addresses of attorneys who have entered them appearance in a matter before the court; a copy [1232]*1232of the notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address, which was not returned; 10 and a copy of the envelope sent to the Garrett Road address that was returned. The trial court credited Groffs testimony, and we are not at liberty to set aside that credibility determination.
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OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
Sherri Wheeler (Wheeler) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) denying her petition to reinstate a civil action against Red Rose Transit Authority (Authority) that had been terminated by the trial court because of inactivity. Wheeler claims that because her attorney did not receive notice of the termination proceeding, the trial court erred in refusing to grant her petition to reinstate her action.
On March 4, 2002, Wheeler commenced a civil action against the Authority by writ of summons. On May 19, 2004, the trial court initiated proceedings to terminate Wheeler’s case because there had been no activity of record for over two years. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2.1 Accordingly, the trial court notified Wheeler’s counsel of record, Howard H. Brown, Esq., of the proposed termination 60 days before it was to occur. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(b)(1). The written notice given to Brown stated that he could stop the court from terminating Wheeler’s case by filing a “Statement of Intention to Proceed” with the Prothonotary. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(e) (prescribing the form of notice of termination to be sent to counsel of record). Brown did not file the statement, and the Prothonotary entered an order terminating Wheeler’s case on August 23, 2004.
On October 20, 2004, Brown filed a petition to reinstate the action. Such a petition will automatically be granted if filed within 30 days of the termination order. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(d)(2).2 A reinstate[1230]*1230ment filed later can still be granted, but only if there is a “reasonable explanation or a legitimate excuse” for the failure to file (1) the statement of intention and (2) the petition to reinstate the action within 30 days of its termination. Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.2(d)(3)(ii). The trial court gave Wheeler two opportunities for demonstrating a “reasonable explanation of a legitimate excuse” for not filing either the statement or the petition to reinstate within the prescribed time limits. When she failed to do so, her petition to reinstate the action was dismissed. This appeal followed.
On appeal,3 Wheeler asserts that the trial court erred. She contends that the trial court’s termination order should have never been issued because the trial court never gave Wheeler’s counsel proper notice of the proposed termination of her action. A fortiori, then, her petition to reinstate should have been granted. Wheeler contends that her due process rights will be denied if she does not get a hearing on the merits of her case.
Wheeler’s case turns on one point: whether the Prothonotary mailed the termination notice to her attorney of record at the correct address. At the hearing on March 28, 2005, Wheeler’s attorney, Brown, asserted that the prothonotary mailed the notice of proposed termination to 4 Garrett Road in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, an office that Brown vacated in 1992. In that year, he moved his office to 235 East Lincoln Highway; thereafter, he moved his office to its present location at 345 Scarlet Road in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania.4 Brown stated at the hearing that 235 East Lincoln Highway would have been a “good address because ... it would have been forwarded to me.” Reproduced Record at 43a (R.R. — ). However, Brown stated that he did not receive the written notice of proposed termination. Evidence of his current address and his statement that he did not receive notice of the termination was evidence sufficient to reinstate Wheeler’s action, according to Brown.
The Authority offered the testimony of the Deputy Prothonotary of Lancaster County, Lori Groff.5 She testified that the Prothonotary’s Office has established a system for tracking the addresses of both parties and attorneys with matters pending in the court. An index of addresses is updated periodically to show an address of a litigant or counsel that is listed on the most recent filing with the court. Groff explained that at the time the notice of termination was mailed to Brown, the Pro-thonotary’s Office had two addresses for his law office: 4 Garrett Road, Upper Darby, Pa. 19082, and 235 East Lincoln High[1231]*1231way, Coatesville, Pa. 19320.6 The Protho-notary sent the notice of termination to both addresses. The notice sent to the Garrett Road address was returned by the postal service, and the returned envelope was entered into evidence.7 The notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address in Coatesville was not returned, indicating it had been delivered.8 A file copy of the notice sent to Coatesville was also entered into evidence.
Groff testified that the procedure in her office is to send a notice of termination proceedings to every address for an attorney listed on the address file, not just the one used on the attorney’s entry of appearance for the action subject to termination. The Prothonotary’s Office keeps a copy of every notice of termination indicating the address to which it was sent. Consistent with that procedure, the office records contained a copy of the termination notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address, which was admitted into evidence.
Pa. R.C.P. No. 440(b) provides that service is complete upon mailing, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that the notice was received. This shifts the burden to the recipient to prove that the notice was not received. Notably, testimony alone will not rebut the presumption. Sheehan v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Supermarkets General), 143 Pa.Cmwlth.624, 600 A.2d 633, 636 (1991).
The facts in this case are virtually identical to those in Samaras v. Hartwick, 698 A.2d 71 (Pa.Super.1997), which is persuasive precedent. In Samaras, the court of common pleas terminated a case after two years of docket inactivity. Two years later, a petition for reinstatement was filed. Petitioner claimed his attorney never received the termination notice; the termination, therefore, violated petitioner’s due process rights. The Superior Court held that proof of mailing, such as testimony by the court administrator responsible for mailing the notice, raised a rebuttable presumption of receipt. The mere assertion by counsel that the notice was not received was held insufficient to overcome the presumption. Samaras, 698 A.2d at 73-74. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s grant of reinstatement.
Because Brown stated that any mail sent to the East Lincoln Highway address would have been forwarded to his current address, the determinative issue was whether the notice of termination was ever sent to Brown at that address.9 In finding that it was, the trial court relied on Groffs testimony about the procedure in her office for updating the addresses of attorneys who have entered them appearance in a matter before the court; a copy [1232]*1232of the notice sent to the East Lincoln Highway address, which was not returned; 10 and a copy of the envelope sent to the Garrett Road address that was returned. The trial court credited Groffs testimony, and we are not at liberty to set aside that credibility determination. We hold that Brown’s testimony that he did not receive the notice was inadequate to rebut the presumption, following the Superior Court’s rationale in Samaras.
Wheeler’s due process argument is also unavailing. An action terminated in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil procedure does not violate due process, and Wheeler offers no authority for such a conclusion. Wheeler was given two hearings to present evidence that would allow the court to conclude that she had a legitimate excuse for her untimely filings. Proving that notice of termination was never received may provide a legitimate excuse for not filing a statement of intention to proceed or a timely petition to reinstate. However, Wheeler failed to rebut the presumption that both notices were received by her counsel. In short, Wheeler had the opportunity to prove a legitimate excuse for not filing a timely petition to reinstate, and this opportunity satisfied due process with respect to the termination of her action.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of January, 2006, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County dated March 28, 2005, in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.