Whatley v. Price

368 F. Supp. 336, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10422
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 28, 1973
DocketCiv. A. 1019-E
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 368 F. Supp. 336 (Whatley v. Price) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whatley v. Price, 368 F. Supp. 336, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10422 (M.D. Ala. 1973).

Opinion

ORDER

VARNER, District Judge.

This is an action brought by a former employee of the Tallapoosa County Board of Education alleging that he was wrongfully discharged by the Board in contravention of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. Jurisdiction is based upon Title 42, § 1983, and Title 28, § 1343, of the United States Code.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff in this cause was employed as a non-tenured employee by the Tallapoosa County Board of Education in May, 1970, to serve as principal of New Site High School in New Site, Alabama. The defense was, and this Court finds, that, during the 1972-1973 school year, dissension and discontent developed in the school primarily as a result of differences between the Plaintiff and various faculty members. This dissension and discontent was not limited to the school but had spread to the entire community of New Site. In an effort to reconcile differences and discuss other problems which might exist, the trustees of the New Site School offered to meet with the Plaintiff in March, 1973. On Saturday, March 24, 1973, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees visited the Plaintiff at his home and asked him if he wished to meet with the trustees and discuss any misunderstanding or problems which might exist. Plaintiff replied that he did not, that he did not need a “peacemaker”, and that he was prepared to rest his case before Mr. Price (the County Superintendent of Education) and the County Board with no further meetings with the trustees. Subsequently, the trustees recommended in writing to the Board of Education that the Plaintiff not be rehired as principal of the New Site School for the next school year.

The recommendation of the trustees was based in part upon 12 reasons which were signed and presented to the Tallapoosa County Board of Education by the trustees (see Appendix A). This recommendation was not made public by either the members of the Board of Trustees or the members of the School Board but was made public by the Plaintiff.

Acting upon the individual knowledge of each of the Board members of the aura of dissension and discontent at the New Site School and the spread thereof into the community, and in accordance with the recommendation of the trustees, the Board of Education voted on April 27, 1973, not to rehire Plaintiff for the 1973-1974 school year. Plaintiff was informed of the Board’s decision by letter from the Superintendent of Education dated April 30, 1973. Plaintiff thereupon requested a hearing before the Board and was immediately informed that he would be granted a hearing on May 8, 1973. On May 8, 1973, the Board met, at which time Plaintiff discussed at length the reasons given by the trustees for their' recommendation that Plaintiff not be rehired as principal of the New Site School. Plaintiff did not request the Board to have any witnesses present at the hearing. Present, however, were the three present trustees of the New Site School and two former trustees, the latter being there at the request of the Plaintiff. During the hearing, which lasted approximately five hours, the present trustees answered questions propounded by Plaintiff and the Board. The former trustees also answered questions which were propounded by Plaintiff. With regard to the reasons or complaints given by the trustees *338 for their recommendation, Plaintiff stated to the Board at the hearing that some of them were true, some partially true, and some untrue.

At the end of this five-hour hearing, the Board of Education, motivated solely by a desire to provide the best educational atmosphere possible at the school, allowed their previous decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract to stand.

The Board of Education completely honored all of its contracts with Plaintiff, particularly the one for the 1972-1973 school year. No one connected with the Board ever gave to the Plaintiff any expectation of continued employment, and at no time did the trustees or the" Board of Education make public the reasons for the trustees’ recommendation that Plaintiff not be hired for the ensuing school year.

II. PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

This Court may summarily discard any possible deprivation of property rights the Plaintiff may have lost by not being retained for further employment since Plaintiff himself makes no such contention. Rather, the Plaintiff in this cause is contending that the nonrenewal of his contract deprived him of an interest in “liberty” in that his reputation was so severely damaged that any possibilities of future employment would be limited. Plaintiff further contends that he was not given a due process hearing before his dismissal.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not require an opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a non-tenured state teacher’s contract unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived him of an interest in “liberty” or that he had a “property” interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548.

We turn then to the meaning of “liberty” and whether or not this Plaintiff suffered any deprivation of it.

While the Supreme Court of the United States has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the term has received much consideration. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad indeed. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551. There might be cases in which a Board of Education refused to re-employ a person under such circumstances that interest in liberty would be implicated. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within this category.

In refusing to rehire the Plaintiff, the Board of Education did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage Plaintiff’s standing and association in his community. The nonrenewal of his contract was not based on a charge that he had been guilty of immorality or dishonesty. If such a charge had been made, we would have a different ease, for,

“[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Roth, supra.

Similarly, there was no suggestion that the Board of Education, in declining to re-employ the Plaintiff, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that for-closed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Thus, this Plaintiff is still free to seek employment wherever he wishes.

“It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of ‘liberty’ when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.” Roth, supra.

Plaintiff contends that his reputation was severely damaged in that the 12 written charges against him infer that he was incompetent.

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Related

D Whatley v. Price
498 F.2d 1401 (Fifth Circuit, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
368 F. Supp. 336, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10422, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whatley-v-price-almd-1973.