YOLLACK, Justice.
The petitioners in this original proceeding, W.H., by and through his guardian ad litem, and the Denver Department of Social Services [hereinafter DSS], seek relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21(a) in the nature of prohibition against the respondent juvenile court, in connection with the court’s order granting temporary physical custody of W.H. to his mother. We issued a rule to show cause why the juvenile court’s order should not be reversed. We now make the rule absolute.
I.
The petitioner, W.H., is a nine-year-old child who has been living with his mother and stepfather in Colorado since the summer of 1986. On January 21, 1987, W.H. failed to return home after school and was reported as a lost child. He was taken into protective custody by the Denver Police Department, and an officer discovered extensive bruising which covered most of W.H.’s left arm. The child reported to the officer that his stepfather had caused the injury by hitting him with a plastic bat. W.H. was taken to the Family Crisis Center, and gave the same explanation to a social worker, a physician, and a police detective the next day. Upon examination, they found extensive bruises of various ages on the child’s back, buttocks, legs, and arms. According to expert testimony, these injuries were the result of nonacci-dental trauma, i.e., child abuse. W.H.’s mother and stepfather were notified that W.H. was in the protective custody of DSS.
On January 23, 1987, the statutorily required detention hearing was held, at which time a dependency or neglect petition was filed and a guardian ad litem appointed for W.H. The parties stipulated at this time that the child would remain in the temporary custody of DSS pending a full detention hearing.
On the date of the full detention hearing, a retired judge was acting in the capacity of the Denver Juvenile Court Commissioner.
At the hearing before the visiting judge, several parties testified and evidence was introduced. At the conclusion, the judge made findings of fact, held that abuse of the minor had not been established, and entered an order returning temporary physical custody of W.H. to his mother and stepfather. DSS and the guardian ad litem sought a stay of the visiting judge’s order. Within the next three days, they filed a Petition for Judicial Review and a Motion for Rehearing. The judge who would ordinarily have reviewed a commissioner’s orders recused himself because of a conflict of interest. The case was reassigned for review to the presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile Court. The presiding judge declined to review the visiting judge’s order because, although the visiting judge was sitting as a commissioner, his status as a judge rendered it inappropriate for the presiding judge to review his order.
DSS and the guardian ad litem sought relief in this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21(a), and we issued a show cause order to determine whether the visiting judge erred. We now make the rule absolute.
II.
The procedural provisions of the Children’s Code control the proceedings at issue. If a law enforcement officer, physician, county department, or hospital administrator (1) reasonably believes that a child has been abused or neglected, and (2) believes that there is “a danger to that child’s life or health in the reasonably foreseeable future” by returning the child to the same person or residence, judicial authorization can be obtained to take a child into temporary protective custody. § 19-10-107, 8B C.R.S. (1986). A law enforcement officer also can take a child into temporary custody, without court order, if the child is lost, abandoned, or seriously endangered in his surroundings, and immediate removal appears necessary for the child’s protection. § 19-2-101(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Either way, the code requires notice to the child’s parent or guardian that the child has been placed in detention, and that the parent or guardian has the right to a prompt hearing. §§ 19-2-103(2), 19-10-107, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
The statutorily required temporary custody hearing is sometimes described as a shelter or detention hearing, and we have held that the word “detention” as used in section 19-2-103(2) is being used “in a generic and non-technical sense to refer to both ‘shelter custody’ and custody resulting from probable cause to believe the child has committed an act of delinquency.”
S.L. v. District Court,
676 P.2d 12, 14 n. 5 (Colo.1984);
P.F.M. v. District Court,
184 Colo. 393, 397, 520 P.2d 742, 744 (1974). The shelter or detention hearing is a pre-adjudicatory procedure which “arises from exigencies requiring
temporary emergency measures
designed to
protect
the
welfare of the child
pending further judicial proceedings.”
S.L.,
676 P.2d at 16 (emphasis added). The applicable test at the hearing is “whether the welfare of the child or of the community require that the ‘detention’ ” or shelter continue.
