Wheatcroft v. Glendale, City of

Opinion

WO

Johnny Wheatcroft, No. CV-18-02347-PHX-MTL

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

City of Glendale, et al.,

Defendants. Before the Court is Defendant Officer Michael Fernandez Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 299) of this Court’s Order denying summary judgment (Doc. 294). Per the Court’s request, Plaintiffs Johnny Wheatcroft and minors J.W. and B.W have filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 307.) Upon reconsideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion. I. The Court previously set forth this case’s background in detail. (Doc. 294 at 1–5.) Defendants Officers Michael Fernandez, Matt Schneider and Mark Lindsey as well as the City of Glendale moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ counts against them. (Docs. 245 and 274.) The Court’s summary judgment order addressed many issues, including denying Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ claims for excessive force and civil rights violations. (Doc. 294 at 40.) The Court also implicitly denied Officer Fernandez’s qualified immunity claim. (Id. at 13–15; 24–26.) /// II. A district court has discretion to reconsider and amend prior orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored and should be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2(g). Additionally, “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored . . . and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003) (cleaned up). Officer Fernandez asserts he made a reasonable mistake of fact regarding who knocked Officer Lindsey unconscious—because Officer Fernandez believed that Wheatcroft struck Officer Lindsey, he deployed his Taser one time, which was objectively reasonable under those circumstances. (Doc. 299 at 3–4.) First, Officer Fernandez contends the uncontested facts show he made a mistake of fact regarding who struck Officer Lindsey. After Officer Fernandez arrived on the scene, he approached the drivers’ side of the vehicle while Officers Lindsey and Schneider were talking with Wheatcroft on the passengers’ side. (Docs. 246 at ¶¶ 47–48, Doc. 261 at ¶¶ 47–48.) Then, Anya Chapman swung a grocery bag full of soda cans and struck Officer Lindsey, knocking him unconscious for several minutes. (See Lindsey Body Cam at 3:19–4:08; Doc. 2446-1 at 146, 114.) After Officer Lindsey was struck, Officer Fernandez came around to the passengers’ side of the vehicle to assist Officer Schneider. (Docs. 246 at ¶ 64, Doc, 261 at ¶ 64.) Officer Fernandez testified at his deposition that he “initially” assumed that Wheatcroft was the person that struck Officer Lindsey. (Doc. 246-1 at 172.) Then, he later testified at his deposition that he “blame[d] Ms. Chapman for Officer Lindsey getting knocked out.” (Doc. 261-2 at 27.) Accordingly, Officer Fernandez asserts he made a mistake of fact regarding who struck Officer Lindsey. (Doc. 299 at 3.) Plaintiffs dispute that Officer Fernandez thought Wheatcroft struck Officer Lindsey. (Doc. 261 at ¶ 66.) But Plaintiffs’ only support for this assertion is Officer Fernandez’s post-hoc assignment of blame. (See id., citing Doc. 261-2 at 27.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that this is not a material disputed fact, and in the moment, Officer Fernandez believed Wheatcroft struck Officer Lindsey. Based on Officer Fernandez’s position on the drivers’ side of the car, then walking around the car to see Officer Lindsey unconscious on the ground with Officer Schneider trying to detain Wheatcroft, the Court concludes this was a reasonable mistake of fact. To assess whether Officer Fernandez is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must apply a two-step framework: whether the facts as shown by plaintiff state a violation of a constitutional right; and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the events in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests––the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Officer Fernandez is entitled to qualified immunity on both Plaintiffs’ excessive force and familial association claims. The Court has already concluded that Officer Fernandez’s mistake of fact regarding who knocked out Wheatcroft was reasonable. Though it is clearly established that an individual has a right to be free from excessive force, and that “force is only justified when there is a need for force,” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007), a reasonably mistaken officer is justified in using “more force than in fact was needed” when he or she believes that a suspect is “likely to fight back,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Plaintiffs argue that Officer Fernandez deployed his Taser against Wheatcroft while he was “defenseless” and he “posed no immediate threat.” (Doc. 307 at 2.) Plaintiffs quote Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 2010) to argue that “there was no immediate threat.” (Id.) But in Bryan, the plaintiff was “obviously and noticeably unarmed, made no threatening statements or gestures, did not resist arrest or attempt to flee, but was standing inert twenty to twenty-five feet away from the officer.” 630 F.3d at 809. Here, Officer Fernandez testified at his deposition that he “couldn’t see what [Wheatcroft] was holding in his hands” and Wheatcroft was within several feet of an unconscious officer while thrashing around. (Doc. 246-1 at 172). Officer Fernandez’s single use of a Taser in dart mode was reasonable under the circumstances. Likewise, given Officer Fernandez’s mistake of fact and even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Fernandez had a purpose to harm Wheatcroft outside of legitimate law enforcement objectives. The Court has already determined that the purpose to harm standard applies to the five-minute melee between the Defendant Officers and Wheatcroft. (Doc. 294 at 24.) Thus, Plaintiffs must prove that Officer Fernandez was driven by “illegitimate law enforcement objectives,” such as “bullying a suspect or getting even.” A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal alterations and quotations omitted)). Plaintiff’s evidence falls short of this standard. (Doc. 307 at 5, see also Doc. 246-1 at 172.) Considering Officer Fernandez’s reasonable mistake of fact, no reasonable jury could conclude that illegitimate law enforcement objectives were behind his decision to Tase Wheatcroft one time. Officer Fernandez believed Wheatcroft had struck Officer Lindsey and knocked him unconscious and was still unhandcuffed. Accordingly, his subsequent decision to Tase him was not done with “an illegitimate purpose in mind.” Id. (quoting Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008)). IV. Defendants assert that “case law is legion that excessive force claims must be analyzed on an individualized basis.” (Doc. 299 at 7.) A motion for reconsideration may not repeat previously made arguments. LRCiv. 7.2(g). As such, a motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought through in its previous ruling. Defs. of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Accordingly, mere disagreement with the previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. Adams v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., No. CV-18-0378-TUC-JGZ (LAB), 2020 WL 4814249, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2020). Defendants’ motion is denied because it relitigates arguments from the summary judgment phase. Officer Fernandez also argues that he is “entitled to common law qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s state law claims.” (Doc. 299 at 9.) But Plaintiff did not allege any state law claims against Officer Fernandez that survived the summary judgment stage. (See Docs. 35, 294.) Nevertheless, the Court, having granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ remaining § 1983 claims, dismisses Officer Fernandez from this case. Defendants’ remaining arguments, as related to Officer Fernandez’s conduct forming the basis for Plaintiffs’ state law claims, is better suited for a motion in limine, and is denied without prejudice. V. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration. (Doc. 299.) IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 245 and 274) as to Plaintiffs’ claims for excessive force (Count I) and civil rights violations (Count V) as to Defendant Michael Fernandez. As set forth herein, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied in all other respects. /// 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Defendant Michael Fernandez as a defendant from this case. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to keep this case open pending resolution of the remaining claims. Dated this 15th day of April, 2022. Wicheal T. Fburde Michael T. Liburdi United States District Judge

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