Wheeler v. Burger

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Wheeler v. Burger

126 A.2d 869, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 292

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedNovember 13, 1956

Docket1869

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 126 A.2d 869 (Wheeler v. Burger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wheeler v. Burger, 126 A.2d 869, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 292 (D.C. 1956).

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Opinion

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Appellant agreed to sell and appellee agreed to buy certain real estate for a price of $24,000. At time of settlement ap-pellee refused to complete the sale and about two months later appellant sold the property to another person for $23,000. This action was brought by appellant for $1,000, alleged to be his loss resulting from appellee’s default. The trial court ruled that the measure of damages ,wás the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of default, 1 and found that the fair market value at the time of default was $24,000. Accordingly the court concluded that appellant had suffered no actual damages and was only entitled to nominal damages of $1.

Appellant concedes that the measure of damages adopted by the trial court was correct, concedes that the burden was upon him to prove fair market value, and concedes that the resale price was riot’ conclusive evidence of market value.'' He argues, however, that the -resale, plus other evidence, established prima facie that the market value was .$23,000 and that appellee offered no competent evidence tending to rebut appellant’s evidence- of'- fair market value.

Appellant’s contention is that appellee’s evidence, largely that of expert witnesses, was not directed to market value at time of default but related to market value at time of trial, which occurred, nearly a year after default. It is true that the record shows that many of the questions put to, and answered by, appellee’s witnesses were in the present tense and were not specifically directed to the time of default. However a reading of the entire transcript dem *870 onstrates with fair accuracy that the court, the parties and the witnesses had in mind that the issue of market value related to the time of default arid the súbsequént resale. Support for this is found in' the fact that no objection was made at trial that the evidence related to' a time not in issue, and on cross-examination of appel-lee’s witnesses no attempt was made to determine whether their testimony, if directed to time of trial, would be different if directed.to time of default. On the whole record we cannot agree with appellant that appellee offered no competent rebutting evidence. Consequently we cannot rule, as appellant urges, that the finding of the trial court was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.

Affirmed.

1

. See Quick v. Pointer, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 186 F.2d 355.

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HOOD, Associate Judge.

Appellant agreed to sell and appellee agreed to buy certain real estate for a price of $24,000. At time of settlement ap-pellee refused to complete the sale and about two months later appellant sold the property to another person for $23,000. This action was brought by appellant for $1,000, alleged to be his loss resulting from appellee’s default. The trial court ruled that the measure of damages ,wás the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of default, 1 and found that the fair market value at the time of default was $24,000. Accordingly the court concluded that appellant had suffered no actual damages and was only entitled to nominal damages of $1.

Appellant concedes that the measure of damages adopted by the trial court was correct, concedes that the burden was upon him to prove fair market value, and concedes that the resale price was riot’ conclusive evidence of market value.'' He argues, however, that the -resale, plus other evidence, established prima facie that the market value was .$23,000 and that appellee offered no competent evidence tending to rebut appellant’s evidence- of'- fair market value.

Appellant’s contention is that appellee’s evidence, largely that of expert witnesses, was not directed to market value at time of default but related to market value at time of trial, which occurred, nearly a year after default. It is true that the record shows that many of the questions put to, and answered by, appellee’s witnesses were in the present tense and were not specifically directed to the time of default. However a reading of the entire transcript dem *870 onstrates with fair accuracy that the court, the parties and the witnesses had in mind that the issue of market value related to the time of default arid the súbsequént resale. Support for this is found in' the fact that no objection was made at trial that the evidence related to' a time not in issue, and on cross-examination of appel-lee’s witnesses no attempt was made to determine whether their testimony, if directed to time of trial, would be different if directed.to time of default. On the whole record we cannot agree with appellant that appellee offered no competent rebutting evidence. Consequently we cannot rule, as appellant urges, that the finding of the trial court was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.

Affirmed.

1

. See Quick v. Pointer, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 186 F.2d 355.

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126 A.2d 869, 1956 D.C. App. LEXIS 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-burger-dc-1956.

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