P.F.M.,
184 Colo. at 397, 520 P.2d at 744. The purpose of a shelter or detention hearing is not to determine a parent’s legal interest in the child; the purpose of a shelter hearing is to ensure the minor’s safety and welfare prior to adjudication.
As such, a shelter or detention hearing must be distinguished from a dependency or neglect adjudicatory hearing. “The primary purpose of a dependency adjudication ... is to furnish the ‘jurisdictional bases for State intervention to assist the parents and child in establishing a relationship and home environment that will preserve the family unit.’ ”
People in Interest of O.E.P.,
654 P.2d 312, 317 (Colo.1982) (quoting
People in Interest of A.M.D., 648
P.2d 625, 640 (Colo.1982)). At an adjudicatory hearing, the determination to be made is “whether the facts show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child is in fact neglected and dependent.”
People in Interest of K.S.,
33 Colo.App. 72, 75, 515 P.2d 130, 132 (1973).
If a child is adjudicated as dependent or neglected, the next step is a separate and distinct dispositional hearing. § 19-3-111, 8B C.R.S. (1986). At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court is authorized to make alternative dispositions, depending on the best interests of the child.
K.S.,
33 Colo.App. at 75-76, 515 P.2d at, 132. The court does not have authority to terminate the parent-child legal relationship until the dispositional stage, after a child has already been adjudicated to be neglected or dependent. § 19-3-111(2, 3), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
III.
The record here reveals that the visiting judge used the standards applicable to an adjudicatory hearing at the shelter or detention hearing before him. The purpose of the hearing from which petitioners seek relief was to determine whether continued temporary shelter, away from
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YOLLACK, Justice.
The petitioners in this original proceeding, W.H., by and through his guardian ad litem, and the Denver Department of Social Services [hereinafter DSS], seek relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21(a) in the nature of prohibition against the respondent juvenile court, in connection with the court’s order granting temporary physical custody of W.H. to his mother. We issued a rule to show cause why the juvenile court’s order should not be reversed. We now make the rule absolute.
I.
The petitioner, W.H., is a nine-year-old child who has been living with his mother and stepfather in Colorado since the summer of 1986. On January 21, 1987, W.H. failed to return home after school and was reported as a lost child. He was taken into protective custody by the Denver Police Department, and an officer discovered extensive bruising which covered most of W.H.’s left arm. The child reported to the officer that his stepfather had caused the injury by hitting him with a plastic bat. W.H. was taken to the Family Crisis Center, and gave the same explanation to a social worker, a physician, and a police detective the next day. Upon examination, they found extensive bruises of various ages on the child’s back, buttocks, legs, and arms. According to expert testimony, these injuries were the result of nonacci-dental trauma, i.e., child abuse. W.H.’s mother and stepfather were notified that W.H. was in the protective custody of DSS.
On January 23, 1987, the statutorily required detention hearing was held, at which time a dependency or neglect petition was filed and a guardian ad litem appointed for W.H. The parties stipulated at this time that the child would remain in the temporary custody of DSS pending a full detention hearing.
On the date of the full detention hearing, a retired judge was acting in the capacity of the Denver Juvenile Court Commissioner.
At the hearing before the visiting judge, several parties testified and evidence was introduced. At the conclusion, the judge made findings of fact, held that abuse of the minor had not been established, and entered an order returning temporary physical custody of W.H. to his mother and stepfather. DSS and the guardian ad litem sought a stay of the visiting judge’s order. Within the next three days, they filed a Petition for Judicial Review and a Motion for Rehearing. The judge who would ordinarily have reviewed a commissioner’s orders recused himself because of a conflict of interest. The case was reassigned for review to the presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile Court. The presiding judge declined to review the visiting judge’s order because, although the visiting judge was sitting as a commissioner, his status as a judge rendered it inappropriate for the presiding judge to review his order.
DSS and the guardian ad litem sought relief in this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21(a), and we issued a show cause order to determine whether the visiting judge erred. We now make the rule absolute.
II.
