Wheeler v. Holland

120 F. Supp. 383, 45 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1968, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3563
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 2, 1954
DocketCiv. A. No. 4599
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 120 F. Supp. 383 (Wheeler v. Holland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wheeler v. Holland, 120 F. Supp. 383, 45 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1968, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3563 (N.D. Ga. 1954).

Opinion

SLOAN, District Judge.

In his complaint, Andrew Jackson Wheeler, the taxpayer, claimed that he was forced to sign a consent to an immediate assessment of taxes (Form 870) under duress. The Government made an assessment of taxes and penalties for the years 1942-1947 on the basis of this consent in the amount of approximately $50,000. At the time this suit was brought the Government had collected approximately $18,000. Since the suit [385]*385has been pending no further collections have been made by the Government.

Because of the alleged duress taxpayer claims the consent is void and of no effect and that the assessments premised on such consent should be set aside and declared null and void, that all warrants of distraint issued be quashed; that the Government agents be enjoined and restrained from taking possession of or of applying against the tax any funds of the taxpayer seized under or by virtue of any warrant or notice of distraint upon any bank or banks; and that the Government agents be restrained and enjoined from the making of any levy or levies upon the taxpayer’s stock of merchandise, furniture, fixtures and equipment of his business or any other property of the taxpayer.

Taxpayer also sought the refund of taxes which had already been paid under the alleged void assessment. The Government moved to dismiss the suit for refund on the ground that no adequate claim for refund had been filed. This motion was granted without prejudice to taxpayer’s right to file a new claim.

The taxpayer alleges that he was coerced to sign the consent to an immediate assessment (without the procedure outlined in Internal Revenue Code Section 272, 26 U.S.C.A.) under duress.

The duress he alleges is based on three contentions:

1. The Government’s computation of taxes (agreed to by taxpayer when he signed the Form 870) was so arbitrary and excessive that no one who was not coerced and under duress would have agreed to it.

2. A Government conferee threatened to recommend the assessment of a higher tax if the taxpayer did not agree to the computation underlying the Form 870.

3. A Special Agent who was active in the case threatened to prosecute Mr. Wheeler if he did not sign the Form 870.

Finding of Facts

Mr. Wheeler did not keep adequate business records. His tax liability, therefore, needs to be computed on the basis of reconstructed records. The Revenue Agent who initially audited Mr. Wheeler’s returns computed the taxes and penalties owing for the years 1942-1947 to be in excess of $70,000. This computation was based on a mark-up computation. On October 14, 1949, a thirty-day letter was issued to the taxpayer proposing a deficiency on this basis. Wheeler protested the proposed deficiencies. Numerous conferences were held in an effort to find a basis of settlement mutually satisfactory to the taxpayer and to the Government. The tax was recomputed on the basis of a net worth computation. In February 1951 the Government conferee submitted to Wheeler’s chief accountant, Lyle Campbell, a set of figures which produced the liability shown on the Form 870. The basic disagreement between the taxpayer’s representatives and the Government in the use of the net worth method resulted from different estimates of Wheeler’s net worth at the beginning of the taxable period. Both taxpayer’s and the Government’s computations are admittedly not perfect. In light of the absence of adequate records, it is unlikely that Mr. Wheeler’s true tax liability will ever be known. He now admits that he owes in excess of $10,000 (his original returns for the years 1942-1947 showed a liability of approximately $2,-000) but denies that he should be assessed penalties. From the evidence it cannot be said that the computation, which was the basis for the Form 870, was so arbitrary, capricious or excessive that it could be concluded that Mr. Wheeler must have been under duress or he would not have signed it, or that the Revenue Agents could not have sincerely, properly and fairly settled on the basis of such computation. It may be that Mr. Wheeler does not owe as much as was assessed pursuant to the Form 870, or it may be that he actually owes more taxes than were assessed. On the basis of the record in this case, however, the mere fact that the assessment was made in the amounts shown and on [386]*386the theory on which it was based does not justify a conclusion that Wheeler was improperly coerced to sign the consent to assess.

The Conferee did not improperly coerce the taxpayer when he announced that if the liability shown in the Form 870 was hot agreed to by the taxpayer, he would recommend an assessment in a higher amount. The Court finds that the figures underlying the Form 870 include adjustments which the Government’s agents resolved in favor of Mr. Wheeler in order to get him to concede certain issues to the Government. There was a give and take in the computation designed to promote a settlement. .If a settlement was not forthcoming, then naturally both parties if forced to a further contest of the issue would not have conceded doubtful issues to the other side. This sort of give and take happens every day in the adjustment of taxpayers’ liabilities. It provides no basis for upsetting the Form 870.

The Special Agent who worked the case is alleged to have threatened Mr. Wheeler with criminal prosecution and terrorized him to the point where his agreement, as evidenced by the Form 870, should be declared void and of no effect. The Court finds that it has not been shown that the Special Agent ever threatened Mr. Wheeler that if taxpayer did not agree to the Government’s computation of his tax, the Special Agent would recommend prosecution in his official capacity or that he would indict Mr. Wheeler in his capacity as private citizen. The Court furthermore finds that the Special Agent did not call Mr. Wheeler a slacker or a black marketeer, nor in any other way abuse his position as a Government Agent. The taxpayer admitted that other than these allegations, which the Court finds not proved by the evidence, no Treasury agents involved in the case acted in an improper manner.

Conclusions of Law

Section 3653 of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. Section 3653 states, however, that it is subject to the provisions of Section 272(a). Section 272(a) provides that no assessment of a deficiency in respect of a tax imposed by this chapter and no distraint or proceeding in court for its collection shall be begun or prosecuted until the Government by registered mail notifies the taxpayer of a proposed deficiency nor until the expiration of ninety days thereafter, nor if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court within that ninety-day period until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. It further states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3653(a) the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or distraint during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.” The Form 870 which the taxpayer signed on April 18, 1951, was an explicit waiver of the procedure outlined in Section 272(a). Unless it is declared void, therefore, Section 3653 bars a suit such as the taxpayer has brought here.1

[387]*387The case cited by the taxpayer in oral argument, Mitsukiyo Yoshimura v. Alsup, 9 Cir., 167 F.2d 104

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Bluebook (online)
120 F. Supp. 383, 45 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1968, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3563, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-holland-gand-1954.