Wheeler v. Grieg

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Wheeler v. Grieg

224 A.D.2d 209, 637 N.Y.S.2d 394, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 957

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 6, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 224 A.D.2d 209 (Wheeler v. Grieg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wheeler v. Grieg, 224 A.D.2d 209, 637 N.Y.S.2d 394, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 957 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered January 18, 1995 which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment for the return of a contract deposit, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The mortgage contingency clause in the standard form contract for the sale of a cooperative apartment was not deleted and, in fact, a mortgage amount was set forth therein. The language in the rider to the contract, relied upon by defendant-appellant seller, does not clearly provide that the closing would take place on an all cash basis if the purchasers did not obtain the mortgage. Accordingly, there being no conflict or inconsistency between the standard form contract and the rider, the provisions of the standard form contract allowing for return of the down payment when the financing contingency clause could not be satisfied must be given effect.

The claim that plaintiffs purchasers did not act in good faith in applying for the loan is wholly conclusory and indeed, contradicted by documents and affidavits in the record. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Ross, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered January 18, 1995 which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment for the return of a contract deposit, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The mortgage contingency clause in the standard form contract for the sale of a cooperative apartment was not deleted and, in fact, a mortgage amount was set forth therein. The language in the rider to the contract, relied upon by defendant-appellant seller, does not clearly provide that the closing would take place on an all cash basis if the purchasers did not obtain the mortgage. Accordingly, there being no conflict or inconsistency between the standard form contract and the rider, the provisions of the standard form contract allowing for return of the down payment when the financing contingency clause could not be satisfied must be given effect.

The claim that plaintiffs purchasers did not act in good faith in applying for the loan is wholly conclusory and indeed, contradicted by documents and affidavits in the record. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Ross, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

224 A.D.2d 209, 637 N.Y.S.2d 394, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-grieg-nyappdiv-1996.