The procedural provisions of the Children’s Code control the proceedings at issue. If a law enforcement officer, physician, county department, or hospital administrator (1) reasonably believes that a child has been abused or neglected, and (2) believes that there is “a danger to that child’s life or health in the reasonably foreseeable future” by returning the child to the same person or residence, judicial authorization can be obtained to take a child into temporary protective custody. § 19-10-107, 8B C.R.S. (1986). A law enforcement officer also can take a child into temporary custody, without court order, if the child is lost, abandoned, or seriously endangered in his surroundings, and immediate removal appears necessary for the child’s protection. § 19-2-101(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Either way, the code requires notice to the child’s parent or guardian that the child has been placed in detention, and that the parent or guardian has the right to a prompt hearing. §§ 19-2-103(2), 19-10-107, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
The statutorily required temporary custody hearing is sometimes described as a shelter or detention hearing, and we have held that the word “detention” as used in section 19-2-103(2) is being used “in a generic and non-technical sense to refer to both ‘shelter custody’ and custody resulting from probable cause to believe the child has committed an act of delinquency.”
S.L. v. District Court,
676 P.2d 12, 14 n. 5 (Colo.1984);
P.F.M. v. District Court,
184 Colo. 393, 397, 520 P.2d 742, 744 (1974). The shelter or detention hearing is a pre-adjudicatory procedure which “arises from exigencies requiring
temporary emergency measures
designed to
protect
the
welfare of the child
pending further judicial proceedings.”
S.L.,
676 P.2d at 16 (emphasis added). The applicable test at the hearing is “whether the welfare of the child or of the community require that the ‘detention’ ” or shelter continue.
P.F.M.,
184 Colo. at 397, 520 P.2d at 744. The purpose of a shelter or detention hearing is not to determine a parent’s legal interest in the child; the purpose of a shelter hearing is to ensure the minor’s safety and welfare prior to adjudication.
As such, a shelter or detention hearing must be distinguished from a dependency or neglect adjudicatory hearing. “The primary purpose of a dependency adjudication ... is to furnish the ‘jurisdictional bases for State intervention to assist the parents and child in establishing a relationship and home environment that will preserve the family unit.’ ”
People in Interest of O.E.P.,
654 P.2d 312, 317 (Colo.1982) (quoting
People in Interest of A.M.D., 648
P.2d 625, 640 (Colo.1982)). At an adjudicatory hearing, the determination to be made is “whether the facts show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child is in fact neglected and dependent.”
People in Interest of K.S.,
33 Colo.App. 72, 75, 515 P.2d 130, 132 (1973).
If a child is adjudicated as dependent or neglected, the next step is a separate and distinct dispositional hearing. § 19-3-111, 8B C.R.S. (1986). At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court is authorized to make alternative dispositions, depending on the best interests of the child.
K.S.,
33 Colo.App. at 75-76, 515 P.2d at, 132. The court does not have authority to terminate the parent-child legal relationship until the dispositional stage, after a child has already been adjudicated to be neglected or dependent. § 19-3-111(2, 3), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
III.
The record here reveals that the visiting judge used the standards applicable to an adjudicatory hearing at the shelter or detention hearing before him. The purpose of the hearing from which petitioners seek relief was to determine whether continued temporary shelter, away from
the mother and stepfather, was m the best interest of W.H. and necessary for his welfare. Rather than basing his decision on whether continued temporary protective custody was in the best interest of the child, the judge applied the standards for an adjudicatory hearing. He made specific findings that allegations set forth in the dependency or neglect petition had not been established. A comparison of paragraph 5, sections (a-f) of the dependency or neglect petition on which the judge based his ruling with the language of the judge’s order
leaves no question that the judge applied the standard required at the adjudicatory stage of a dependency or neglect action
to this pre-adjudicatory hearing.
The applicable test for deciding whether to continue a child’s shelter or “detention” at the pre-adjudication shelter hearing is whether temporary protective custody is necessary for protection of the child’s welfare and best interest. This standard is much different than the test applied in deciding whether a petition in dependency or neglect has been sustained.
Based on the facts before him, and the application of an erroneous legal standard, the judge ordered that W.H. be returned to his mother and stepfather. Because the visiting judge applied the wrong standard at the shelter or detention hearing, we make the rule absolute and remand for a rehearing applying the appropriate standard for temporary protective custody.