Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States

71 Cust. Ct. 81, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3368
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedNovember 5, 1973
DocketC.D. 4479; Court No. 69/39396
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 71 Cust. Ct. 81 (Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 71 Cust. Ct. 81, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3368 (cusc 1973).

Opinion

Madetz, Judge:

This is an action by an American manufacturer challenging the classification by the government of certain imported fiberboard,1 having a density of approximately 42 pounds per cubic foot,2 under item 245.90 of the tariff schedules as “Building boards not specially provided for, whether or not face finished: * * * Other boards, of vegetable fibers (including wood fibers).” In accordance with that item, duty was assessed at 2 per centum ad valorem.

Plaintiff contends that the merchandise is “hardboard” and claims alternatively that it is properly classifiable under one of the following four provisions:

Hardboard, whether or not face finished:
Not face finished; and oil treated, whether or not regarded as tempered, but not otherwise face finished :
245.00 Valued not over $48.33% per short ton_ 12% ad val.
245.10 Valued over $48.33% but not over $96.66% per short ton_ 12% ad val., but not more than $7.25 per short ton.
245.20 Valued over $96.66% per short ton_7.5% ad val.
245.30 Other_21.5% ad val.

The parties agree that the imported merchandise consists of hard fiberboards, 7/16-inch thick, made up of wood fibers bonded under heat and pressure, having a smooth finish on one surface and a screen [83]*83finish on the other, with a density of approximately 42 pounds per cubic foot. The imported boards were manufactured under a process known in the hardboard industry as the “wet process.” In this process, wood chips are reduced to fibers and fiber bundles, to which resins, binders, and waterproofing agents are added. The resulting substances are then heated and formed into a board under a hot press.

Against this background, plaintiff contends that the common meaning of the term “hardboard” at the date of enactment of the tariff schedules in 1962 encompassed fiberboard, such as the imported merchandise, with a density less than 50 pounds per cubic foot. In contrast, the government argues that at the time of the enactment of the tariff schedules in 1962, the common meaning of the term “hardboard” did not embrace fiberboard, such as that involved here, which had a density of less than 50 pounds per cubic foot.3 Thus, the question presented is whether the common meaning of the term “hardboard” at the time of enactment of the tariff schedules encompassed fiberboard with a density less than 50 pounds per cubic foot, i.e., 42 pounds per cubic foot.

I

At the outset, it is clear that the term “hardboard” is an eo nomine designation which, without limitation or a demonstrated legislative intent, judicial decision, or administrative practice to the contrary, and without proof of commercial designation, will include all forms of the article. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., 48 CCPA 33, C.A.D. 759 (1960); Nootka Packing Co. v. United States, 22 CCPA 464, T.D. 47464 (1935); John L. Westland & Son, Inc. v. United States, 42 Cust. Ct. 229, C.D. 2091 (1959). It is equally clear that Congress is regarded as having used the name of an article in its commercial sense which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is presumed to be the common meaning the word has in ordinary use. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., supra, 48 CCPA at 35. No commercial designation having been established here, it is thus necessary to ascertain the common meaning of the imported merchandise. On this aspect, as pointed out in United States v. John B. Stetson Co., 21 CCPA 3, 9, T.D. 46319 (1933):

* * * The common meaning to be attached to a term or word used by the Congress in a provision of a tariff act is a matter to [84]*84be determined by the court having the same under consideration. In making this determination the court may rely upon its own understanding of the word or term used, and it may assist its own understanding by reference to the works of standard lexicographers, scientific authorities, the testimony of witnesses, or by such other means as may be available. If testimony be offered upon the common meaning of a statutory word or term such testimony is advisory only and has no binding effect on the court. * * *

Finally, it is axiomatic that the common meaning of an eo nomine tariff provision is to be determined and is fixed at the date of its enactment, and does not fluctuate as the meaning of words might subsequently vary. E.g., Hoyt, Shepston & Sciaroni v. United States, 52 CCPA 101, 103-104, C.A.D. 865 (1965); Davies Turner & Co. v. United States, 45 CCPA 39, 41-42, C.A.D. 669 (1957) ; United States v. Victoria Gin Co., supra, 48 CCPA at 37. Applying that principle here, it is important to observe that the date of enactment of the various hardboard provisions in the tariff schedules was May 24, 1962 — the date of enactment of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962. 76 Stat. 72. See Arthur J. Fritz & Co. v. United States, 59 CCPA 46, C.A.D. 1036 (1971); United States v. National Silver Co., 59 CCPA 64, C.A.D. 1040 (1972).

For the reasons that follow, it is concluded that in or about 1962, and prior thereto, fiberboard, such as the imported merchandise, having a density of less than 50 pounds per cubic foot, was within the common meaning of “hardboard.”

II

We turn first to the record which consists of the testimony of 5 witnesses (all of whom were called by the plaintiff), one joint exhibit (a stipulation), 21 exhibits that were introduced by plaintiff and 24 exhibits that were introduced by defendant. In the circumstances of the present case, it is believed that the record is best understood by summarizing the testimony that was presented.

Plaintiff’s first witness was Wayne C. Lewis, a research engineer for the Forest Products Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service. He obtained his degree in engineering in 1936 from the University of Wisconsin and became a registered professional engineer in the State of Wisconsin in 1940. He belongs to numerous engineering societies, among which are the Forest Products Eesearch Society and the American Society for Testing and Materials where he served as chairman of the committee on wood and chairman of the subcommittee on wood-based fiber and particle panel materials.

In 1966, Lewis received the Award of Merit and title of fellow in the American Society for Testing and Materials (hereinafter referred [85]*85to as “ASTM”) and in 1988 be won the Gottshalk Award for outstanding service to that society. Through 1971, he had published 47 papers and articles on the subject of wood, of which more than 15 dealt with hardboard.

Lewis’ employer, the Forest Products Laboratory, is a national research laboratory and deals with forest products utilization. It maintains close cooperation with, and frequently acts as consultant for, the National Bureau of Standards. During the past seven years, the Forest Products Laboratory completed a basic study on high density hardboard, which study was conceived by Lewis and the work done under his direction.

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Related

John H. Faunce, Inc. Masonite v. United States
80 Cust. Ct. 139 (U.S. Customs Court, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
71 Cust. Ct. 81, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weyerhaeuser-co-v-united-states-cusc-1973.